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Summaries in English
Essay 1: Does Debt Explain the Investment Premium?
The first essay presents new empirical findings which are inconsistent with prominent theories on
the investment premium. The investment premium is the positive stock return differential between
firms with low and high asset growth. Asset growth is the annual percentage change in total assets
and is typically interpreted as the firm’s investments. The investment premium is an integral part
of recent factor models which are fundamental tools for both finance academics and practitioners.
In the essay I present three new empirical findings. First, I show that firms with low asset
growth on average have higher financial leverage. To the extent that firms with higher leverage have
higher returns, cross-sectional differences in leverage account for part of the investment premium.
Second, I document that there is no investment premium among zero-leverage firms. Third, I find
that the investment premium increases with firms’ refinancing intensities which are the ratio of
short-term debt to total debt. These findings reflect firms’ financing decisions and are inconsistent
with prominent theories using firms’ investment decisions to explain the investment premium.
In the literature there are two prominent theories on why the investment premium exists. On
the one hand, rational theories suggest that the investment premium reflects firms’ investment de-
cisions (e.g. Cochrane (1991, 1996), Li et al. (2009), Liu et al. (2009), Berk et al. (1999), and Fama
and French (2015)). On the other hand, behavioral theories argue that the investment premium
reflects mispricing as investors do not properly incorporate information on firms’ investment deci-
sions into asset prices (e.g. Titman et al. (2004) and Cooper et al. (2008)). These theories share
two important features. First, they predict that the investment premium should also exist among
zero-leverage firms. Second, they cannot explain why the investment premium should depend on
refinancing intensities.
To explain my empirical findings I develop a new model in which firms not only make investment
decisions as in the existing literature but also make financing decisions. The model shows that the
investment premium reflects both leverage and refinancing intensities consistent with my empirical
findings. In sum, I find that debt-related risks explain part of the investment premium.
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Essay 2: Why Does Debt Dispersion Affect Yield Spreads?
The second essay investigates the well-known negative relationship between corporate bond yield
spreads and debt dispersion. Yield spreads measure firms’ debt financing costs and debt dispersion
is the extent to which firms divide their total debt financing into several debt issues. Understanding
the determinants of yield spreads remains an important task not only for finance academics but
also for finance practitioners to inform corporate policies. In the essay I examine two possible
explanations of the negative relationship between yield spreads and debt dispersion.
First, theories of rollover risk argue that firms with more dispersed debt have lower yield
spreads when they spread out the debt maturity dates across time. The reason is that firms
mitigate the adverse effects of deteriorating capital market conditions by limiting the amount of
debt that matures at a given point in time. By spreading out the repayment of debt over multiple
time periods, the firm can reduce its default risk and therefore also the yield spread.
Second, theories of strategic debt service suggest that more dispersed debt increases renegoti-
ation frictions which determine how difficult it is to renegotiate the firm’s debt. In these models
equity holders can threaten to default strategically with a view to obtain debt concessions. Higher
renegotiation frictions reduce equity holders’ incentive to default strategically. This strategic de-
fault effect reduces the probability of default and therefore also the yield spread.
Empirically, measures of debt maturity dispersion and proxies for renegotiation frictions are
often highly correlated. Both rollover risk and strategic debt service models can therefore explain
the negative relationship between yield spreads and debt dispersion. To disentangle these two
candidate explanations from each other I examine how the relationship depends on the level of fi-
nancial constraints. In rollover risk models yield spreads should decrease more with debt maturity
dispersion for financially constrained firms because they more exposed to capital market condi-
tions. I document empirically that the negative relationship is more pronounced for financially
constrained firms consistent with rollover risk theories.
In strategic debt service models the relationship between yield spreads and renegotiation fric-
tions is determined by a trade-off between two opposing effects. On the one hand, higher rene-
gotiation frictions reduce yield spreads through the strategic default effect. On the other hand,
higher renegotiation frictions also increase expected liquidation costs in bankruptcy because rene-
gotiations are more likely to fail. This recovery effect decreases recovery rates and increases yield
spreads. I show theoretically that financial constraints strengthen the recovery effect because eq-
uity holders in financially constrained firms default more often. The relationship between yield
spreads and renegotiation frictions should therefore be less negative for financially constrained
firms. My empirical results contradict this prediction.
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Essay 3: What Determines Bid-Ask Spreads in Over-the-Counter Markets?
with Peter Feldhu¨tter
The third essay studies the cross-sectional variation in bid-ask spreads, measured by realized
transaction costs, in the U.S. corporate bond market. We use the variation to test over-the-counter
(OTC) theories of why the bid-ask spread arises. Bid-ask spreads are often used to measure market
liquidity. Market liquidity influences bond prices and therefore directly affects firms’ debt financing
costs. Our findings shed new light on the ability of OTC theories to explain the cross-sectional
variation of bond bid-ask spreads.
Our analysis begins by documenting patterns in the cross-section of bid-ask spreads across bond
maturity and rating. When we sort in one dimension alone, we find that average spreads increase
with bond maturity and credit risk consistent with findings from the existing literature. When we
double-sort on maturity and rating, however, a surprising pattern emerges. Spreads for investment
grade bonds increase strongly in maturity, while spreads for speculative grade bonds show no clear
relation. For short-maturity bonds, spreads increase in credit risk while for long-maturity bonds,
spreads for bonds rated AA+ or AAA are substantially higher than other investment grade bonds.
We compare these documented patterns in bid-ask spreads to the variation in proxies motivated
by theories of the bid-ask spread in OTC markets.
We consider four theories based on inventory, dealer network, search-and-bargaining frictions,
and asymmetric information and examine the extent to which the variation in proxies explains the
variation in bid-ask spreads. We find that dealer inventory is the most important determinant of
the variation in bid-ask spreads. In inventory models dealers provide immediacy to investors and
charge a bid-ask spread to compensate for the risk that the bond price may decline while it is
in the dealer’s inventory. We also find that models based on dealer networks explain part of the
variation in bid-ask spreads especially for speculative grade bonds. In these models, the dealers’
position in the network of other dealers as well as the number of dealers involved in intermediating
a trade determines the bid-ask spread.
We also find that search-and-bargaining frictions and asymmetric information models have
limited explanatory power for bid-ask spreads. In search-and-bargaining models the bid-ask spread
depends on the easy of finding counterparties to trade with and the strength of their bargaining
power over the transaction price. In asymmetric information models some investors have private
information about the value of the security and the dealer charges a bid-ask spread to compensate
for losses incurred when trading with informed counterparties.
Taken together, we document new facts about the cross-sectional variation in bid-ask spreads
and provide new evidence on the ability of OTC theories to explain the variation.
vii
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Summaries in Danish
Essay 1: Does Debt Explain the Investment Premium?
Det første essay præsenterer nye empiriske resultater, som er inkonsistente med prominente teorier
om investeringspræmien. Investeringspræmien er det positive aktieafkastdifferentiale imellem virk-
somheder med lav og høj aktivvækst. Aktivvækst er den a˚rlige procentvise ændring i totale aktiver
og bliver typisk fortolket som virksomhedens investeringer. Investeringspræmien udgør et centralt
element i de seneste faktormodeller, som er fundamentale værktøjer for b˚ade forskere og praktikere.
Artiklen præsenterer tre nye empiriske resultater. For det første har virksomheder med lav
aktivvækst i gennemsnit højere finansiel gearing. En del af investeringspræmien kan derfor forklares
ud fra tværsnitsforskelle i gearing, s˚afremt virksomheder med højere gearing ogs˚a har højere afkast.
For det andet eksisterer der ikke nogen investeringspræmie blandt virksomheder uden gæld. For
det tredje vokser investeringspræmien med virksomheders gældsandele af kortfristet gæld. Disse
tre resultater afspejler virksomheders finansieringsbeslutninger og er inkonsistente med prominente
teorier, som forklarer investeringspræmien ud fra virksomheders investeringsbeslutninger.
I litteraturen er der to prominente teorier, som kan forklare hvorfor investeringspræmien eksis-
terer. P˚a den ene side argumenterer rationelle teorier for, at investeringspræmien afspejler virk-
somheders investeringsbeslutninger. P˚a den anden side argumenterer adfærdsøkonomiske teorier
for, at investeringspræmien skyldes investorers manglende evne til at inkorporere information ko-
rrekt i priserne p˚a finansielle aktiver. Disse to teorier har to vigtige egenskaber tilfælles. For det
første beror de begge to p˚a, at der eksisterer en investeringspræmie for virksomheder uden gæld.
For det andet kan de ikke forklare, hvorfor investeringspræmien vokser med virksomheders gæld-
sandele af kortfristet gæld. Mine empiriske resultater er derfor inkonsistente med disse to teorier
og bidrager med et nyt perspektiv p˚a den økonomiske fortolkning af investeringspræmien.
Til at forklare mine empiriske resultater udvikler jeg en ny model, hvori virksomheder træffer
b˚ade investerings- og finansieringsbeslutninger. Modellen viser, at investeringspræmien afspejler
b˚ade finansiel gearing og gældsandelen af kortfristet gæld i lighed med de empiriske resultater. Kon-
klusionen er dermed, at gældsrelaterede risici forklarer en betydelig andel af investeringspræmien.
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Essay 2: Why Does Debt Dispersion Affect Yield Spreads?
Det andet essay analyserer den velkendte negative relation imellem virksomhedsobligationers kred-
itspænd og spredning af gæld. Kreditspænd m˚aler virksomheders gældsfinansieringsomkostninger
og spredning af gæld angiver i hvor høj grad virksomheder deler deres totale gældsfinansiering op
i mindre gældsserier. Det er vigtigt for b˚ade forskere og praktikere at forst˚a determinanterne af
kreditspænd, med henblik p˚a at vejlede virksomheder bedst muligt. I artiklen undersøger jeg to
potentielle forklaringer p˚a den negative relation imellem kreditspænd og spredning af gæld.
For det første argumenterer teorier om refinansieringsrisiko for, at virksomheder med mere
spredt gæld har lavere kreditspænd, hvis de fordeler gældens forfaldstidspunkter over tid. Det
skyldes, at virksomheder kan formindske konsekvenserne af forringede kapitalmarkeder ved at
begrænse mængden af gæld, som forfalder p˚a et givet tidspunkt. Ved at sprede tilbagebetalingen
af gæld ud over flere perioder reduceres virksomhedes fallitrisiko og dermed ogs˚a kreditspændet.
For det andet argumenterer teorier om strategisk gældsservice for, at spredning af gæld øger
genforhandlingsfriktioner, som afgør hvor vanskeligt det er at genforhandle virksomhedens gæld. I
disse modeller har aktionærerne mulighed for at lade virksomheden g˚a strategisk fallit med henblik
p˚a at opn˚a gældssanering. Højere friktioner reducerer aktionærenes incitament til at g˚a strategisk
fallit. Denne strategiske falliteffekt reducerer fallitsandsynligheden og dermed ogs˚a kreditspændet.
Empirisk er der ofte en stærk korrelation imellem m˚al for spredning af gældens forfaldstid-
spunker og proxyvariable for genforhandlingsfriktioner. B˚ade teorier om refinansieringsrisiko og
strategisk gældsservice kan alts˚a forklare den negative relation imellem kreditspænd og spredning
af gæld. For at adskille disse to potentielle forklaringer fra hinanden, undersøger jeg, hvordan re-
lationen afhænger af virksomheders finansielle begrænsninger. Ifølge refinansieringsrisikomodeller
bør kreditspændet aftage i større grad med spredning af gæld for finansielt begrænsede virk-
somheder eftersom de er mere eksponerede over for kapitalmarkederne. Mine empiriske resultater
er konsistente med denne prædiktion.
I strategiske gældsservicemodeller er det en afvejning af to modsatrettede effekter, som bestem-
mer relationen imellem kreditspænd og spredning af gæld. P˚a den ene side øger spredning af gæld
genforhandlingsfriktioner og reducerer kreditspænd gennem den strategiske falliteffekt. P˚a den
anden side øger genforhandlingsfriktioner ogs˚a forventede likvidationsomkostninger i fallit efter-
som det bliver sværere at genforhandle virksomhedens gæld. Denne recovery-effekt reducerer
gældens recovery-rater og øger kreditspændet. Jeg viser teoretisk, at finansielle begrænsninger gør
recovery-effekten stærkere, fordi finansielt begrænsede virksomheder g˚ar oftere fallit. Relationen
imellem kreditspænd og spredning af gæld bør derfor være mindre negativ for finansielt begrænsede
virksomheder. Mine empiriske resultater viser det modsatte.
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Essay 3: What Determines Bid-Ask Spreads in Over-the-Counter Markets?
med Peter Feldhu¨tter
Det tredje essay undersøger tværsnitsvariationen af bid-ask spreads, som m˚ales ved realiserede
transaktionsomkostninger, i det amerikanske erhvervsobligationsmarked. Vi bruger variationen
til at teste over-the-counter (OTC) teorier om bid-ask spreads. Bid-ask spreads benyttes ofte
til at m˚ale markedslikviditet. Markedslikviditet p˚avirker obligationspriser og har dermed direkte
indflydelse p˚a virksomheders gældsfinansieringsomkostninger. Vores resultater viser, i hvor høj
grad OTC-teorier kan forklare tværsnitsvariationen af bid-ask spreads.
Først dokumenterer vi, hvordan bid-ask spreads varierer p˚a tværs af obligationers løbetid
og rating. N˚ar vi sorterer p˚a en dimension alene, s˚a stiger gennemsnitlige bid-ask spreads med
løbetid og kreditrisiko i lighed med resultater fra den eksisterende litteratur. Ved at dobbelt-
sortere p˚a løbetid og rating finder vi et overraskende mønster. Bid-ask spreads stiger tydeligt med
løbetid for investment-grade-obligationer, mens der ikke er nogen tydelig relation for speculative-
grade-obligationer. For korte obligationer stiger bid-ask spreads med kreditrisiko, hvorimod lange
obligationer med en rating p˚a AA+ eller AAA har væsentligt højere bid-ask spreads sammenlignet
med alle andre investment-grade-obligationer. Vi sammenligner disse mønstre i bid-ask spreads
med variationen i proxyvariable, som vi motiverer ud fra OTC-teorier om bid-ask spreads.
Vi betragter fire teorier baseret p˚a forhandlerbeholdning, forhandlernetværk, search-and-bargaining-
friktioner og asymmetrisk information og undersøger i hvor høj grad variation i proxyvariable fork-
larer variation i bid-ask spreads. Vores resultater viser, at forhandlerbeholding er den vigtigste
determinant af variation i bid-ask spreads. I forhandlerbeholdningsmodeller kan investorer handle
obligationer med forhandlere, som opkræver et bid-ask spread i kompensation for, at obligation-
sprisen kan ændre sig mens forhandleren har den p˚a lager. Modeller baseret p˚a forhandlernetværk
forklarer ogs˚a en del af variationen i bid-ask spreads, særligt for speculative-grade-obligationer. I
disse modeller er det forhandleres position i forhandlernetværket og ogs˚a antallet af involverede
forhandlere i en given handel, som bestemmer bid-ask spread’et.
Vores resultater viser desuden ogs˚a, at search-and-bargaining-friktioner og asymmetrisk-informations-
modeller har begrænset forklaringsgrad for bid-ask spreads. I search-and-bargaing-modeller afhænger
bid-ask spreads af hvor let det er finde modparter at hande med, men ogs˚a af deres indbyrdes
forhandlingskraft over transaktionsprisen. I asymmetrisk-informations-modeller har nogle inve-
storer privat information omkring værdien af et værdipapir og forhandleren opkræver et bid-ask
spread som kompensation for de tab, som opst˚ar ved at handle med informerede modparter.
Alt i alt bidrager artiklen med nye resultater om tværsnitsvariationen af bid-ask spreads, men
ogs˚a med at undersøge i hvor høj grad OTC-teorier om bid-ask spreads kan forklare variationen.
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Introduction
This thesis consists of three self-contained essays, which study how financial frictions influence the
pricing of equities, corporate bonds, and transaction costs. In the first essay I consider asset pricing
implications of firms’ investment and financing decisions for the cross-section of equity returns. I
show that risks related to firms’ debt structures explain a substantial fraction of the investment
premium i.e. the finding that firms with low asset growth deliver high average stock returns. In
the second essay I investigate why debt dispersion — the extent to which firms divide their total
debt financing into several debt issues — affect yield spreads on corporate bonds. I document
that the negative relationship between yield spreads and debt dispersion is more pronounced for
financially constrained firms and show that this finding is consistent with theories of rollover risk.
The third essay (co-authored with Peter Feldhu¨tter) presents new facts on the cross-section of
bid-ask spreads in the corporate bond market. We find that models based on dealer inventory and
dealer networks explain a large fraction of the variation in bid-ask spreads while models based on
search-and-bargaining frictions and asymmetric information have limited explanatory power.
Does Debt Explain the Investment Premium?
The first essay studies the pervasive empirical phenomenon in the stock market called the invest-
ment premium. The investment premium is the positive stock return differential between firms
with low and firms with high asset growth where asset growth is the annual percentage change
in total assets. In this essay I present three new empirical findings. First, I find that the in-
vestment premium reflects differences in financial leverage. Second, I document that there is no
investment premium among zero-leverage firms. And third, I find that the magnitude of the invest-
ment premium increases with firms’ refinancing intensities which are the ratio of short-term debt
to total debt. These three findings are important because they are inconsistent with prominent
explanations of the investment premium.
In the literature there are two prominent theories on why the investment premium exists.
On the one hand, rational theories argue that the investment premium reflects firms’ investment
decisions (e.g. the q-theory of investment including Cochrane (1991, 1996), Li et al. (2009), Liu
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et al. (2009), real option models such as Berk et al. (1999), and the dividend discount model
from Fama and French (2015)). On the other hand, behavioral theories argue that the invest-
ment premium reflects mispricing as investors do not properly incorporate information on firms’
investment decisions into asset prices (e.g. Titman et al. (2004) and Cooper et al. (2008)). Both
of these theories share two important features. First, they predict a positive return differential
between zero-leverage firms with low and high asset growth. Second, they cannot explain why the
return differential increases with firms’ refinancing intensities. My empirical results are therefore
inconsistent with these theories and offer a novel perspective on the economic interpretation of the
investment premium.
To explain my empirical findings I develop a new model in which firms not only make endoge-
nous investment decisions as in the existing literature but they also make endogenous financing
decisions. The model shows that the investment premium reflects both leverage and refinancing
intensities consistent with my empirical findings. Taken together, the novelty of the first essay
rests in showing that debt-related risks explain part of the investment premium.
Why Does Debt Dispersion Affect Yield Spreads?
While the first essay studies asset pricing in equity markets, the second essay considers asset
pricing in corporate bond markets. In particular, I investigate the well-known negative relationship
between yield spreads and debt dispersion1. Yield spreads measure firms’ debt financing costs and
debt dispersion is the extent to which firms divide their total debt financing into several debt issues.
I document empirically that the negative relationship between yield spreads and debt dispersion
is more pronounced for financially constrained firms. This cross-sectional variation is crucial for
understanding why debt dispersion affects yield spreads.
In the essay I examine two candidate explanations for the negative relationship between yield
spreads and debt dispersion. On the one hand, theories of rollover risk argue that firms with more
dispersed debt have lower yield spreads when they spread out debt maturity dates across time
(e.g. Choi et al. (2018)). On the other hand, theories of strategic debt service suggest that more
dispersed debt increases renegotiation frictions, which determine how difficult it is to renegotiate
the firm’s debt, and reduce equity holders’ incentive to threaten to default strategically (e.g.
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007)). In both models debt dispersion reduces yield spreads but for
different reasons.
To disentangle these two candidate explanations from each other I analyze the effects of finan-
cial constraints. In rollover risk models yield spreads should decrease more with debt maturity
1See e.g. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), Dass and Massa (2014), and Nagler (2019).
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dispersion for financially constrained firms because they more exposed to capital market conditions.
In strategic debt service models I show that the relationship should be less negative for financially
constrained firms. I document empirically that the negative relationship is more pronounced for
financially constrained firms consistent with theories of rollover risk.
What Determines Bid-Ask Spreads in Over-the-Counter Markets?
Unlike the first two essays that study asset pricing implications for corporate securities, the third
essay examines the cost of trading financial securities. More precisely, we study the cross-sectional
variation in bid-ask spreads, measured by realized transaction costs, in the U.S. corporate bond
market. It is well-documented in the literature that average bid-ask spreads increase in bond
maturity and credit risk when considering one dimension alone2.
Our first contribution is to document two new facts about bid-ask spreads by double-sorting on
both bond rating and maturity. First, we find that bid-ask spreads do not increase with maturity
for speculative grade bonds. Second, we show that long-maturity bonds rated AAA or AA+ have
significantly higher spreads than other investment grade bonds. Our results are robust to excluding
the financial crisis, adding time fixed effects, and holds separately for bonds issued by financial
and non-financial firms.
Our second contribution is to examine the relative importance of different over-the-counter
(OTC) theories ability to explain the variation in bid-ask spreads. We consider four theories based
on dealer inventory, dealer networks, search-and-bargaining frictions, and asymmetric informa-
tion. We find that dealer inventory is the most important determinant of the variation in bid-ask
spreads. Dealer network models also explain part of the variation, especially for speculative grade
bonds. Lastly, we find that search-and-bargaining frictions and asymmetric information models
have limited explanatory power for bid-ask spreads.
2See e.g. Edwards et al. (2007), Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), and Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2018).
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Chapter 1
Does Debt Explain the Investment
Premium?
Thomas Kjær Poulsen*
Abstract
The investment premium — the finding that firms with low asset growth deliver high average
returns — is an integral part of recent factor models. I document empirically that the investment
premium (1) reflects financial leverage, (2) does not exist among zero-leverage firms, and (3)
increases with firms’ refinancing intensities. This new evidence challenges prominent explanations
of the investment premium including the q-theory of investment and behavioral finance. To explain
the evidence, I develop a model in which firms make both optimal investment and financing
decisions. The model shows that the investment premium reflects both leverage and refinancing
intensities consistent with my empirical findings.
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1 Introduction
Firms with low asset growth have higher expected stock returns than firms with high asset growth1.
This return differential is the investment premium from the five-factor Fama and French (2015)
model and the q-factor model by Hou et al. (2015). Factor models are fundamental tools for both
finance academics and finance professionals. The lack of agreement on the economic interpretation
of the factors calls for more empirical evidence to inform asset pricing theories. In this paper,
I study the investment factor and document that the investment premium (1) reflects financial
leverage, (2) does not exist among zero-leverage firms, and (3) increases with firms’ refinancing
intensities. This cross-sectional variation reflects firms’ financing decisions and is inconsistent with
prominent theories using firms’ investment decisions to explain the investment premium.
On the one hand, rational theories suggest that the investment premium reflects firms’ invest-
ment decisions (e.g. the q-theory of investment including Cochrane (1991, 1996), Li et al. (2009),
Liu et al. (2009), real option models such as Berk et al. (1999), and the dividend discount model
from Fama and French (2015)). On the other hand, behavioral theories argue that the invest-
ment premium reflects mispricing as investors do not properly incorporate information on firms’
investment decisions into asset prices (e.g. Titman et al. (2004) and Cooper et al. (2008)). Both
of these theories share two important features. First, they predict a positive return differential
between zero-leverage firms with low and high asset growth. Second, they cannot explain why the
return differential increases with firms’ refinancing intensities. My empirical results are therefore
inconsistent with these theories and offer a novel perspective on the economic interpretation of the
investment premium.
I begin my empirical analysis by confirming a strong negative relationship between asset growth
and leverage consistent with the findings by Lang et al. (1996). Doshi et al. (2018) argue that
leverage explains a substantial fraction of several cross-sectional anomalies. To control for leverage,
I use their methodology to unlever stock returns and find that the investment premium decreases
from 0.32% per month with levered returns to 0.15% with unlevered returns. If firms’ investment
decisions fully explain the investment premium and if financing decisions are irrelevant, the invest-
ment premium should also exist among zero-leverage firms. I use portfolio sorts to document that
the return differential between zero-leverage firms with low and high asset growth is −0.11% per
month and statistically insignificant.
Next, I consider levered firms’ refinancing intensities and analyze how the return differential
between low and high asset-growth firms depends on this financing decision. I measure refinancing
1See e.g. Fairfield et al. (2003), Hirshleifer et al. (2004), Titman et al. (2004), Richardson et al. (2005), Anderson
and Garvia-Feijo´o (2006), Fama and French (2006, 2015), Cooper et al. (2008), Lyandres et al. (2008), Xing (2008),
Polk and Sapienza (2009), and Aharoni et al. (2013).
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intensity by the ratio of debt maturing within one year to total debt and find that the return
differential increases monotonically from 0.12% per month for firms with low refinancing intensities
to 0.64% for firms with high refinancing intensities. This increase in the return differential of 0.52%
is statistically significant and remains almost the same measured in risk-adjusted returns when I
control for exposures to common risk-factors (market, size, value, momentum, profitability, and
investments). When I control for leverage, the unlevered return differential between low and high
asset-growth firms increases with refinancing intensities by 0.33%. Leverage therefore explains
some of the cross-sectional return differential but refinancing intensities remain informative about
the investment premium.
My empirical results show that the investment premium reflects both leverage and refinanc-
ing intensities. In the time-series, I regress (levered) investment factor returns on two factors
constructed based on leverage and refinancing intensities. These two factors explain 36% of the
time-series variation in the investment factor. I develop a corporate finance model to study the
impact of leverage and refinancing intensities on the investment premium. Specifically, I integrate
the growth option from Diamond and He (2014) into the Friewald et al. (2018) model and study
implications of firms’ investment and financing decisions for expected stock returns. Consistent
with my empirical results, the model shows that the investment premium reflects both leverage
and refinancing intensities.
The model features a firm with risky debt and a growth option to increase the growth rate of
assets-in-place. Equity holders determine the firm’s investment and default policies to maximize
the value of equity. Debt overhang arises because debt and equity holders share the value from
the firm’s investments, whereas equity holders pay the entire investment cost. The firm can issue
more short-term debt to improve investment incentives and reduce debt overhang at the expense
of increasing rollover risk. Rollover risk arises because the firm retires maturing debt at principal
value and issues new debt at market value. Equity holders finance the difference between the
principal and market value of debt by issuing new equity.
The model shows that investment decisions have implications for expected stock returns. Equity
holders capture a lower share of the value from the firm’s investments the more risky the firm’s
debt and vice versa. When the firm has sufficiently risky debt, equity holders’ share of the value
from the firm’s investments is too low to justify paying the investment cost. Since equity holders
determine the investment policy, the firm does not invest when it has sufficiently risky debt. In
the model, both the riskiness of debt and the expected stock return increase with leverage. Firms
therefore invest when they have low leverage and expected stock returns are low, whereas firms do
not invest when they have high leverage and expected stock returns are high. The model predicts
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that firms with low asset growth have higher leverage and higher expected stock returns relative
to firms with high asset growth consistent with my empirical findings.
The firm jointly determines optimal leverage and debt maturity by choosing a mix between
short-term and long-term bonds. This financing decision reflects a trade-off between investment
incentives, rollover risk, and reduced-form debt benefits that reflect tax shields, reduction of agency
costs, and/or reduction of information asymmetries. If the firm has no debt benefits, it optimally
chooses zero leverage to improve investment incentives. Zero-leverage firms have no debt overhang
and always invest because the growth option has positive net present value (NPV). This means
that there is no cross-sectional variation in their investment policies and they all have the same
leverage ratio of zero. For this reason, their investment decisions remain uninformative about
expected stock returns and there is no return differential between zero-leverage firms with low and
high asset growth.
If the firm has debt benefits, it chooses an optimal mix of short and long-term debt at inception.
The fraction of short-term debt to total debt determines the refinancing intensity and the firm
commits to keep the debt principal values constant through time. Over time, leverage changes with
fluctuations in the market value of equity, whereas the refinancing intensity remains fixed. While
expected stock returns increase with both leverage for a given refinancing intensity and likewise
with the refinancing intensity for a given leverage, the model features an important interaction
effect. Expected stock returns increase faster with refinancing intensities for firms with high
leverage relative to firms with low leverage because short-term debt amplifies rollover risk. Since
firms invest when they have low leverage and do not invest when they have high leverage, this
interaction effect predicts that the return differential between firms with low and high asset growth
increases with refinancing intensities.
1.1 Related Literature
My paper is related to Friewald et al. (2018) who study implications of firms’ financing decisions
for the cross-section of expected stock returns. They find that leverage and refinancing intensities
explain a substantial fraction of the size and value factors. Doshi et al. (2018) also find that
the size and value factors reflect leverage. These two papers do not focus on the investment
factor. Prominent theories using firms’ investment decisions to explain the investment factor do
not consider financing decisions. My contribution is to study implications of both investment and
financing decisions for expected stock returns.
Rational theories on the investment factor include three main explanations. First, the q-theory
of investment predicts that firms invest more when expected stock returns are lower and vice
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versa. All else equal, firms invest more when discount rates are lower because the NPV of new
projects is higher (e.g. Cochrane (1991, 1996), Li et al. (2009), Liu et al. (2009)2, and Hou et al.
(2015)). Second, real option models show that risky growth options have higher expected returns
than less risky assets-in-place. When the firm invests, the importance of growth options relative to
assets-in-place decreases and the expected stock return decreases as well (e.g. Berk et al. (1999),
Carlson et al. (2004), Gomes et al. (2003), and Cooper (2006)). Third, Fama and French (2006,
2015) rewrite the dividend discount model and show that firms with higher expected growth in
book equity have lower expected stock returns. They argue that growth in book equity reflects
investments.
Behavioral theories on the investment factor include two main explanations. First, Cooper et al.
(2008) build on the idea from Lakonishok et al. (1994) that investors extrapolate past performance
too far into the future when they value stocks. If firms with high asset growth performed well in the
past, investors expect them to continue to do so in the future. Investors overvalue stocks in these
firms to the extent that they cannot live up to the high growth expectations going forward. When
realized asset growth falls short of expectations, the market corrects the initial overvaluation and
these stocks have low returns. Second, Titman et al. (2004) argue that investors fail to recognize
that high asset growth may reflect over-investment (see Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Jensen
(1986)). Investors therefore tend to overvalue firms with high asset growth. The subsequent low
stock returns to high asset-growth firms reflect that the market corrects the initial over-valuation.
My paper also relates to the corporate finance literature on debt overhang and rollover risk
which does not consider implications for expected stock returns. Hackbarth and Mauer (2012),
Dockner et al. (2012), Sundaresan et al. (2014), Diamond and He (2014), and Chen and Manso
(2017) study the debt overhang problem described by Myers (1977) using the conceptual framework
from Leland (1994b), Leland (1994a), Leland and Toft (1996), Leland (1998), and Goldstein et al.
(2001). The literature on rollover risk include He and Xiong (2012b), He and Milbradt (2014), and
Chen et al. (2018) and mainly focuses on credit risk implications of debt rollover and bond market
illiquidity.
2 Data and Summary Statistics
I obtain monthly stock returns from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and annual
firm characteristics from COMPUSTAT. I use the CRSP-COMPUSTAT linking table to merge the
two data sets. At the end of June in year t, I calculate accounting based variables using information
2In Liu et al. (2009), the firm finances investments using both equity and one-period debt. This model features a
leverage effect but the firm cannot choose its debt maturity. Liu et al. (2009) use leverage to improve the quantitative
fit of the model and do not analyze the relationship between investments and leverage.
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from the fiscal years ending in calendar year t − 1 and t − 2. I update all accounting variables
annually at the end of June in year t and match them with monthly returns from July of year t to
June of t + 1. This procedure ensures a minimum gap of six months between fiscal year-end and
the first following stock return.
A firm must be listed in COMPUSTAT for at least two years before it is included in the
sample to mitigate survival bias (see Fama and French (1993)). A firm must also have all data
items required to calculate asset growth, leverage, refinancing intensity, and market value. I only
consider stock returns on common equity (SHRCD equal to 10 or 11 in CRSP) from stocks listed
on NYSE, NASDAQ, or AMEX and I also include delisting returns. I exclude financials (SIC codes
6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) because they have special capital structures. If an
SIC code is not available from COMPUSTAT, I use the SIC code from CRSP. I obtain the Fama-
French factors and the risk-free rate from Kenneth French’s website. The return tests start in July
1970 and ends in June 2016. These requirements result in 1,669,994 firm-month observations from
14,727 unique firms.
I follow Fama and French (2015) and calculate the firm’s asset growth rate (AG) as the change
in total assets from the fiscal year ending in t− 2 to the fiscal year ending in t− 1 divided by total
assets from t− 2. I measure the refinancing intensity (RI ) with the ratio of debt maturing within
one year to total debt similar to Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), Stohs and
Mauer (1996), Chen et al. (2013), and Friewald et al. (2018). Leverage (LEV ) is the ratio of total
debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity at the end of December in t− 1 as in
Fama and French (1992, 1993). Size (ME ) is the market value of equity at the end of June in year
t. Appendix A contains a detailed description of all variables. Table 1 presents summary statistics
and correlations for firm characteristics as well as monthly excess returns. Before I calculate
summary statistics, I winsorize asset growth rates each month at the 1st and 99th percentiles to
mitigate the influence of potential data errors and outliers.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
3 Empirical Results
In this section, I investigate the relationship between expected stock returns and firms’ investment
and financing decisions. My empirical analysis uses portfolio sorts with NYSE breakpoints and
value-weighted returns to alleviate the impact of microcaps following Fama and French (1993,
2008, 2015) and Hou et al. (2017)3. First, I consider the relationship between the investment
3Fama and French (2008) define microcaps as stocks with a market capitalization below the 20th NYSE percentile.
They argue that these stocks can be influential in equal-weighted portfolios and Fama and MacBeth (1973) regres-
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premium and leverage. Second, I analyze zero-leverage firms because their stock returns by defi-
nition cannot reflect any debt related information. Third, I examine the relationship between the
investment premium and firms’ refinancing intensities. Fourth, I study the time-series variation in
the investment premium.
3.1 The Investment Premium and Leverage
I begin by investigating the relationship between the investment premium and leverage. Fama
and French (2015) construct the investment factor from an independent portfolio double-sort on
size and asset growth. At the end of each June, I therefore independently double-sort stocks into
two portfolios based on size and into three portfolios based on asset growth rates using NYSE
breakpoints.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
Panel A in Table 2 presents average excess returns on each of the six portfolios. Consistent
with Fama and French (2015), I find that average excess returns decrease with asset growth and
the effect is more pronounced for small firms. Panel B and C reveal a strong relationship between
asset growth and leverage. For both small and big firms, the average leverage ratio decreases
monotonically with asset growth. The differences between average leverage ratios in the low and
high asset-growth portfolios are highly statistically significant. This negative relationship between
asset growth and leverage is consistent with the empirical findings by Lang et al. (1996) and
suggests that firms’ investment and financing decisions are related.
Doshi et al. (2018) point out the challenges in controlling for leverage in the cross-section of
expected stock returns. They advocate to unlever equity returns using leverage ratios instead of
including leverage as a control variable in Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. I follow Doshi
et al. (2018) and calculate unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1 − Li(t − 1)) where RE,i(t) is
the excess return for firm i in month t and Li(t − 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end
of month t − 14. Panel D in Table 2 presents average unlevered excess returns for each of the
six portfolios constructed based on size and asset growth. With unlevered returns, the return
differentials between firms with low and high asset growth are substantially smaller compared to
using levered returns. In fact, the average return on the two low minus the average return on the
two high asset-growth portfolios is 0.15% per month (t-stat 1.86) with unlevered returns compared
sions. Hou et al. (2017) investigate 447 cross-sectional asset pricing anomalies and find that 286 of these anomalies
become statistically insignificant when using NYSE breakpoints and value-weighted portfolios.
4Doshi et al. (2018) show that using more sophisticated methods to unlever stock returns such as the Merton
(1974) model or the Leland and Toft (1996) model give virtually the same results. For this reason, I use their most
simple and model-free approach to unlever stock returns.
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to 0.32% (t-stat 3.63) with levered returns. Leverage therefore explains a substantial fraction of
the investment premium.
3.2 The Investment Premium and Zero-Leverage Firms
If firms’ investment decisions fully explain the investment premium and if financing decisions are
irrelevant, the investment premium should also exist among zero-leverage firms. In this section,
I therefore analyze the return differential between zero-leverage firms with low and high asset
growth. Zero-leverage firms are important for at least two reasons. First, several theories on the
investment premium explicitly consider zero-leverage firms and therefore predict a positive return
differential between zero-leverage firms with low and high asset growth. Second, zero-leverage
firms represent the only firm type in the data without any cross-sectional variation in leverage
simply because they have no debt.
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort my sample of zero-leverage firms into
two portfolios based on size and into two portfolios based on asset growth rates using NYSE
breakpoints. I sort zero-leverage firms based on size to mitigate the influence of the biggest firms
in the value-weighted portfolios by allocating these firms to separate portfolios. I need accounting
information from the fiscal years ending in year t− 2 and t− 1 to calculate asset growth. I follow
Strebulaev and Yang (2013) and define firm i as zero-leverage if in both years t− 2 and t− 1 the
outstanding amounts of both short-term debt (DLC ) and long-term debt (DLTT ) equal zero. My
sample of zero-leverage firms features 164, 337 firm-month observations from 3, 278 unique firms.
In an average year, zero-leverage firms constitute 9.90% of all firms and account for 4.01% of total
market capitalization.
[INSERT TABLE 3]
Panel A in Table 3 shows average excess returns on the low and high asset-growth portfolios
for small and big firms. The average excess return of the small and big Low-High AG portfolios
is −0.11% per month and statistically insignificant. Even for small firms where the asset-growth
effect is more pronounced cf. Table 2, the return differential is 0.12% and statistically insignificant.
For big firms, the return differential is −0.34% and statistically insignificant. These results show
that there is no investment premium among zero-leverage firms. Panel B reports value-weighted
spreads in asset growth of −48.80% for small firms and −35.34% for big firms resulting in an
average spread of −42.07%. For comparison, the full sample has an average spread in asset growth
of −51.72% cf. Panel B in Table 2. The fact that there is no positive return differential between
zero-leverage firms with low and high asset growth is therefore not driven by a lack of a meaningful
spread in asset growth.
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Panel C shows the average number of stocks in each of the four portfolios. The two portfolios
of big firms contain a fairly small number of stocks and in particular during the early part of the
sample period. The big portfolio with the lowest number of stocks contains only three stocks in a
particular month cf. Panel D. This feature of the data reflects that I use NYSE size breakpoints to
construct portfolios and most zero-leverage firms are not listed on NYSE. NYSE firms are typically
much larger and few firms listed on NASDAQ or AMEX are large enough to be included in the
big portfolios5. As a robustness check in Section 3.5, I consider the larger sample of firms with
non-positive net debt which has a higher number of stocks in each portfolio. I also find that there
is no investment premium among these firms.
Testing theories on the investment premium
The empirical fact that there is no return differential between zero-leverage firms with low and high
asset growth is inconsistent with prominent theories on the investment premium. Rational theories
such as the dividend discount model and the real option models predict a positive return differential
for zero-leverage firms. The q-theory of investment may potentially explain the non-existing return
differential but only in the unlikely case that zero-leverage firms have zero adjustment costs of
capital. Li and Zhang (2010) and Lam and Wei (2011) use financing constraints to proxy for
adjustment costs of capital when they test predictions from q-theory. The empirical evidence
from Devos et al. (2012) and Bessler et al. (2013) suggest that zero-leverage firms have severe
financial constraints. Geelen (2017) shows theoretically that adverse selection costs preclude zero-
leverage firms from issuing debt. These papers therefore suggest that zero-leverage firms are more
financially constrained in which case q-theory predicts a positive return differential among these
firms.
Behavioral theories such as the over-extrapolation hypothesis from Cooper et al. (2008) does
not distinguish between zero-leverage and levered firms. This theory therefore predicts a positive
return differential also among zero-leverage firms. According to Jensen (1986) and Titman et al.
(2013), zero-leverage firms likely have the highest agency costs because they have no debt forcing
management to pay out part of the free cash flow. The over-investment hypothesis therefore
predicts a higher positive return differential between zero-leverage firms with low and high asset
growth. My empirical findings do not support any of these predictions.
5In an average month, the median NYSE-zero-leverage firm is more than four times larger than the median
NASDAQ-zero-leverage firm and more than fifteen times larger than the median AMEX-zero-leverage firm. If I
instead use NYSE-AMEX-NASDAQ breakpoints to construct portfolios of zero-leverage firms, the portfolio with the
lowest average number of stocks contain 53 stocks in an average month and the lowest number of stocks is 12. Using
these breakpoints, the value-weighted return differential between zero-leverage firms with low and high asset growth
is a statistically insignificant −0.03% per month measured in excess returns.
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3.3 The Investment Premium and Refinancing Intensities
In this section, I examine another aspect of firms’ financing decisions namely their refinancing
intensities. Friewald et al. (2018) show that controlling for refinancing intensities, expected stock
returns increase with leverage. Since asset growth is negatively related to leverage in the data, I
also analyze if the investment premium reflects refinancing intensities. Importantly, none of the
prominent theories on the investment premium feature any testable predictions on firms’ refinanc-
ing intensities.
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into five portfolios based on refi-
nancing intensities and into five portfolios based on asset growth rates using NYSE breakpoints6.
I present average excess returns on the 25 portfolios with value-weighted returns in Table 4. In
each asset-growth quintile, I construct a High-Low RI portfolio that buys the High RI portfolio
and sells the Low RI portfolio. In each refinancing quintile, I construct a Low-High AG portfolio
that buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the High AG portfolio. Lastly, I also calculate the
return differential of buying the Low-High AG portfolio for firms with high refinancing intensities
and selling the Low-High AG portfolio for firms with low refinancing intensities. This portfolio
measures how the return differential between low and high asset-growth firms depends on the
refinancing intensity.
[INSERT TABLE 4]
Panel A in Table 4 shows that average excess returns decrease with asset growth in all refinanc-
ing quintiles. The Low-High AG column shows that the return differential between firms with low
and high asset growth increases monotonically with refinancing intensities from 0.12% to 0.64%
per month. The Low-High AG return differential is therefore 0.52% higher for firms with high
refinancing intensities compared to firms with low refinancing intensities. This finding means that
the magnitude of the investment premium increases with firms’ refinancing intensities.
Panel B presents the average leverage ratio for each portfolio. Consistent with my previous
findings, leverage decreases with asset growth within each refinancing quintile. The return differ-
ential between firms with low and high asset growth therefore partly reflects a leverage effect. To
control for leverage, I repeat the independent portfolio double-sort based on refinancing intensities
and asset growth using unlevered returns instead of levered returns. Panel C shows that average
excess returns continue to decrease with asset growth in most refinancing quintiles. The average
excess returns on the Low-High AG portfolios are smaller with unlevered returns but leverage only
6I obtain qualitatively and quantitatively similar results when I independently triple-sort stocks into two portfolios
based on size, five portfolios based on refinancing intensities, and five portfolios based on asset growth rates. I present
the results from the independent portfolio double-sort because they are simpler to describe.
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explains part of the return differential. In fact, the unlevered return differential is 0.33% per month
higher for firms with high refinancing intensities compared to firms with low refinancing intensi-
ties. This finding suggests that refinancing intensities convey information about the investment
premium even when controlling for leverage.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
In Table 5, I test if my finding that the return differential between low and high asset-growth
firms increases with refinancing intensities can be explained by exposures to common risk-factors.
For each refinancing quintile, I calculate alpha estimates from regressing the Low-High AG port-
folio excess returns on the market, the three Fama-French factors (market, size, and value), the
four factors (market, size, value, and momentum), and the five Fama-French factors (market, size,
value, profitability, and investments). Panel A presents alpha estimates for levered returns. The
first column shows that CAPM alphas increase from 0.19% to 0.77% per month. Importantly, the
High-Low RI portfolio shows that the return differential between low and high asset-growth firms
is 0.58% higher in firms with high refinancing intensities relative to firms with low refinancing in-
tensities. Risk-adjusted returns using three, four, and five factors have almost the same magnitude
and remain statistically significant.
Panel B shows risk-adjusted return differentials based on unlevered returns. Consistent with my
previous findings, the unlevered return differentials remain smaller than levered return differentials.
For CAPM alphas, the return differential between firms with low and high asset growth increases
from 0.13% per month for firms with low refinancing intensities to 0.53% for firms with high
refinancing intensities. The CAPM alpha on the High-Low RI portfolio is 0.41% and remains
statistically significant. Risk-adjusted returns using three, four, and five factors have almost the
same magnitude. Taken together, the risk-adjusted portfolio returns support my finding that the
investment premium increases with firms’ refinancing intensities.
Testing theories on the investment premium
Prominent theories on the investment premium cannot explain why the return differential increases
with firms’ refinancing intensities. Jensen (1986) points out that debt reduces agency costs of free
cash flows by committing management to service debt payments. If the investment premium
reflects that investors under-react to over-investment, the return differential between low and
high asset-growth firms should be larger in firms with higher agency costs. The firm can use its
debt maturity to discipline management from engaging in value-decreasing investments. Short-
term debt commits the firm to frequently raise new debt in capital markets to roll over maturing
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debt. Since capital markets reevaluate the firm’s prospects as part of the valuation of new debt
issuances, firms with short-term debt should have lower agency costs. In turn, the over-investment
hypothesis from Titman et al. (2004) predicts a smaller return differential for firms with high
refinancing intensities because they have lower agency costs. My results directly contradict this
prediction.
The dividend discount model, real option models, the q-theory of investment, and the over-
extrapolation hypothesis do not feature any directly testable predictions on refinancing intensities.
Li and Zhang (2010) and Lam and Wei (2011) point out that it is challenging to disentangle can-
didate explanations of the investment premium in the data. For example, q-theory predicts that
the return differential should increase with investment frictions because frictions make investment
less responsive to changes in the discount rate. Behavioral theories predict a larger return dif-
ferential in firms with stocks that have high limits-to-arbitrage because rational investors find it
more challenging to step in and correct the mispricing. If measures of investment frictions, limits-
to-arbitrage, and refinancing intensities are highly correlated then it is challenging to disentangle
the predictions from each other. To explore this possibility, I calculate Spearman rank correlations
between measures of investment frictions, limits-to-arbitrage, and refinancing intensities.
Li and Zhang (2010) and Lam and Wei (2011) use several proxies to measure investment fric-
tions and limits-to-arbitrage. They hypothesize that firms with high investment frictions have
smaller asset size, lower payout rates, and are younger. Firms with high limits-to-arbitrage have
high idiosyncratic stock volatility, low stock price, high bid-ask spread, high Amihud (2002) illiq-
uidity measure, and low dollar volume. Appendix A contains a detailed description of all variables.
Table 6 presents Spearman rank correlations between these measures and refinancing intensities.
Consistent with Li and Zhang (2010) and Lam and Wei (2011), I find high correlations between
measures of investment frictions and measures of limits-to-arbitrage. However, Table 6 shows
only modest correlations between refinancing intensities and these measures. This finding suggests
that refinancing intensities convey information not captured by investment frictions or limits-to-
arbitrage.
[INSERT TABLE 6]
It is also not clear from the theoretical literature on debt maturity that we should expect firms
with short-term debt to have high investment frictions. For example, Diamond (1991) predicts an
inverse U-shape between debt maturity and credit risk when firms trade off lower borrowing costs
of short-term debt against higher refinancing risk. Chen et al. (2013) show that firms with higher
exposure to systematic risk choose longer debt maturities. Dangl and Zechner (2015) find that
short-term debt typically increases firms’ debt capacities. To the extent that higher credit risk,
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higher systematic risk, and lower debt capacity are associated with higher investment frictions, we
should not expect firms with short-term debt to have high investment frictions.
For the limits-to-arbitrage measures, it is not clear from the literature how and if they should
be related to debt maturity. Chen et al. (2013) and Friewald et al. (2018) show that firms with
higher idiosyncratic volatility issue more short-term debt because long-term debt becomes relatively
more expensive. Since stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility have high limits-to-arbitrage, it is
challenging to disentangle the predictions based on limits-to-arbitrage and refinancing intensities
using this measure. Taken together, my results suggest that the higher return differential among
firms with high refinancing intensities does not simply reflect higher investment frictions or higher
limits-to-arbitrage.
3.4 Time-Series Variation in the Investment Factor
My cross-sectional results show that the investment premium reflects leverage and refinancing
intensities. In this section, I study to what extent leverage and refinancing intensities explain the
time-series variation in the investment factor.
I follow Fama and French (2015) and construct the investment factor as follows. At the end
of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into two portfolios based on size and into three
portfolios based on asset growth rates using NYSE breakpoints. This procedure generates a cross-
section of 2 × 3 = 6 portfolios. The investment factor is the average return on the two low
asset-growth portfolios (small and big) minus the average return on the two high asset-growth
portfolios using value-weighted portfolios. I use the same procedure to construct two factors based
on leverage and refinancing intensities. The leverage factor is the average return on the two high-
leverage portfolios (small and big) minus the average return on the two low-leverage portfolios.
The refinancing-intensity factor is long stocks with high refinancing intensities and short stocks
with low refinancing intensities. I regress the time-series of investment factor returns on the two
factors based on leverage and refinancing intensities and present the results in Table 7.
[INSERT TABLE 7]
The first column in Table 7 shows that the investment premium in my sample is 0.32% per
month and statistically significant. In column (2), I regress investment factor returns on the
leverage factor and find that the intercept decreases to 0.23% and remains statistically significant.
The investment factor has positive loading on the leverage factor and the adjusted R2 of the
regression is 34.16%. When I only include the refinancing-intensity factor in the regression then
the loading is close to zero and statistically insignificant while the intercept is virtually unchanged.
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This finding suggests that refinancing intensities alone has no explanatory power for the time-
series variation of the investment factor. When I include both factors in the regression, the
loading on each factor is positive and statistically significant. The adjusted R2 increases to 35.82%
and suggests that leverage and refinancing intensities jointly explain a significant fraction of the
investment premium.
3.5 Robustness Checks
This section summarizes robustness checks which I include in the Internet Appendix. Table IA.1-
IA.4 show that my results are robust to using equal-weighted portfolios. In addition to zero-
leverage firms, Strebulaev and Yang (2013) also consider firms with zero long-term debt, almost
zero-leverage firms, and firms with non-positive net debt7. I also analyze the return differential
between firms with low and high asset growth for these firm types. I only report the results for
firms with non-positive net debt in the Internet Appendix because it gives the largest sample and
the other firm types give similar results (result are available upon request). My sample of firms
with non-positive net debt features 518, 505 firm-month observations from 7, 741 unique firms. In
an average year, firms with non-positive net debt constitute 30.31% of all firms and account for
23.83% of total market capitalization. Table IA.5 shows that the return differential between low
and high asset-growth firms remains close to zero and statistically insignificant.
The number of portfolios to sort stocks into is arguably an arbitrary choice. I therefore also
conduct the independent double-sorts based on refinancing intensities and asset growth for a dif-
ferent number of portfolios. I keep the number of portfolios based on asset growth fixed to ensure
that each portfolio contains a reasonable number of stocks. The difference between the return
differential in firms with low and high refinancing intensities should increase with the number
of portfolios because the difference between the average refinancing intensity in the highest and
lowest portfolio increases as well. Table IA.6 shows that the return differential increases with the
number of portfolios.
In the main analysis, I use independent portfolio double-sorts to analyze the relationship be-
tween asset growth and refinancing intensities. The number of stocks in each portfolio can therefore
vary considerably. My sample features a large cross-section of stocks and the portfolio with the
lowest number of stocks in the 5 × 5 sorts contains 62 stocks on average and the lowest number
of stocks is 29. To mitigate the concern that the portfolios are not well-diversified, I repeat the
main analysis using conditional double-sorts. At the end of each June, I first sort stocks into five
7Firms with zero long-term debt have DLTT = 0, almost zero-leverage firms have DLC+DLTT
AT
≤ 5%, and
firms with non-positive net debt have DLTT + DLC − CHE ≤ 0. Capitalized acronyms correspond to annual
COMPUSTAT items.
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portfolios based on refinancing intensities and then into five portfolios based on asset growth rates.
The remainder of the portfolio analysis is identical to the independent double-sorts. I also perform
conditional double-sorts by first sorting on asset growth and subsequently sorting on refinancing
intensities. The results are qualitatively similar and I present these results in Table IA.7-IA.10.
I also consider different measures of refinancing intensities and asset growth. Almeida et al.
(2012) and Gopalan et al. (2014) calculate the refinancing intensity with the ratio of debt maturing
within one year to total assets. Lipson et al. (2011) show that the change in total assets, which I
use to measure asset growth, largely subsumes other measures of asset growth. Nonetheless, I also
consider the investment-to-asset ratio from Lyandres et al. (2008) as a further robustness check of
my results8. Table IA.11-IA.16 show that my results are qualitatively similar with these measures
but quantitatively less pronounced.
Finally, I also repeat the main analysis using Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions. The
dependent variable is either the excess stock return or the unlevered excess stock return in month t+
1 while the independent variables are characteristics in month t. I present the time-series averages
of monthly coefficient estimates from cross-sectional Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions in Table
IA.17-IA.19 in the Internet Appendix. For the cross-sectional regressions, I use either ordinary least
squares estimates (equal-weighted) or weighted least squares with the market value of equity as
the weighting scheme (value-weighted). The value-weighted Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions
mitigate the influence of small stocks.
Table IA.17 shows that the negative coefficient estimates on asset growth are substantially
smaller with unlevered excess returns compared to (levered) excess returns. This result supports
my finding that leverage explains a substantial fraction of the investment premium. In addition,
Table IA.18 shows that the coefficient estimates on asset growth are statistically insignificant for
zero-leverage firms. This result means that there is no investment premium for zero-leverage
firms. To analyze how the investment premium depends on firms’ refinancing intensities, I regress
future returns on asset growth, refinancing intensities, and the interaction between asset growth
and refinancing intensities. The coefficient estimates on the interaction term are negative and
economically large suggesting that the investment premium is more pronounced for firms with
high refinancing intensities but the coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant.
8At the end of June in year t, the refinancing intensity is given by
DD1t−1
ATt−1 and the investment-to-asset ratio is
∆PPEGTt−1+∆INV Tt−1
ATt−2 . Capitalized acronyms correspond to annual COMPUSTAT items.
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4 The Model
In this section, I develop a corporate finance model by integrating the investment option from
Diamond and He (2014) into the Friewald et al. (2018) model. The purpose of the model is to
study the impact of leverage and refinancing intensities on the investment premium. Friewald et al.
(2018) study implications of firms’ financing decisions for the cross-section of expected stock returns
and do not consider investment decisions. Diamond and He (2014) do not analyze implications for
expected stock returns. My contribution is to study implications of both investment and financing
decisions for expected stock returns within a unified model.
4.1 Firm Fundamental
The firm has assets-in-place that generate cash flows at a rate of Xt > 0. The cash flows follow a
geometric Brownian motion under the equivalent martingale measure Q:
dXt = i˜tXtdt+ σXtdZt (1)
where i˜t is the risk-neutral growth rate, σ is the volatility, and dZt is the increment of a standard
Brownian motion {Zt : 0 ≤ t <∞} under Q. One can show that the value of the firm’s assets-in-
place share their dynamics with Xt because assets-in-place denote a claim to the entire cash flow
stream. I refer to the firm’s cash flows and assets-in-place interchangeably in the remainder of the
paper.
At each instant in time, the equity holders endogenously determine the growth rate i˜t of assets-
in-place. The growth rate can take two values i˜t = {0, i} with i > 0. When i˜t = 0 the firm does not
invest and when i˜t = i the firm invests. The firm pays an instantaneous investment cost λiXtdt
when it invests. Diamond and He (2014) show that equity holders use a threshold investment
strategy i.e. they invest when the current cash flow Xt exceeds an endogenous investment boundary
Xi. If the firm always invests, the expected present value of the cash flow stream is:
EQt
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t) (Xs − λiXs) ds
]
=
1− λi
r − i Xt
If the firm never invests, the expected present value of the cash flow stream is Xtr . I follow Diamond
and He (2014) and assume λr < 1 to ensure that the growth option has positive net present value.
When λr < 1, a zero-leverage firm will always choose to invest because the market value of the firm
with investments 1−λir−i Xt is strictly greater than the market value of the firm without investments
Xt
r . A levered firm with risky debt, however, will not always invest because of debt overhang.
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4.2 Debt and Equity
The firm chooses a mix between short-term zero-coupon bonds (S) and long-term zero coupon
bonds (L) at time t = 0 similar to Friewald et al. (2018). Each bond type j = {S,L} has an
aggregate principal value P j and the total principal value corresponds to P = PS + PL. Each
bond matures at a random point in time and the maturity event follows a Poisson occurrence
with intensity φj . Each bond therefore has an expected maturity of 1/φj years as in Cheng and
Milbradt (2012), He and Xiong (2012a), and Chen et al. (2018). I assume that φS > φL to ensure
that S has a shorter expected maturity than L.
I follow Friewald et al. (2018) and assume that the firm obtains a flow of debt benefits kφjP j
with scaling factor k > 0 when it issues debt9. Short-term debt offers more debt benefits relative
to long-term debt since φS > φL to reflect lower fixed issuance costs, better market liquidity, and
the potential to reduce agency costs and/or information asymmetries (see for example Flannery
(1986), Diamond (1991), Datta et al. (2005), Brockman et al. (2010), He and Milbradt (2014), Chen
et al. (2013), and Custo´dio et al. (2013)). Intuitively, this relative advantage of short-term debt
reflects the additional benefits over and above the fact that short-term debt improves investment
incentives. The firm commits to keep the aggregate principal values constant through time. This
stationary debt structure implies that at each instant in time, the firm retires an expected principal
amount of φSPS+φLPL and issues new bonds to keep the principal values constant10. The newly-
issued zero-coupon bonds sell at market value and have the same principal value and seniority as
the retired bonds they replace.
When the market value of debt differs from the principal value, the firm incurs expected rollover
losses of
∑
j φ
j [Dj(Xt)− P j ] where Dj(Xt) denotes the market value of bond j11. Maturing debt
holders receive the full principal value while equity holders finance rollover losses by issuing new
equity. Debt rollover therefore features a conflict of interests between equity and debt holders.
When cash flows decrease, equity holders service debt payments as long as the option value of
keeping the firm alive remains positive. For some positive starting value of the cash flow process,
X0, the firm defaults when Xt reaches a lower endogenous default boundary XB. The absolute
priority rule applies and the firm loses its growth option in bankruptcy. Debt holders recover the
9This assumption ensures that the firm has an incentive to issue debt. The Diamond and He (2014) model features
no debt benefits and instead allows the firm to choose its optimal debt maturity for a fixed (sub-optimal) amount of
debt. The implications of the firm’s investment and financing decisions for expected stock returns, however, remain
qualitatively the same in the Diamond and He (2014) model and in the model I present.
10Leland (1994a), Leland and Toft (1996), and Leland (1998) likewise assume stationary debt structures.
11The firm always incur rollover losses with zero-coupon bonds. If the firm instead issues fixed-rate coupon bonds
at par values at time t = 0 then the firm may face both rollover gains and losses at time t > 0. This feature, however,
does not qualitatively affect the results and I therefore consider zero-coupon bonds to keep the model as simple as
possible.
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value of assets-in-place without investments proportionally to their share of the total principal i.e.
proportional to P j/P . These assumptions translate into the following value-matching conditions
at XB:
E(XB) = 0, D
j(XB) =
XB
r
θj (2)
where E(Xt) is the market value of equity, r is the risk-free rate, and θ
j is the fraction of debt j
to total debt i.e. θj = P j/P .
The firm’s investment policy introduces an additional conflict of interest between equity and
debt holders. When the firm invests, the higher asset growth tends to push the firm away from
the default boundary over time. Debt holders benefit from the firm’s investments because debt
becomes safer and hence more valuable. Equity holders pay the entire investment cost but only
capture part of the value from the firm’s investments. The equity holders therefore have low
incentives to invest when a large share of the value from the firm’s investments accrues to debt
holders. Debt overhang implies a non-investment region when XB < Xt < Xi where the firm does
not invest despite the fact that investment at each instant in time maximizes firm value. This
non-investment region reflects that equity holders maximize the value of equity and not the value
of the firm. I provide the technical details for the valuation of debt and equity in closed-form in
Appendix B.
4.3 Default and Investment Boundaries
Equity holders determine the endogenous default and investment boundaries to maximize the value
of equity following the inaugural debt issue. The two boundaries satisfy the following smooth
pasting conditions:
∂E(X)
∂X
∣∣∣∣
X=XB
= 0,
∂E(X)
∂X
∣∣∣∣
X=Xi
= λ (3)
These smooth pasting conditions give rise to a system of non-linear equations, which I solve
numerically for the default and investment boundaries. The boundaries characterize the optimal
default and investment policies for a given choice of principal values P j = {PS , PL}.
4.4 Optimal Leverage and Refinancing Intensity
At time t = 0, the firm chooses the principal amounts of short and long-term debt to maximize
the value of the firm. The optimal principal amounts P j∗ solve the maximization problem:
{PS∗, PL∗} = arg max
PS ,PL
(
E(X0) +D(X0)
)
(4)
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subject to the constraints from equation (3) and the requirements that Dj(XB) < P
j/(1 + r/φj)
for j = {S,L}. This requirement ensures that there is an interior optimum refinancing intensity.
Intuitively, the requirement states that the firm cannot issue risk-free debt which would eliminate
the debt overhang problem. The optimal principal amounts are not available in closed-form and
must be determined numerically. By choosing the principal amounts of short and long-term debt,
the firm jointly chooses optimal leverage and refinancing intensity.
Consistent with the measures of leverage and refinancing intensities from the empirical analysis
above, I define the firm’s leverage ratio L(Xt) as:
L(Xt) =
P
P + E(Xt)
(5)
and I measure the firm’s refinancing intensity by the ratio of short-term debt principal to total
debt principal:
θS =
PS
PS + PL
(6)
4.5 Expected Stock Return
I derive the value of debt and equity from the Q–dynamics of the cash flow process Xt in Appendix
B. The calculation of the expected stock return requires the P–dynamics of Xt. For simplicity, I
assume a constant risk premium ξ and remain silent on the structure of the pricing kernel that
determines the value of the underlying cash flow process in equation (1). The expected stock
return is therefore given by:
EPt [Rt] = r + βtξ (7)
where the conditional equity beta is:
βt =
dlogE(Xt)
dXt
5 Model Predictions
In this section, I parameterize the model and explain the trade-off between investment incentives,
debt benefits, and rollover risk that determines optimal leverage and refinancing intensity. Next, I
consider implications of investment and financing decisions for the cross-section of expected stock
returns.
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5.1 Optimal Leverage and Refinancing Intensity
I use the parameter values from Diamond and He (2014) and Friewald et al. (2018) and set X0 = 1,
r = 10%, σ = 15%, i = 7%, and k = 1%. At time t = 0, the firm determines the optimal mix
between a short-term zero-coupon bond with one-year expected maturity (φS = 1) and a long-term
zero-coupon bond with ten-year expected maturity (φL = 0.1) to maximize firm value. For a given
level of the investment cost λ, I consider the firm’s optimal choices of leverage and refinancing
intensity.
[INSERT FIGURE 1]
Panel A in Figure 1 shows optimal leverage as a function of the investment cost λ12. This
relationship reflects the firm’s trade-off between investment incentives and debt benefits. On the
one hand, the value of debt benefits increases as the firm issues more debt. On the other hand,
the value of the growth option decreases with the amount of debt because debt distorts investment
incentives. As λ increases, it becomes more expensive to invest and the value of the growth option
decreases. In turn, the firm has greater incentive to exploit debt benefits compared to improving
investment incentives. The optimal leverage therefore increases with λ.
Panel B in Figure 1 displays the optimal principal values of short-term debt PS and long-term
debt PL as a function of λ. Consistent with the findings on optimal leverage in Panel A, the
total amount of debt P = PS + PL increases with λ. The figure also shows that the amount of
long-term debt increases with λ whereas the amount of short-term debt decreases. This finding
has implications for the firm’s refinancing intensity.
Panel C in Figure 1 displays the optimal refinancing intensity θS as a function of λ. This
relationship reflects the firm’s trade-off between rollover risk and investment incentives. On the
one hand, the firm improves investment incentives by using more short-term debt relative to long-
term debt. This feature comes from the fact that the value of short-term debt is less sensitive to
the firm’s assets-in-place compared to long-term debt. Short-term debt holders therefore share less
of the benefits from the firm’s investments with equity holders when assets-in-place increase. On
the other hand, the firm’s rollover risk increases with the amount of short-term debt relative to
long-term debt. Short-term debt holders share fewer losses with equity holders when assets-in-place
decrease and the firm therefore defaults earlier. Since the value of the growth option decreases
12Friewald et al. (2018) emphasize that it is challenging to match the level of several measures from their model
(most importantly leverage ratios) with corresponding measures in the real world. I face the same challenge because
I extend their model by incorporating the investment option from Diamond and He (2014). Similar to Friewald et al.
(2018), the purpose of my theoretical analysis is to study the structural relationships between key variables in a
stylized model and to consider implications for expected stock returns. I refer to Strebulaev and Whited (2012) for
a more elaborate discussion on the general challenges corporate finance models have in terms of matching real-world
quantities.
24
with λ, the firm has greater incentive to reduce rollover risk compared to improving investment
incentives the higher the value of λ. For this reason, the optimal refinancing intensity decreases
with λ.
Panel D in Figure 1 depicts the investment and default boundaries as functions of λ. The
investment boundary Xi lies above the default boundary XB when λ > 0. As λ increases, it
becomes more expensive to invest and the firm endogenously chooses higher leverage and lower
refinancing intensity. This financing choice impairs investment incentives and Xi increases. Since
the value of the growth option decreases with λ, equity holders become less willing to keep the
firm alive when assets-in-place deteriorate and this tends to increase XB. The fact that the firm
endogenously chooses higher leverage also tends to increase XB. The lower refinancing intensity,
however, reduces rollover risk and tends to decrease XB. Nonetheless, the two former effects
dominate the latter and XB increases with λ. In the limiting case where λ → 0 then Xi → XB
because the firm always invests when the investment cost approaches zero. In this case, the model
reduces to Friewald et al. (2018) as a special case.
5.2 Expected Stock Returns
The previous section considered the firm’s optimal financing decisions at time t = 0. At time
t > 0 most firms deviate from their optimal capital structures (see e.g. Leary and Roberts (2005)
and Strebulaev (2007)). In this section, I therefore consider implications of firms’ investment and
financing decisions for the cross-section of expected stock returns at time t > 0. First, I explore the
relationship between investments and expected stock returns which gives rise to a return differential
consistent with the investment premium. Second, I investigate the return differential among zero-
leverage firms. Third, I analyze how the return differential depends on firms’ refinancing intensities.
Investments and Expected Stock Returns
I set the asset risk-premium to ξ = 1% and analyze the relationship between the firm’s investment
policy and expected stock returns at time t > 0. The model has a constant risk-free rate and I
refer to the expected excess stock return as the expected stock return below. Consider a single
firm with λ = 9.5 which chooses its optimal leverage and refinancing intensity at time t = 0. The
firm’s refinancing intensity remains fixed over time but leverage does not. At time t > 0, the
firm’s current leverage deviates from its optimal leverage whenever Xt 6= X0. The firm invests
when Xt ≥ Xi = 0.67 and defaults when Xt = XB = 0.61. Debt overhang makes equity holders
unwilling to invest when XB < Xt < Xi even though the growth option has positive NPV.
[INSERT FIGURE 2]
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Panel A in Figure 2 shows the expected stock return as a function of the firm’s assets-in-place
Xt. Consider two identical firms, A and B, with the same value of Xt. Suppose Firm A experiences
a negative shock to assets and Firm B experiences a positive shock. Since the principal amount
of debt P remains fixed over time, Firm A’s current leverage increases whereas Firm B’s current
leverage decreases. Panel B in Figure 2 shows that the expected stock return increases with current
leverage because the conditional equity beta increases. After the shock to assets-in-place, Firm
A has a higher expected stock return, whereas Firm B has a lower expected stock return. If we
construct a portfolio that is long Firm A with low asset growth and short Firm B with high asset
growth, the return differential is positive and consistent with the investment premium.
This mechanism, however, does not imply an investment premium in the cross-section. To see
why, consider two firms C and D with different Xt and all other parameters identical. Suppose
Firm C has a high Xt and Firm D has a low Xt. Now, Firm C experiences a negative shock to
assets and Firm D experiences a positive shock. Firm C moves to a higher expected stock return
but it remains a low level. Similarly, Firm D moves to a lower expected stock return but it remains
at a high level. In this case, if we construct a portfolio that is long Firm C and short Firm D, the
return differential is negative and inconsistent with the investment premium.
In contrast, debt overhang gives rise to an optimal investment policy with implications for the
cross-section of stock returns. Equity holders have low incentives to invest when a large share of
the value from the firm’s investments accrues to debt holders. As the firm’s assets-in-place decrease
and debt becomes more risky, the sensitivities of the debt claims to assets-in-place increase. Debt
holders therefore capture an increasing share of the value from the firm’s investments, the lower
the assets-in-place. This feature entails that equity holders do not invest when the firm’s assets-
in-place become sufficiently low because their share of the value from the firm’s investments is too
low to justify paying the investment cost.
The solid lines in Figure 2 denote the non-investment region where the asset growth rate is
i˜t = 0% and the dotted lines denote the investment region where i˜t = 7%. Firms with high asset
growth are in the investment region where leverage and the expected stock return is low, whereas
firms with low asset growth are in the non-investment region where leverage and the expected stock
return is high13. If we construct a portfolio that is long firms with low asset growth and short
firms with high asset growth, the return differential is positive and consistent with the investment
13Since asset volatility is constant in the model, leverage measures credit risk. Empirically, firms have different
asset volatilities and leverage may therefore be an insufficient measure of credit risk. For this reason, I also estimate
one-year default probabilities using the Merton (1974) model as in Vassalou and Xing (2004) which takes into account
both leverage and asset volatilities. In the 2×3 independent double-sorts on size and asset growth from Table 2, the
average one-year default probabilities are is 2.25%, 0.91%, and 0.81% for the low, medium, and high asset-growth
portfolios, respectively. The difference of 1.44 percentage points between the low and high asset-growth portfolio is
highly statistically significant (t-stat 26.87). This finding that firms with low asset growth have higher credit risk
than firms with high asset growth is also consistent with the model.
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premium. This predictions rests on a negative relationship between asset growth and leverage
consistent with my empirical findings and Lang et al. (1996).
The Investment Premium and Zero-Leverage Firms
The previous section shows that debt overhang removes the incentive to invest for high leverage
firms with risky debt. If firms do not suffer from debt overhang, they should always invest because
the growth option has positive NPV. In the model, firms cannot issue risk-free debt and thereby
eliminate the debt overhang problem. There are two situations, however, where firms do not suffer
from debt overhang.
First, the incentives of debt and equity holders remain aligned when the investment cost λ = 0
and the firm therefore always invest. Second, when there are no debt benefits k = 0 the firm has no
incentive to issue debt because doing so would impair investment incentives and reduce firm value.
This financing decision has implications for expected stock returns. Zero-leverage firms have no
debt overhang and they should always invest. All zero-leverage firms therefore choose the same
optimal investment policy and there is no cross-sectional relationship between asset growth and
expected stock returns. The reason is that zero-leverage firms have the same βt = 1 and the same
expected growth rate i˜t = i
14. The model therefore predicts that there is no return differential
between zero-leverage firms with low and high asset growth consistent with my empirical results.
The Investment Premium and Refinancing Intensities
In this section, I focus on another dimension of firms’ financing decisions and the implications
for expected stock returns. I consider a cross-section of firms with different levels of investment
costs λ and therefore also with different refinancing intensities. At time t = 0, all firms choose
their optimal leverage and refinancing intensities. I then turn to analyze the relationship between
investments and expected stock returns at time t > 0 for different levels of refinancing intensities.
Since firms invest when they have safer debt and do not invest when they have riskier debt, a
firm in the investment region has lower current leverage than a firm in the non-investment region
for a given refinancing intensity. I therefore compare firms at time t > 0 in the investment region
with a fixed leverage ratio to firms in the non-investment region with a higher fixed leverage ratio15.
14Note that there will be cross-sectional differences in realized asset growth rates among zero-leverage firms. It is
only in expectation that the asset growth rate is the same for all zero-leverage firms.
15I have to consider extreme leverage ratios because the non-investment region is small for low values of λ cf. the
shaded area in Panel D from Figure 1. Since the firm’s leverage ratio equals one at the default boundary XB , the
leverage ratio is also high at the investment boundary Xi when XB and Xi remain close to each other. When I
compare firms with different λ but with the same current leverage, I therefore have to choose leverage ratios such
that all firms remain in either the investment or the non-investment region respectively. If I change the investment
cost to λ(Xt; ρ) = ρ+ λiXt where ρ > 0 is a fixed flow cost of investment similar to the extension in Diamond and
He (2014) then the non-investment region becomes larger and I can compare firms with less extreme leverage ratios.
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Panel A in Figure 3 shows that expected stock returns increase with refinancing intensities θS for
both high and low asset-growth firms. This finding reflects that equity holders require a higher
expected stock return for firms with higher rollover risk.
[INSERT FIGURE 3]
Panel A also shows that expected stock returns for low asset-growth firms increase faster with
θS compared to high asset-growth firms. To see this relationship more clearly, Panel B plots the
stock return differential of low asset-growth firms relative to high asset-growth firms as a function
of θS . The stock return differential increases monotonically with firms’ refinancing intensities and
reflects an interaction effect between refinancing intensities and leverage. Expected stock returns
increase faster with refinancing intensities for firms with high leverage relative to firms with low
leverage because short-term debt amplifies rollover risk. Since firms invest when they have low
leverage and do not invest when they have high leverage, this interaction effect predicts that
the return differential between low and high asset-growth firms increases with firms’ refinancing
intensities. My empirical results support this prediction.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I document that the investment premium (1) reflects financial leverage, (2) does
not exist among zero-leverage firms, and (3) increases with firms’ refinancing intensities. This
new evidence challenges prominent explanations of the investment premium. On the one hand,
rational theories such as the q-theory of investment, real option models, and the dividend discount
model suggest that the investment premium reflects firms’ investment decisions. On the other
hand, behavioral theories argue that the investment premium reflects mispricing as investors do
not properly incorporate information on firms’ investment decisions into asset prices. Both of these
theories predict a positive return differential between zero-leverage firms with low and high asset
growth. They also cannot explain why the return differential increases with firms’ refinancing
intensities. My empirical results are therefore inconsistent with these theories.
My empirical results show that leverage and refinancing intensities explain a significant fraction
of the investment premium. These findings suggest that the investment premium reflects firms’
financing decisions. I therefore develop a corporate finance model in which firms make both optimal
investment and financing decisions. Specifically, I integrate the investment option from Diamond
and He (2014) into the Friewald et al. (2018) model. The model shows that the investment premium
reflects both leverage and refinancing intensities consistent with my empirical findings.
The predictions from the model remain qualitatively the same and I therefore focus on the simplest case with ρ = 0.
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Taken together, my results offer a novel perspective on the economic interpretation of the
investment premium and shed new light on the asset pricing implications of firms’ investment and
financing decisions. I focus on the effects of leverage and refinancing intensities but the investment
premium may also be related to other financing decisions such as the choice of debt covenants. For
example, Billet et al. (2007) study the impact of growth options on the joint choices of leverage,
debt maturity, and covenant protection while Helwege et al. (2017) analyze the relationship between
covenants and expected stock returns. The impact of debt covenants on the investment premium
remains an interesting avenue for future research.
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Appendices
A Definition of Variables
This section contains the detailed variable descriptions. The capitalized acronyms correspond to
annual COMPUSTAT data items and subscripts refer to the calendar time.
Main Variables
AGt Asset growth at the end of June in year t is:
AGt =
ATt−1 −ATt−2
ATt−2
where ATt−1 denotes ”Assets - Total” at the end of the fiscal year ending in t− 1.
RIt Refinancing intensity at the end of June in year t is:
RIt =
DD1t−1
DLCt−1 +DLTTt−1
where DD1t−1 is ”Long-Term Debt Due in One Year”, DLCt−1 is ”Debt in Current
Liabilities - Total”, and DLTTt−1 is ”Long-Term Debt - Total” at the end of the fiscal
year ending in t− 1.
MEt Size is measured by the market value of equity at the end of June in year t:
MEt = abs(PRCt) ∗ SHROUTt
where PRCt is the stock price at the end of June in year t and SHROUTt is the number
of shares outstanding from CRSP.
LEVt Leverage at the end of June in year t is:
LEVt =
DLCt−1 +DLTTt−1
DLCt−1 +DLTTt−1 +MEt−1
where DLCt−1 is ”Debt in Current Liabilities - Total”, DLTTt−1 is ”Long-Term Debt
- Total”, and MEt−1 is the market value of equity at the end of December in year t− 1
from CRSP.
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Measures of Investment Frictions
ATt Total assets at the end of June in year t is given by ATt−1 i.e. ”Assets - Total” from
the fiscal year ending in year t− 1.
AGEt Age is the number of years a firm has appeared in COMPUSTAT at the end of the
previous fiscal year.
PAYt Payout at the end of June in year t is the tercile ranking of the payout ratio:
Payout Ratiot =
PRSTKCt−1 +DV Pt−1 +DV Ct−1
OIBDPt−1
where PRSTKCt−1 is ”Purchase of Common and Preferred Stock”, DV Pt−1 is
”Dividends - Preferred/Preference”, DV Ct−1 is ”Dividends Common/Ordinary”, and
OIBDPt−1 is ”Operating Income Before Depreciation” at the end of the fiscal year
ending in t− 1. For firms with non-positive OIBDPt−1, I include those with positive
distributions in the high payout tercile and those with zero distributions in the low
payout tercile.
Measures of Limits-to-Arbitrage
IV OLt Idiosyncratic stock volatility is estimated from daily stock returns over the last year
ending in June in year t. I run time-series regressions of each stock’s daily realized
returns on market returns obtained from Kenneth French’s website and use the stan-
dard deviation of the residuals to measure idiosyncratic volatility. I require at least
200 observations in the estimation window.
PRCt Price is the stock price at the end of June in year t from CRSP.
BAt Bid-ask spread is the time-series average of daily stock bid-ask spreads over the last
year ending in June in year t. I calculate daily bid-ask spreads as :
Bid-Ask Spreadt =
ASKt −BIDt
1
2(ASKt +BIDt)
where ASKt is the end-of-day ask price and BIDt is the end-of-day bid price from
CRSP.
AMt Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure is the time-series average of absolute daily returns
divided by daily dollar trading volume over the past year ending in June in year t from
CRSP.
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Measures of Limits-to-Arbitrage (continued)
DV OLt Dollar volume is the time-series average of daily trading volumes calculated as stock
price times trading volume over the past year ending in June in year t from CRSP.
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B Valuations of Debt and Equity
In this appendix, I derive the value of debt and equity. For simplicity, I omit time subscripts such
that X = Xt throughout the derivations.
Debt Value
The market value of debt, Dj(X), for j = {S,L} is the solution to the ordinary differential equation
(ODE):
rDj =
1
2
σ2X2DjXX + i˜XD
j
X + φ
j [P j −Dj ] (B.1)
where I write Dj = Dj(X) and use subscripts to denote partial derivatives. The equation states
that the required return on the left-hand side must equal the expected return on the right-hand
side. The first two terms is the expected change in the value of debt when X fluctuates where
i˜ is the asset growth rate determined by equity holders which depends on X. The third term is
the change in debt value from retiring maturing debt at principal value and issuing new debt at
market value.
Diamond and He (2014) show that equity holders follow a threshold investment strategy: the
firm invests when X ≥ Xi and it does not invest when XB < X < Xi. The general solution to
equation (B.1) is therefore given by:
Dj(X) =
d
j
1X
−γj1 + pj , X ≥ Xi
dj2X
−γj2 + dj3X
δj2 + pj , XB < X < Xi
(B.2)
where pj = P
j
1+r/φj
is the default-free debt value and the exponents are given by:
γj1 =
(i− 12σ2) +
√
(i− 12σ2)2 + 2σ2(r + φj)
σ2
> 0
γj2 =
−12σ2 +
√
1
4σ
4 + 2σ2(r + φj)
σ2
> 0 (B.3)
δj2 =
1
2σ
2 +
√
1
4σ
4 + 2σ2(r + φj)
σ2
> 1
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The value-matching condition at XB together with the continuity and differentiability conditions
at Xi determine the three coefficients d
j
1, d
j
2 and d
j
3:
Dj(XB) =
XB
r
θj
lim
X↑Xi
Dj(X) = lim
X↓Xi
Dj(X) (B.4)
lim
X↑Xi
DjX(X) = limX↓Xi
DjX(X)
which are then given by:
dj1 = d
j
2X
γj1−γj2
i + d
j
3X
γj1+δ
j
2
i
dj2 = d
j
3
γj1 + δ
j
2
γj2 − γj1
X
γj2+δ
j
2
i (B.5)
dj3 =
θjXB/r − pj
γj1+δ
j
2
γj2−γj1
X
γj2+δ
j
2
i X
−γj2
B +X
δj2
B
Equity Value
The market value of equity, E(X), satisfies the equation:
rE = max
i˜∈{0,i}
1
2
σ2X2EXX + i˜XEX +X − λi˜X + k
∑
j
φjP j −
∑
j
φj [P j −Dj ] (B.6)
where I have omitted the optimal default policy. The equation states that the required return
on the left-hand side must equal the expected return on the right-hand side given equity holders’
optimal investment strategy. The first two terms is the expected change in the value of equity
when X fluctuates. The third and fourth terms are the cash flows to equity holders per unit time
from the firm’s cash flow minus the investment cost. The fifth term is the debt benefits and the
sixth term is debt rollover costs.
It is challenging to solve equation (B.6) directly, because it depends on the debt values Dj(X).
Instead, I value the equity claim as the residual between the levered firm value and debt value.
The general solution to the unlevered firm value, V (X), is given by:
V (X) =

v1X
−γ3 +
X(1− λi)
r − i , X ≥ Xi
v2X
−γ4 + v3Xδ4 +
X
r
, XB < X < Xi
(B.7)
where the expected present value of the earnings stream is X(1−λi)r−i when the firm always invests
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and Xr when the firm never invests. The exponents are given by:
γ3 =
(i− 12σ2) +
√
(i− 12σ2)2 + 2σ2r
σ2
> 0
γ4 =
−12σ2 +
√
1
4σ
4 + 2σ2r
σ2
> 0 (B.8)
δ4 =
1
2σ
2 +
√
1
4σ
4 + 2σ2r
σ2
> 1
The value-matching condition at XB together with the continuity and differentiability conditions
at Xi determine the coefficients v1, v2 and v3:
V (XB) =
XB
r
lim
X↑Xi
V (X) = lim
X↓Xi
V (X) (B.9)
lim
X↑Xi
VX(X) = lim
X↓Xi
VX(X)
which are then given by:
v1 = − i(1− λr)
r(r − i) X
1+γ3
i − v3Xγ4+δ4B Xγ3−γ4i + v3Xγ3+δ4i
v2 = −v3Xγ4+δ4B (B.10)
v3 =
(1 + γ3)
i(1−λr)
r(r−i) X
γ4+1
i
(γ3 + δ4)X
δ4+γ4
i − (γ3 − γ4)Xγ4+δ4B
The general solution to the value of debt benefits, B(X), is given by:
B(X) =

b1X
−γ3 + k
∑
j
φjP j
r
, X ≥ Xi
b2X
−γ4 + b3Xδ4 + k
∑
j
φjP j
r
, XB < X < Xi
(B.11)
where k
∑
j
φjP j
r is the expected present value of receiving the debt benefits in perpetuity. The
value-matching condition at XB together with the continuity and differentiability conditions at Xi
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determine the coefficients b1, b2 and b3:
B(XB) = 0
lim
X↑Xi
B(X) = lim
X↓Xi
B(X) (B.12)
lim
X↑Xi
BX(X) = lim
X↓Xi
BX(X)
which are then given by:
b1 = −b3Xγ4+δ4B Xγ3−γ4i − k
∑
j
φjP j
r
Xγ4B X
γ3−γ4
i + b3X
γ3+δ4
i
b2 = −b3Xγ4+δ4B − k
∑
j
φjP j
r
Xγ4B (B.13)
b3 =
(γ3 − γ4)k
∑
j
φjP j
r X
γ4
B
(γ3 + δ4)X
δ4+γ4
i − (γ3 − γ4)Xγ4+δ4B
Given the unlevered firm value from equation (B.7), the value of debt benefits from equation
(B.11), and the debt values from equation (B.2), the equity value is the residual:
E(X) = V (X) +B(X)−
∑
j
Dj(X) (B.14)
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Table 1: Summary Statistics and Correlations
This table shows summary statistics and correlations for the variables I use in the main empirical analysis.
Panel A reports time-series averages of the cross-sectional mean, standard deviation, 25%–quantile, median,
and 75%–quantile of monthly excess returns, annual asset growth rates (AG), refinancing intensities (RI ),
and leverage (LEV ) in percent. I calculate AG as the change in total assets from the fiscal year ending in
t− 2 to the fiscal year ending in t− 1 divided by total assets from t− 2. RI is the ratio of debt maturing
within one year to total debt in t − 1. LEV is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the
market value of equity at the end of December in t − 1. ME is the market value of equity in millions of
USD measured at the end of June in year t. Before I calculate summary statistics, I winsorize asset growth
rates each month at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Panel B presents time-series averages of the monthly
cross-sectional Spearman rank correlations. The sample period is from July 1970 to June 2016 where I have
excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999).
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Mean SD Q25 Median Q75
Excess return (RET ) 0.94 16.27 -7.04 -0.26 7.05
Asset growth rate (AG) 18.54 47.70 -1.99 7.70 22.00
Refinancing intensity (RI ) 13.27 19.18 1.56 5.73 16.13
Leverage (LEV ) 25.45 23.10 5.59 19.75 40.07
Size (ME ) 1,753 8,492 44 177 723
Panel B: Spearman Rank Correlations
RET AG RI LEV ME
Excess return (RET ) 1.00
Asset growth rate (AG) 0.00 1.00
Refinancing intensity (RI ) -0.01 -0.06 1.00
Leverage (LEV ) 0.00 -0.14 -0.17 1.00
Size (ME ) 0.05 0.21 -0.22 -0.08 1.00
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Table 2: Portfolios Independently Sorted by Size and Asset Growth
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into two portfolios based on size (ME ) and into
three portfolios based on asset growth rates (AG) using NYSE breakpoints. This procedure generates a
cross-section of 2×3 = 6 portfolios. For both small and big firms, I construct a Low-High AG portfolio that
buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the High AG portfolio. Panel A presents monthly value-weighted means
of excess returns in percentage points. Panel B and C show value-weighted average asset growth rates and
leverage ratios in percent. Panel D presents monthly value-weighted means of unlevered excess returns in
percentage points. I follow Doshi et al. (2018) and calculate unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1−Li(t−1))
where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm i in month t and Li(t − 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the
end of month t − 1. The sample period is from July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials
(SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). The parentheses contain t-statistics.
Low AG 2 High AG Low-High AG t-stat
Panel A: Excess Returns
Small 0.94 0.97 0.53 0.41 (4.87)
Big 0.78 0.63 0.54 0.24 (1.79)
Average 0.86 0.80 0.54 0.32 (3.63)
Panel B: Asset Growth
Small -8.63 7.48 53.11 -61.74 (-59.23)
Big -4.08 7.54 37.62 -41.71 (-53.82)
Average -6.35 7.51 45.37 -51.72 (-59.68)
Panel C: Leverage
Small 30.22 23.88 20.01 10.21 (53.92)
Big 25.80 19.44 15.41 10.38 (42.10)
Average 28.01 21.66 17.71 10.29 (54.85)
Panel D: Unlevered Excess Returns
Small 0.62 0.73 0.42 0.21 (2.76)
Big 0.55 0.50 0.45 0.10 (0.82)
Average 0.59 0.62 0.43 0.15 (1.86)
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Table 3: Portfolios of Zero-Leverage Firms Independently Sorted by Size and Asset
Growth
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort zero-leverage firms into two portfolios based on size
(ME ) and into two portfolios based on asset growth rates (AG) using NYSE breakpoints. This procedure
generates a cross-section of 2 × 2 = 4 portfolios. For both small and big firms, I construct a Low-High
AG portfolio that buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the High AG portfolio. Panel A presents monthly
value-weighted means of excess returns in percentage points. Panel B shows value-weighted asset growth
rates in percent. Panel C presents the average number of stocks in each portfolio and Panel D shows the
minimum number of stocks in each portfolio. I define firm i as zero-leverage if in both years t − 2 and
t−1 the outstanding amounts of both short-term debt (DLC ) and long-term debt (DLTT ) equal zero. The
sample period is from July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). The parentheses contain t-statistics.
Low AG High AG Low-High AG t-stat
Panel A: Excess Returns
Small 0.80 0.67 0.12 (0.84)
Big 0.44 0.77 -0.34 (-1.42)
Average 0.62 0.72 -0.11 (-0.72)
Panel B: Asset Growth
Small -3.69 45.11 -48.80 (-46.29)
Big 2.10 37.44 -35.34 (-37.64)
Average -0.80 41.27 -42.07 (-45.87)
Panel C: Average Number of Stocks
Small 141 100
Big 18 40
Panel D: Minimum Number of Stocks
Small 27 15
Big 3 6
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Table 4: Portfolios Independently Sorted by Refinancing Intensitites and Asset
Growth
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into five portfolios based on refinancing in-
tensities (RI ) and into five portfolios based on asset growth rates (AG) using NYSE breakpoints. In each
refinancing quintile, I construct a Low-High AG portfolio that buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the
High AG portfolio. In each asset-growth quintile, I construct a High-Low RI portfolio that buys the High
RI portfolio and sells the Low RI portfolio. I also calculate the return differential of buying the Low-High
AG portfolio for firms with high refinancing intensities and selling the Low-High AG portfolio for firms with
low refinancing intensities. Panel A presents monthly value-weighted means of excess returns in percentage
points. Panel B shows value-weighted average leverage ratios in percent. Panel C presents monthly value-
weighted means of unlevered excess returns in percentage points. I follow Doshi et al. (2018) and calculate
unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1 − Li(t − 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm i in month t
and Li(t− 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month t− 1. The sample period is from July 1970
to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999).
The parentheses contain t-statistics.
Low AG 2 3 4 High AG Low-High AG t-stat
Panel A: Excess Returns
Low RI 0.70 0.81 0.76 0.79 0.57 0.12 (0.62)
2 0.90 0.81 0.65 0.70 0.47 0.43 (2.27)
3 0.76 0.80 0.75 0.50 0.31 0.45 (2.52)
4 0.87 0.68 0.56 0.72 0.36 0.51 (3.16)
High RI 1.11 0.77 0.77 0.66 0.46 0.64 (3.46)
High-Low RI 0.41 -0.04 0.01 -0.12 -0.11 0.52 (2.60)
t-stat (2.62) (-0.28) (0.08) (-0.81) (-0.70)
Panel B: Leverage
Low RI 26.97 20.60 18.38 15.49 14.84 12.13 (37.04)
2 31.52 25.87 20.86 18.31 18.43 13.09 (30.61)
3 30.06 25.10 21.18 17.81 22.40 7.66 (16.50)
4 33.95 25.69 21.88 18.88 20.82 13.13 (27.02)
High RI 28.97 21.57 19.70 15.13 11.85 17.11 (41.05)
High-Low RI 2.00 0.97 1.32 -0.36 -2.98 4.98 (12.27)
t-stat (4.67) (2.63) (2.28) (-0.93) (-12.76)
Panel C: Unlevered Excess Returns
Low RI 0.46 0.62 0.62 0.66 0.47 -0.01 (-0.08)
2 0.58 0.59 0.50 0.56 0.38 0.19 (1.21)
3 0.51 0.57 0.57 0.42 0.18 0.32 (2.13)
4 0.56 0.49 0.41 0.60 0.26 0.30 (2.24)
High RI 0.72 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.40 0.32 (1.87)
High-Low RI 0.26 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.07 0.33 (1.93)
t-stat (2.05) (-0.22) (-0.30) (-0.75) (-0.51)
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Table 5: Long-Short Portfolios Independently Sorted by Refinancing Intensitites and
Asset Growth
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into five portfolios based on refinancing in-
tensities (RI ) and into five portfolios based on asset growth rates (AG) using NYSE breakpoints. In each
refinancing quintile, I construct a Low-High AG portfolio that buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the
High AG portfolio. For each of these five long-short portfolios, I calculate monthly value-weighted means in
percentage points of alpha estimates from regressing excess returns on the market (MKT), the three Fama-
French factors (MKT, SMB, HML), the four factors including momentum (MKT, SMB, HML, UMD), and
the five Fama-French factors (MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA). I also calculate the return differential of
buying the Low-High AG portfolio for firms with high refinancing intensities and selling the Low-High AG
portfolio for firms with low refinancing intensities. Panel A presents the results for risk-adjusted levered
returns and Panel B shows the results for risk-adjusted unlevered returns. I follow Doshi et al. (2018) and
calculate unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1− Li(t− 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm i in
month t and Li(t− 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month t− 1. The sample period is from
July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes
4900-4999). The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01, and
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
CAPM α 3-factor α 4-factor α 5-factor α
Panel A: Risk-Adjusted Returns
Low RI 0.19 -0.14 -0.24 -0.47∗∗∗
(0.96) (-0.81) (-1.33) (-2.91)
2 0.52∗∗∗ 0.19 0.14 -0.16
(2.75) (1.12) (0.79) (-1.05)
3 0.51∗∗∗ 0.33∗ 0.28 0.19
(2.91) (1.91) (1.60) (1.15)
4 0.59∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.46∗∗∗ 0.21
(3.70) (2.55) (3.05) (1.43)
High RI 0.77∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗ 0.05
(4.21) (2.63) (2.31) (0.33)
High-Low RI 0.58∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.52∗∗
(2.88) (2.77) (2.97) (2.49)
Panel B: Risk-Adjusted Unlevered Returns
Low RI 0.13 -0.15 -0.24 -0.43∗∗∗
(0.77) (-0.97) (-1.55) (-3.15)
2 0.35∗∗ 0.11 0.06 -0.17
(2.27) (0.75) (0.44) (-1.29)
3 0.44∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.24 0.20
(2.97) (2.12) (1.61) (1.42)
4 0.44∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗ 0.34∗∗∗ 0.17
(3.50) (2.44) (2.82) (1.43)
High RI 0.53∗∗∗ 0.25∗ 0.21 -0.06
(3.47) (1.85) (1.57) (-0.48)
High-Low RI 0.41∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗
(2.39) (2.30) (2.59) (2.14)
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Table 6: Correlations between Refinancing Intensitites, Investment Frictions, and
Limits-to-Arbitrage
This table reports time-series averages of Spearman rank correlations at each June between refinancing
intensities, measures of investment frictions, and measures of limits-to-arbitrage. Refinancing intensity (RI )
is the ratio of debt maturing within one year to total debt. Measures of investment frictions include total
assets (AT ), age (AGE ), and payout tercile (PAY ). Measures of limits-to-arbitrage include idiosyncratic
volatility (IVOL), stock price (PRC ), bid-ask spread (BA), Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure (AM ), and
dollar volume (DVOL). I explain the detailed construction of each variable in Appendix A. Before I calculate
correlations, I winsorize AT, IVOL, BA, and AM each June at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The sample
period is from June 1970 to June 2015 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities
(SIC codes 4900-4999). Correlations involving bid-ask spreads cover the sample period from June 1983 to
June 2016 because bid and ask quotes are not available in CRSP before November 1982.
RI AT AGE PAY IVOL PRC BA AM DVOL
Refinancing intensity (RI ) 1.00
Total assets (AT ) -0.27 1.00
Age (AGE ) -0.13 0.46 1.00
Payout tercile (PAY ) -0.08 0.17 0.21 1.00
Idiosyncratic vol. (IVOL) 0.18 -0.62 -0.42 -0.25 1.00
Stock price (PRC ) -0.18 0.69 0.37 0.18 -0.74 1.00
Bid-ask spread (BA) 0.15 -0.71 -0.17 -0.14 0.69 -0.77 1.00
Amihud measure (AM ) 0.20 -0.82 -0.33 -0.16 0.64 -0.78 0.93 1.00
Dollar volume (DVOL) -0.19 0.79 0.27 0.12 -0.51 0.74 -0.89 -0.96 1.00
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Table 7: Time-Series Variation in Investment Factor Returns
This table presents regression results with investment factor returns as the dependent variable. The inde-
pendent variables are leverage and/or refinancing-intensity factor returns. I construct the factors as follows.
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into two portfolios based on size (ME ) and into
three portfolios based on either asset growth rates (AG), leverage (LEV ), or refinancing intensities (RI ).
The investment factor is the average return on the two low AG portfolios (small and big) minus the average
return on the two high AG portfolios. I use the same procedure to construct the leverage and refinancing
intensity factors. The leverage factor is long high LEV stocks and short low LEV stocks, whereas the
refinancing-intensity factor is long high RI stocks and short low RI stocks. The sample period is from
July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes
4900-4999). The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01, and
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 0.32∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(3.63) (3.17) (3.63) (3.16)
Leverage factor 0.42∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(16.94) (17.59)
Refinancing-intensity factor -0.01 0.23∗∗∗
(-0.13) (3.90)
Adj. R2 0.00 34.16 -0.18 35.82
N 552 552 552 552
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Figure 1: Optimal Leverage and Refinancing Intensity
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(B) Optimal principal values
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(D) Investment and default boundaries
This figure shows the firm’s optimal leverage and refinancing intensity at time t = 0 for different
levels of investment costs λ. Panel A reports the optimal leverage and Panel B the optimal debt
principal values. Panel C displays the optimal refinancing intensity and Panel D shows that the
investment boundary lies above the default boundary. I set the remaining parameter values to
X0 = 1, r = 10%, i = 7%, σ = 15%, k = 1%, φ
S = 1, and φL = 0.1.
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Figure 2: Expected Excess Stock Returns
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(A) Expected return and assets-in-place
Low AG
High AG
0.96 0.97 0.98 0.99
L(Xt)
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
E[R]-r
(B) Expected return and leverage
This figure shows the expected excess stock return at time t > 0 as a function of either assets-
in-place (Panel A) or current leverage (Panel B) for a firm with λ = 9.5. The firm chooses its
optimal leverage and refinancing intensity at time t = 0. The dotted line denotes the investment
region where i˜t = 7% and the solid line denotes the non-investment region where i˜t = 0%. I set
the remaining parameter values to X0 = 1, r = 10%, σ = 15%, k = 1%, φ
S = 1, φL = 0.1, and
ξ = 1%.
Figure 3: The Investment Premium and Refinancing Intensities
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(B) Stock return differential
This figure illustrates the relationship between expected excess stock returns and refinancing in-
tensities at time t > 0. Firms differ in the level of investment costs λ and choose their optimal
refinancing intensity at time t = 0 by solving the optimization problem in equation (4). Panel A
shows expected excess stock returns for low and high asset-growth firms with fixed leverage at time
t > 0. I calibrate Xt such that all low asset-growth firms have a leverage ratio of 0.99 and all high
asset-growth firms have a leverage ratio of 0.90 (see the discussion on these values in footnote 15.).
Panel B shows the stock return differential of low asset-growth firms relative to high asset-growth
firms as a function of the refinancing intensity. I set the remaining parameter values to X0 = 1,
r = 10%, i = 7%, σ = 15%, k = 1%, φS = 1, φL = 0.1, and ξ = 1%.
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Internet Appendix for:
Does Debt Explain the Investment Premium?
Abstract
This Internet Appendix contains the robustness checks mentioned in the paper. First, I present
the results from the paper with equal-weighted returns (IA.1-IA.4). Second, I show the results for
firms with non-positive net debt (IA.5). Third, I repeat the independent portfolio double-sort based
on refinancing intensities and asset growth with a different number of portfolios (IA.6). Fourth,
I present the results with sequential portfolio double-sorts using either refinancing intensities or
asset growth as the first sorting variable (I.7-I.10). Fifth, I show the results using the investment-
to-assets ratio from Lyandres et al. (2008) to measure asset growth (IA.11-IA.14). Sixth, I show
the results using short-term debt to total assets to measure refinancing intensities (IA.15-IA.16).
Seventh, I present the results from Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions (IA.17-IA.19).
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Table IA.1: Portfolios Independently Sorted by Size and Asset Growth: Equal-
Weighted Returns
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into two portfolios based on size (ME ) and into
three portfolios based on asset growth rates (AG) using NYSE breakpoints. This procedure generates a
cross-section of 2×3 = 6 portfolios. For both small and big firms, I construct a Low-High AG portfolio that
buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the High AG portfolio. Panel A presents monthly value-weighted means
of excess returns in percentage points. Panel B and C show value-weighted average asset growth rates and
leverage ratios in percent. Panel D presents monthly value-weighted means of unlevered excess returns in
percentage points. I follow Doshi et al. (2018) and calculate unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1−Li(t−1))
where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm i in month t and Li(t − 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the
end of month t − 1. The sample period is from July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials
(SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). The parentheses contain t-statistics.
Low AG 2 High AG Low-High AG t-stat
Panel A: Excess Returns
Small 1.35 1.09 0.55 0.80 (8.61)
Big 0.90 0.85 0.59 0.31 (2.90)
Average 1.13 0.97 0.57 0.56 (6.70)
Panel B: Asset Growth
Small -11.65 7.29 57.29 -68.94 (-61.53)
Big -5.30 7.50 44.73 -50.03 (-46.21)
Average -8.48 7.40 51.01 -59.48 (-55.29)
Panel C: Leverage
Small 30.87 26.09 22.56 8.31 (43.54)
Big 28.97 21.99 17.38 11.60 (67.82)
Average 29.92 24.04 19.97 9.95 (58.84)
Panel D: Unlevered Excess Returns
Small 0.81 0.77 0.37 0.44 (5.97)
Big 0.59 0.64 0.47 0.12 (1.27)
Average 0.70 0.70 0.42 0.28 (3.87)
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Table IA.2: Portfolios of Zero-Leverage Firms Independently Sorted by Size and Asset
Growth: Equal-Weighted Returns
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort zero-leverage firms into two portfolios based on size
(ME ) and into two portfolios based on asset growth rates (AG) using NYSE breakpoints. This procedure
generates a cross-section of 2 × 2 = 4 portfolios. For both small and big firms, I construct a Low-High
AG portfolio that buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the High AG portfolio. Panel A presents monthly
equal-weighted means of excess returns in percentage points. Panel B shows equal-weighted asset growth
rates in percent. Panel C presents the average number of stocks in each portfolio and Panel D shows the
minimum number of stocks in each portfolio. I define firm i as zero-leverage if in both years t − 2 and
t−1 the outstanding amounts of both short-term debt (DLC ) and long-term debt (DLTT ) equal zero. The
sample period is from July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). The parentheses contain t-statistics.
Low AG High AG Low-High AG t-stat
Panel A: Excess Returns
Small 1.24 0.88 0.35 (2.61)
Big 0.48 0.76 -0.28 (-1.62)
Average 0.86 0.82 0.04 (0.31)
Panel B: Asset Growth
Small -6.91 46.77 -53.68 (-54.19)
Big 1.37 37.45 -36.08 (-38.61)
Average -2.77 42.11 -44.88 (-48.49)
Panel C: Average Number of Stocks
Small 141 100
Big 18 40
Panel D: Minimum Number of Stocks
Small 27 15
Big 3 6
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Table IA.3: Portfolios Independently Sorted by Refinancing Intensitites and Asset
Growth: Equal-Weighted Returns
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into five portfolios based on refinancing in-
tensities (RI ) and into five portfolios based on asset growth rates (AG) using NYSE breakpoints. In each
refinancing quintile, I construct a Low-High AG portfolio that buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the
High AG portfolio. In each asset-growth quintile, I construct a High-Low RI portfolio that buys the High
RI portfolio and sells the Low RI portfolio. I also calculate the return differential of buying the Low-High
AG portfolio for firms with high refinancing intensities and selling the Low-High AG portfolio for firms with
low refinancing intensities. Panel A presents monthly equal-weighted means of excess returns in percentage
points. Panel B shows equal-weighted average leverage ratios in percent. Panel C presents monthly equal-
weighted means of unlevered excess returns in percentage points. I follow Doshi et al. (2018) and calculate
unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1 − Li(t − 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm i in month t
and Li(t− 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month t− 1. The sample period is from July 1970
to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999).
The parentheses contain t-statistics.
Low AG 2 3 4 High AG Low-High AG t-stat
Panel A: Excess Returns
Low RI 1.08 1.06 0.90 0.90 0.37 0.71 (4.37)
2 1.17 1.14 0.95 0.77 0.47 0.70 (4.72)
3 1.17 1.12 0.90 0.76 0.35 0.82 (5.93)
4 1.27 1.29 1.02 1.00 0.39 0.88 (6.91)
High RI 1.45 1.16 1.14 1.00 0.39 1.06 (7.82)
High-Low RI 0.38 0.11 0.24 0.10 0.03 0.35 (2.47)
t-stat (3.09) (0.96) (2.34) (0.99) (0.25)
Panel B: Leverage
Low RI 31.42 27.87 23.87 22.08 22.46 8.96 (40.39)
2 44.40 37.93 32.45 29.53 30.14 14.26 (69.61)
3 44.38 38.20 32.56 29.80 30.46 13.93 (64.47)
4 40.67 35.74 31.15 27.63 28.63 12.04 (41.49)
High RI 29.16 24.87 21.68 18.49 17.65 11.52 (52.28)
High-Low RI -2.26 -2.99 -2.20 -3.59 -4.82 2.56 (13.84)
t-stat (-10.03) (-16.72) (-12.72) (-28.43) (-25.05)
Panel C: Unlevered Excess Returns
Low RI 0.57 0.73 0.64 0.68 0.22 0.35 (3.03)
2 0.56 0.62 0.60 0.52 0.29 0.28 (2.96)
3 0.52 0.58 0.57 0.49 0.18 0.34 (4.01)
4 0.59 0.76 0.66 0.67 0.17 0.41 (4.83)
High RI 0.85 0.79 0.85 0.79 0.26 0.59 (5.50)
High-Low RI 0.28 0.06 0.22 0.10 0.04 0.24 (2.37)
t-stat (3.12) (0.76) (2.72) (1.28) (0.41)
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Table IA.4: Long-Short Portfolios Independently Sorted by Refinancing Intensitites
and Asset Growth: Equal-Weighted Returns
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into five portfolios based on refinancing in-
tensities (RI ) and into five portfolios based on asset growth rates (AG) using NYSE breakpoints. In each
refinancing quintile, I construct a Low-High AG portfolio that buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the
High AG portfolio. For each of these five long-short portfolios, I calculate monthly equal-weighted means in
percentage points of alpha estimates from regressing excess returns on the market (MKT), the three Fama-
French factors (MKT, SMB, HML), the four factors including momentum (MKT, SMB, HML, UMD), and
the five Fama-French factors (MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA). I also calculate the return differential of
buying the Low-High AG portfolio for firms with high refinancing intensities and selling the Low-High AG
portfolio for firms with low refinancing intensities. Panel A presents the results for risk-adjusted levered
returns and Panel B shows the results for risk-adjusted unlevered returns. I follow Doshi et al. (2018) and
calculate unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1− Li(t− 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm i in
month t and Li(t− 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month t− 1. The sample period is from
July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes
4900-4999). The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01, and
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
CAPM α 3-factor α 4-factor α 5-factor α
Panel A: Risk-Adjusted Returns
Low RI 0.80∗∗∗ 0.63∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗
(4.99) (4.13) (3.74) (4.19)
2 0.75∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(5.00) (3.68) (3.27) (2.83)
3 0.83∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
(5.94) (4.99) (4.82) (4.77)
4 0.91∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗
(7.10) (6.09) (5.92) (5.85)
High RI 1.14∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.90∗∗∗ 0.92∗∗∗
(8.55) (7.66) (7.16) (7.74)
High-Low RI 0.34∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.31∗∗
(2.39) (2.19) (2.17) (2.09)
Panel B: Risk-Adjusted Unlevered Returns
Low RI 0.48∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗
(4.40) (3.54) (2.98) (3.76)
2 0.40∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(4.76) (3.65) (2.84) (2.95)
3 0.45∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(5.82) (5.23) (4.56) (5.31)
4 0.51∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗
(6.45) (5.70) (5.09) (5.86)
High RI 0.74∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.54∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗
(7.57) (6.60) (5.75) (6.56)
High-Low RI 0.26∗∗ 0.24∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.21∗
(2.52) (2.35) (2.11) (1.94)
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Table IA.5: Portfolios of Firms with Non-Positive Net Debt Independently Sorted by
Size and Asset Growth
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort firms with non-positive net debt into two portfolios
based on size (ME ) and into two portfolios based on asset growth rates (AG) using NYSE breakpoints.
This procedure generates a cross-section of 2× 2 = 4 portfolios. For both small and big firms, I construct a
Low-High AG portfolio that buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the High AG portfolio. Panel A presents
monthly value-weighted means of excess returns in percentage points. Panel B shows value-weighted asset
growth rates in percent. Panel C presents the average number of stocks in each portfolio and Panel D shows
the minimum number of stocks in each portfolio. I define firm i as a firm with non-positive net debt if in
both years t− 2 and t− 1 the sum of short-term debt (DLC ) and long-term debt (DLTT ) minus cash and
short-term investments (CHE ) is non-positive. The sample period is from July 1970 to June 2016 where I
have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). The parentheses contain
t-statistics.
Low AG High AG Low-High AG t-stat
Panel A: Excess Returns
Small 0.82 0.66 0.16 (1.65)
Big 0.59 0.62 -0.03 (-0.18)
Average 0.71 0.64 0.07 (0.64)
Panel B: Asset Growth
Small -2.47 48.12 -50.59 (-38.53)
Big 3.54 31.43 -27.88 (-31.56)
Average 0.54 39.78 -39.24 (-37.73)
Panel C: Average Number of Stocks
Small 430 349
Big 53 107
Panel D: Minimum Number of Stocks
Small 78 55
Big 17 36
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Table IA.6: Long-Short Portfolios Independently Sorted by Refinancing Intensities
and Asset Growth with Different Number of Portfolios
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into N portfolios based on firms’
refinancing intensities (RI ) and into five portfolios based on firms’ asset growth rates (AG). This
procedure generates a cross-section of N × 5 portfolios. In each refinancing quantile, I construct a
Low-High AG portfolio that buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the High AG portfolio. Next, I
calculate the return differential of buying the Low-High AG portfolio for firms with high refinancing
intensities and selling the Low-High AG portfolio for firms with low refinancing intensities. For this
portfolio, I calculate the monthly value-weighted mean in percentage points of excess returns and
alpha estimates from regressing value-weighted excess returns on the market (MKT), the three
Fama-French factors (MKT, SMB, HML), the four factors including momentum (MKT, SMB,
HML, UMD), and the five Fama-French factors (MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA). I follow Doshi
et al. (2018) and calculate unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1 − Li(t − 1)) where RE,i(t) is the
excess return for firm i in month t and Li(t− 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month
t − 1. The sample period is from July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC
codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). The convention for p-values is: ∗ when
p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01, and t-statistics are in parenthesis.
Levered Returns Unlevered Returns
3× 5 5× 5 7× 5 3× 5 5× 5 7× 5
Excess return 0.38∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.24 0.33∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(2.12) (2.60) (3.65) (1.56) (1.93) (2.99)
CAPM α 0.41∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.79∗∗∗ 0.28∗ 0.41∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(2.28) (2.88) (3.68) (1.86) (2.39) (3.36)
3-factor α 0.42∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.76∗∗∗ 0.29∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.64∗∗∗
(2.33) (2.77) (3.48) (1.92) (2.30) (3.36)
4-factor α 0.55∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗
(3.05) (2.97) (3.49) (2.68) (2.59) (3.37)
5-factor α 0.42∗∗ 0.52∗∗ 0.68∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.38∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗
(2.26) (2.49) (3.05) (2.00) (2.14) (3.07)
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Table IA.7: Portfolios Sequentially Sorted by Refinancing Intensitites and Asset
Growth
At the end of each June, I sequentially double-sort stocks first into five portfolios based on refinancing
intensities (RI ) and then into five portfolios based on asset growth rates (AG) using NYSE breakpoints.
In each refinancing quintile, I construct a Low-High AG portfolio that buys the Low AG portfolio and
sells the High AG portfolio. In each asset-growth quintile, I construct a High-Low RI portfolio that buys
the High RI portfolio and sells the Low RI portfolio. I also calculate the return differential of buying the
Low-High AG portfolio for firms with high refinancing intensities and selling the Low-High AG portfolio
for firms with low refinancing intensities. Panel A presents monthly value-weighted means of excess returns
in percentage points. Panel B shows value-weighted average leverage ratios in percent. Panel C presents
monthly value-weighted means of unlevered excess returns in percentage points. I follow Doshi et al. (2018)
and calculate unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1− Li(t− 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm
i in month t and Li(t − 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month t − 1. The sample period
is from July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC
codes 4900-4999). The parentheses contain t-statistics.
Low AG 2 3 4 High AG Low-High AG t-stat
Panel A: Excess Returns
Low RI 0.73 0.76 0.76 0.73 0.56 0.17 (0.94)
2 0.88 0.81 0.63 0.71 0.48 0.40 (2.18)
3 0.81 0.82 0.76 0.46 0.32 0.49 (2.72)
4 0.89 0.67 0.58 0.65 0.48 0.41 (2.44)
High RI 1.11 0.81 0.79 0.69 0.44 0.67 (3.53)
High-Low RI 0.38 0.05 0.03 -0.04 -0.12 0.50 (2.45)
t-stat (2.30) (0.31) (0.17) (-0.24) (-0.76)
Panel B: Leverage
Low RI 26.35 21.22 17.74 13.84 16.04 10.31 (28.22)
2 31.08 25.20 20.06 18.51 18.67 12.41 (29.50)
3 29.88 25.16 20.37 18.11 22.91 6.97 (15.19)
4 34.23 26.14 21.76 19.34 20.53 13.70 (28.71)
High RI 28.75 23.12 20.57 15.16 12.22 16.53 (38.92)
High-Low RI 2.40 1.90 2.83 1.32 -3.83 6.22 (14.66)
t-stat (5.87) (5.77) (5.54) (3.49) (-14.24)
Panel C: Unlevered Excess Returns
Low RI 0.50 0.58 0.62 0.63 0.45 0.05 (0.33)
2 0.56 0.60 0.50 0.57 0.39 0.17 (1.08)
3 0.56 0.58 0.60 0.38 0.19 0.36 (2.37)
4 0.56 0.48 0.44 0.51 0.37 0.20 (1.43)
High RI 0.73 0.60 0.60 0.58 0.37 0.35 (2.07)
High-Low RI 0.23 0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.07 0.30 (1.71)
t-stat (1.68) (0.09) (-0.18) (-0.38) (-0.49)
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Table IA.8: Long-Short Portfolios Sequentially Sorted by Refinancing Intensitites and
Asset Growth
At the end of each June, I sequentially double-sort stocks first into five portfolios based on refinancing
intensities (RI ) and then into five portfolios based on asset growth rates (AG) using NYSE breakpoints. In
each refinancing quintile, I construct a Low-High AG portfolio that buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the
High AG portfolio. For each of these five long-short portfolios, I calculate monthly value-weighted means in
percentage points of alpha estimates from regressing excess returns on the market (MKT), the three Fama-
French factors (MKT, SMB, HML), the four factors including momentum (MKT, SMB, HML, UMD), and
the five Fama-French factors (MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA). I also calculate the return differential of
buying the Low-High AG portfolio for firms with high refinancing intensities and selling the Low-High AG
portfolio for firms with low refinancing intensities. Panel A presents the results for risk-adjusted levered
returns and Panel B shows the results for risk-adjusted unlevered returns. I follow Doshi et al. (2018) and
calculate unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1− Li(t− 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm i in
month t and Li(t− 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month t− 1. The sample period is from
July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes
4900-4999). The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01, and
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
CAPM α 3-factor α 4-factor α 5-factor α
Panel A: Risk-Adjusted Returns
Low RI 0.24 -0.07 -0.16 -0.29∗
(1.29) (-0.43) (-0.93) (-1.88)
2 0.50∗∗∗ 0.19 0.14 -0.13
(2.77) (1.15) (0.86) (-0.85)
3 0.55∗∗∗ 0.35∗∗ 0.32∗ 0.22
(3.05) (2.04) (1.79) (1.29)
4 0.48∗∗∗ 0.23 0.34∗∗ 0.06
(2.88) (1.52) (2.27) (0.39)
High RI 0.77∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.41∗∗ 0.10
(4.13) (2.56) (2.46) (0.63)
High-Low RI 0.54∗∗∗ 0.49∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.39∗
(2.62) (2.39) (2.72) (1.83)
Panel B: Risk-Adjusted Unlevered Returns
Low RI 0.18 -0.07 -0.15 -0.27∗
(1.12) (-0.51) (-1.03) (-1.95)
2 0.33∗∗ 0.09 0.06 -0.15
(2.22) (0.65) (0.45) (-1.20)
3 0.46∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗ 0.26∗ 0.22
(3.06) (2.15) (1.76) (1.49)
4 0.34∗∗∗ 0.16 0.24∗∗ 0.04
(2.60) (1.36) (1.98) (0.34)
High RI 0.55∗∗∗ 0.26∗ 0.26∗ 0.00
(3.47) (1.88) (1.83) (-0.04)
High-Low RI 0.37∗∗ 0.34∗ 0.41∗∗ 0.26
(2.13) (1.91) (2.30) (1.43)
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Table IA.9: Portfolios Sequentially Sorted by Asset Growth and Refinancing Intensi-
tites
At the end of each June, I sequentially double-sort stocks first into five portfolios based on asset growth
rates (AG) and then into five portfolios based on refinancing intensities (RI ) using NYSE breakpoints. In
each refinancing quintile, I construct a Low-High AG portfolio that buys the Low AG portfolio and sells
the High AG portfolio. In each asset-growth quintile, I construct a High-Low RI portfolio that buys the
High RI portfolio and sells the Low RI portfolio. I also calculate the return differential of buying the
Low-High AG portfolio for firms with high refinancing intensities and selling the Low-High AG portfolio
for firms with low refinancing intensities. Panel A presents monthly value-weighted means of excess returns
in percentage points. Panel B shows value-weighted average leverage ratios in percent. Panel C presents
monthly value-weighted means of unlevered excess returns in percentage points. I follow Doshi et al. (2018)
and calculate unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1− Li(t− 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm
i in month t and Li(t − 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month t − 1. The sample period
is from July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC
codes 4900-4999). The parentheses contain t-statistics.
Low AG 2 3 4 High AG Low-High AG t-stat
Panel A: Excess Returns
Low RI 0.70 0.86 0.77 0.82 0.59 0.12 (0.60)
2 0.93 0.77 0.62 0.70 0.43 0.50 (2.69)
3 0.71 0.82 0.72 0.51 0.35 0.35 (2.09)
4 0.92 0.74 0.55 0.69 0.35 0.57 (3.48)
High RI 1.14 0.73 0.75 0.69 0.48 0.66 (3.69)
High-Low RI 0.44 -0.13 -0.02 -0.12 -0.11 0.54 (2.70)
t-stat (2.70) (-0.86) (-0.13) (-0.83) (-0.68)
Panel B: Leverage
Low RI 27.10 21.33 18.67 15.67 14.39 12.71 (34.54)
2 31.59 26.07 20.91 17.56 18.12 13.47 (34.02)
3 31.02 25.25 21.39 17.77 22.51 8.51 (17.65)
4 33.61 25.46 21.93 18.62 21.35 12.26 (24.60)
High RI 27.54 22.15 19.44 15.63 12.64 14.90 (34.47)
High-Low RI 0.44 0.82 0.77 -0.04 -1.75 2.19 (4.43)
t-stat (0.93) (2.24) (1.37) (-0.10) (-6.71)
Panel C: Unlevered Excess Returns
Low RI 0.46 0.66 0.63 0.69 0.49 -0.03 (-0.16)
2 0.62 0.55 0.49 0.57 0.34 0.28 (1.76)
3 0.48 0.59 0.54 0.43 0.25 0.23 (1.60)
4 0.58 0.53 0.40 0.58 0.23 0.35 (2.65)
High RI 0.77 0.56 0.57 0.57 0.42 0.35 (2.16)
High-Low RI 0.31 -0.10 -0.06 -0.12 -0.07 0.38 (2.17)
t-stat (2.31) (-0.84) (-0.46) (-0.88) (-0.49)
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Table IA.10: Long-Short Portfolios Sequentially Sorted by Refinancing Intensitites
and Asset Growth
At the end of each June, I sequentially double-sort stocks first into five portfolios based on asset growth
rates (AG) and then into five portfolios based on refinancing intensities (RI ) using NYSE breakpoints. In
each refinancing quintile, I construct a Low-High AG portfolio that buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the
High AG portfolio. For each of these five long-short portfolios, I calculate monthly value-weighted means in
percentage points of alpha estimates from regressing excess returns on the market (MKT), the three Fama-
French factors (MKT, SMB, HML), the four factors including momentum (MKT, SMB, HML, UMD), and
the five Fama-French factors (MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA). I also calculate the return differential of
buying the Low-High AG portfolio for firms with high refinancing intensities and selling the Low-High AG
portfolio for firms with low refinancing intensities. Panel A presents the results for risk-adjusted levered
returns and Panel B shows the results for risk-adjusted unlevered returns. I follow Doshi et al. (2018) and
calculate unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1− Li(t− 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm i in
month t and Li(t− 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month t− 1. The sample period is from
July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes
4900-4999). The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01, and
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
CAPM α 3-factor α 4-factor α 5-factor α
Panel A: Risk-Adjusted Returns
Low RI 0.20 -0.14 -0.25 -0.46∗∗∗
(1.02) (-0.82) (-1.41) (-2.90)
2 0.56∗∗∗ 0.28 0.21 -0.07
(3.00) (1.60) (1.16) (-0.46)
3 0.43∗∗ 0.24 0.21 0.10
(2.53) (1.46) (1.27) (0.61)
4 0.67∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗∗ 0.28∗
(4.11) (2.87) (3.23) (1.85)
High RI 0.76∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗ 0.11
(4.30) (2.78) (2.46) (0.80)
High-Low RI 0.56∗∗∗ 0.58∗∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗
(2.77) (2.82) (3.07) (2.69)
Panel B: Risk-Adjusted Unlevered Returns
Low RI 0.12 -0.16 -0.25∗ -0.44∗∗∗
(0.74) (-1.05) (-1.65) (-3.20)
2 0.42∗∗∗ 0.21 0.14 -0.05
(2.76) (1.47) (0.98) (-0.35)
3 0.35∗∗ 0.21 0.17 0.10
(2.52) (1.62) (1.23) (0.78)
4 0.50∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.38∗∗∗ 0.22∗
(4.02) (2.90) (3.25) (1.95)
High RI 0.54∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗ 0.23∗ 0.01
(3.58) (2.00) (1.68) (0.10)
High-Low RI 0.42∗∗ 0.43∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.46∗∗
(2.37) (2.40) (2.66) (2.48)
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Table IA.11: Portfolios Independently Sorted by Size and Investment-to-Assets
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into two portfolios based on size (ME ) and
into three portfolios based on investment-to-assets (IA) using NYSE breakpoints. This procedure generates
a cross-section of 2 × 3 = 6 portfolios. For both small and big firms, I construct a Low-High IA portfolio
that buys the Low IA portfolio and sells the High IA portfolio. Panel A presents monthly value-weighted
means of excess returns in percentage points. Panel B and C show value-weighted average investment-to-
assets ratios and leverage ratios in percent. Panel D presents monthly value-weighted means of unlevered
excess returns in percentage points. I follow Doshi et al. (2018) and calculate unlevered excess returns as
RE,i(t)(1− Li(t− 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm i in month t and Li(t− 1) is the leverage
ratio of firm i at the end of month t − 1. The sample period is from July 1970 to June 2016 where I have
excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). The parentheses contain
t-statistics.
Low IA 2 High IA Low-High IA t-stat
Panel A: Excess Returns
Small 0.92 0.92 0.57 0.35 (4.59)
Big 0.71 0.60 0.55 0.15 (1.40)
Average 0.82 0.76 0.56 0.25 (3.39)
Panel B: Investment-to-Assets
Small -4.61 5.96 39.65 -44.26 (-12.19)
Big -1.86 6.08 22.91 -24.77 (-76.78)
Average -3.24 6.02 31.28 -34.52 (-18.52)
Panel C: Leverage
Small 27.59 22.81 22.68 4.91 (26.55)
Big 24.46 18.48 16.62 7.84 (33.34)
Average 26.02 20.65 19.65 6.37 (36.90)
Panel C: Unlevered Excess Returns
Small 0.64 0.68 0.43 0.21 (3.11)
Big 0.52 0.47 0.45 0.07 (0.68)
Average 0.58 0.58 0.44 0.14 (2.03)
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Table IA.12: Portfolios of Zero-Leverage Firms Independently Sorted by Size and
Investment-to-Assets
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort zero-leverage firms into two portfolios based on size
(ME ) and into two portfolios based on investment-to-assets (IA) using NYSE breakpoints. This procedure
generates a cross-section of 2 × 2 = 4 portfolios. For both small and big firms, I construct a Low-High
IA portfolio that buys the Low IA portfolio and sells the High IA portfolio. Panel A presents monthly
value-weighted means of excess returns in percentage points. Panel B shows value-weighted asset growth
rates in percent. Panel C presents the average number of stocks in each portfolio and Panel D shows the
minimum number of stocks in each portfolio. I define firm i as zero-leverage if in both years t − 2 and
t−1 the outstanding amounts of both short-term debt (DLC ) and long-term debt (DLTT ) equal zero. The
sample period is from July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). The parentheses contain t-statistics.
Low IA High IA Low-High IA t-stat
Panel A: Excess Returns
Small 0.75 0.68 0.06 (0.46)
Big 0.41 0.76 -0.35 (-1.42)
Average 0.58 0.72 -0.14 (-0.96)
Panel B: Asset Growth
Small 11.36 35.32 -23.96 (-29.99)
Big 16.61 38.10 -21.49 (-21.98)
Average 13.98 36.71 -22.73 (-29.16)
Panel C: Average Number of Stocks
Small 154 86
Big 26 32
Panel D: Minimum Number of Stocks
Small 27 18
Big 1 5
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Table IA.13: Portfolios Independently Sorted by Refinancing Intensitites and
Investment-to-Assets
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into five portfolios based on refinancing inten-
sities (RI ) and into five portfolios based on investment-to-assets (IA) using NYSE breakpoints. In each
refinancing quintile, I construct a Low-High IA portfolio that buys the Low IA portfolio and sells the High
IA portfolio. In each investment-to-assets quintile, I construct a High-Low RI portfolio that buys the High
RI portfolio and sells the Low RI portfolio. I also calculate the return differential of buying the Low-High
IA portfolio for firms with high refinancing intensities and selling the Low-High IA portfolio for firms with
low refinancing intensities. Panel A presents monthly value-weighted means of excess returns in percentage
points. Panel B shows value-weighted average leverage ratios in percent. Panel C presents monthly value-
weighted means of unlevered excess returns in percentage points. I follow Doshi et al. (2018) and calculate
unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1 − Li(t − 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm i in month t
and Li(t− 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month t− 1. The sample period is from July 1970
to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999).
The parentheses contain t-statistics.
Low IA 2 3 4 High IA Low-High IA t-stat
Panel A: Excess Returns
Low RI 0.77 0.57 0.77 0.71 0.64 0.13 (0.68)
2 0.80 0.77 0.59 0.69 0.43 0.37 (2.03)
3 0.63 0.69 0.77 0.65 0.33 0.30 (1.81)
4 0.76 0.70 0.57 0.55 0.39 0.37 (2.22)
High RI 1.04 0.74 0.56 0.66 0.43 0.61 (3.28)
High-Low RI 0.27 0.16 -0.21 -0.05 -0.21 0.48 (2.18)
t-stat (1.65) (1.09) (-1.31) (-0.35) (-1.17)
Panel B: Leverage
Low RI 25.28 17.18 17.15 16.19 18.60 6.67 (14.32)
2 27.85 24.22 20.34 19.22 19.08 8.77 (21.98)
3 28.64 23.75 21.81 19.61 22.30 6.34 (16.00)
4 29.86 27.15 21.92 18.98 21.13 8.73 (19.67)
High RI 25.74 24.39 17.10 13.42 12.96 12.78 (34.01)
High-Low RI 0.46 7.21 -0.06 -2.78 -5.64 6.10 (11.19)
t-stat (1.03) (15.50) (-0.12) (-7.02) (-22.39)
Panel C: Unlevered Excess Returns
Low RI 0.55 0.48 0.64 0.54 0.51 0.05 (0.29)
2 0.49 0.57 0.45 0.56 0.36 0.13 (0.82)
3 0.41 0.51 0.57 0.50 0.22 0.19 (1.35)
4 0.57 0.50 0.42 0.43 0.26 0.30 (2.21)
High RI 0.71 0.54 0.45 0.56 0.35 0.36 (2.15)
High-Low RI 0.15 0.06 -0.19 0.02 -0.16 0.31 (1.64)
t-stat (1.14) (0.50) (-1.31) (0.13) (-0.98)
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Table IA.14: Long-Short Portfolios Independently Sorted by Refinancing Intensitites
and Investment-to-Assets
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into five portfolios based on refinancing inten-
sities (RI ) and into five portfolios based on investment-to-assets (IA) using NYSE breakpoints. In each
refinancing quintile, I construct a Low-High IA portfolio that buys the Low IA portfolio and sells the High IA
portfolio. For each of these five long-short portfolios, I calculate monthly value-weighted means in percent-
age points of alpha estimates from regressing excess returns on the market (MKT), the three Fama-French
factors (MKT, SMB, HML), the four factors including momentum (MKT, SMB, HML, UMD), and the five
Fama-French factors (MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA). I also calculate the return differential of buying
the Low-High IA portfolio for firms with high refinancing intensities and selling the Low-High IA portfolio
for firms with low refinancing intensities. Panel A presents the results for risk-adjusted levered returns and
Panel B shows the results for risk-adjusted unlevered returns. I follow Doshi et al. (2018) and calculate
unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1 − Li(t − 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm i in month t
and Li(t− 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month t− 1. The sample period is from July 1970
to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999).
The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01, and t-statistics are
in parenthesis.
CAPM α 3-factor α 4-factor α 5-factor α
Panel A: Risk-Adjusted Returns
Low RI 0.21 0.00 -0.10 -0.23
(1.06) (-0.02) (-0.53) (-1.22)
2 0.52∗∗∗ 0.31∗ 0.22 0.03
(2.92) (1.82) (1.27) (0.18)
3 0.35∗∗ 0.19 0.11 -0.04
(2.08) (1.15) (0.68) (-0.22)
4 0.43∗∗ 0.26 0.31∗ 0.21
(2.52) (1.58) (1.90) (1.30)
High RI 0.70∗∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.49∗∗∗ 0.09
(3.75) (2.55) (2.75) (0.53)
High-Low RI 0.49∗∗ 0.45∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.31
(2.21) (2.00) (2.61) (1.37)
Panel B: Risk-Adjusted Unlevered Returns
Low RI 0.16 0.00 -0.07 -0.17
(0.97) (-0.02) (-0.46) (-1.08)
2 0.31∗∗ 0.13 0.08 -0.05
(2.06) (0.91) (0.57) (-0.33)
3 0.28∗∗ 0.15 0.09 -0.02
(2.02) (1.14) (0.68) (-0.15)
4 0.42∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.36∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗
(3.15) (2.48) (2.71) (2.25)
High RI 0.52∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.01
(3.27) (2.15) (2.21) (0.04)
High-Low RI 0.36∗ 0.33∗ 0.42∗∗ 0.17
(1.91) (1.71) (2.13) (0.88)
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Table IA.15: Portfolios Independently Sorted by Refinancing Intensitites and Asset
Growth
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into five portfolios based on refinancing in-
tensities (RI ) and into five portfolios based on asset growth rates (AG) using NYSE breakpoints. In each
refinancing quintile, I construct a Low-High AG portfolio that buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the
High AG portfolio. In each asset-growth quintile, I construct a High-Low RI portfolio that buys the High
RI portfolio and sells the Low RI portfolio. I also calculate the return differential of buying the Low-High
AG portfolio for firms with high refinancing intensities and selling the Low-High AG portfolio for firms with
low refinancing intensities. Panel A presents monthly value-weighted means of excess returns in percentage
points. Panel B shows value-weighted average leverage ratios in percent. Panel C presents monthly value-
weighted means of unlevered excess returns in percentage points. I follow Doshi et al. (2018) and calculate
unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1 − Li(t − 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm i in month t
and Li(t− 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month t− 1. The sample period is from July 1970
to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999).
The parentheses contain t-statistics.
Low AG 2 3 4 High AG Low-High AG t-stat
Panel A: Excess Returns
Low RI 0.54 0.77 0.80 0.66 0.65 -0.11 (-0.60)
2 0.96 0.81 0.60 0.73 0.54 0.42 (2.14)
3 0.72 0.81 0.65 0.66 0.26 0.46 (2.77)
4 0.76 0.80 0.71 0.60 0.38 0.38 (2.44)
High RI 1.04 0.73 0.73 0.62 0.64 0.40 (2.18)
High-Low RI 0.50 -0.04 -0.08 -0.04 -0.01 0.51 (2.45)
t-stat (3.01) (-0.27) (-0.48) (-0.26) (-0.06)
Panel B: Leverage
Low RI 15.53 12.98 11.89 9.42 7.55 7.99 (28.57)
2 25.08 20.62 16.03 12.63 13.68 11.40 (33.72)
3 27.92 25.10 20.41 17.66 17.38 10.54 (28.70)
4 33.66 28.01 24.04 21.09 22.98 10.68 (26.87)
High RI 39.81 32.61 31.52 28.85 27.76 12.05 (24.39)
High-Low RI 24.28 19.63 19.63 19.44 20.22 4.07 (7.16)
t-stat (54.57) (44.90) (47.81) (55.35) (57.16)
Panel C: Unlevered Excess Returns
Low RI 0.43 0.64 0.71 0.59 0.61 -0.18 (-1.03)
2 0.70 0.63 0.50 0.63 0.44 0.26 (1.46)
3 0.48 0.58 0.49 0.56 0.20 0.28 (1.94)
4 0.49 0.56 0.52 0.47 0.25 0.25 (1.86)
High RI 0.57 0.46 0.44 0.43 0.50 0.08 (0.52)
High-Low RI 0.14 -0.18 -0.26 -0.16 -0.12 0.26 (1.43)
t-stat (1.01) (-1.36) (-1.97) (-1.08) (-0.70)
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Table IA.16: Long-Short Portfolios Independently Sorted by Refinancing Intensitites
and Asset Growth
At the end of each June, I independently double-sort stocks into five portfolios based on refinancing in-
tensities (RI ) and into five portfolios based on asset growth rates (AG) using NYSE breakpoints. In each
refinancing quintile, I construct a Low-High AG portfolio that buys the Low AG portfolio and sells the
High AG portfolio. For each of these five long-short portfolios, I calculate monthly value-weighted means in
percentage points of alpha estimates from regressing excess returns on the market (MKT), the three Fama-
French factors (MKT, SMB, HML), the four factors including momentum (MKT, SMB, HML, UMD), and
the five Fama-French factors (MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA). I also calculate the return differential of
buying the Low-High AG portfolio for firms with high refinancing intensities and selling the Low-High AG
portfolio for firms with low refinancing intensities. Panel A presents the results for risk-adjusted levered
returns and Panel B shows the results for risk-adjusted unlevered returns. I follow Doshi et al. (2018) and
calculate unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1− Li(t− 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm i in
month t and Li(t− 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month t− 1. The sample period is from
July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes
4900-4999). The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01, and
t-statistics are in parenthesis.
CAPM α 3-factor α 4-factor α 5-factor α
Panel A: Risk-Adjusted Returns
Low RI -0.01 -0.35∗∗ -0.40∗∗ -0.64∗∗∗
(-0.08) (-2.15) (-2.35) (-4.51)
2 0.51∗∗∗ 0.17 0.12 -0.14
(2.60) (0.99) (0.68) (-0.83)
3 0.53∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗ 0.34∗∗ 0.22
(3.19) (2.08) (2.14) (1.40)
4 0.46∗∗∗ 0.25∗ 0.30∗∗ 0.08
(2.95) (1.71) (1.99) (0.53)
High RI 0.51∗∗∗ 0.22 0.31∗ -0.11
(2.79) (1.35) (1.85) (-0.68)
High-Low RI 0.52∗∗ 0.57∗∗∗ 0.70∗∗∗ 0.53∗∗
(2.47) (2.78) (3.35) (2.54)
Panel B: Risk-Adjusted Unlevered Returns
Low RI -0.04 -0.36∗∗ -0.41∗∗∗ -0.63∗∗∗
(-0.24) (-2.41) (-2.62) (-4.85)
2 0.40∗∗ 0.13 0.08 -0.14
(2.34) (0.84) (0.47) (-0.93)
3 0.40∗∗∗ 0.24∗ 0.25∗ 0.17
(2.88) (1.83) (1.90) (1.30)
4 0.39∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗ 0.26∗∗ 0.12
(3.17) (2.14) (2.19) (1.01)
High RI 0.23∗ 0.03 0.13 -0.21∗
(1.68) (0.28) (1.01) (-1.73)
High-Low RI 0.27 0.40∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗
(1.49) (2.27) (2.99) (2.42)
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Table IA.17: FM Regressions: Asset Growth and Leverage
This table presents the results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of future excess returns on the
logarithm of asset growth (AG), beta (β), the logarithm of the market value of equity (ME ), the logarithm
of the book-to-market ratio (BM ), and the logarithm of operating profitability (OP). For the cross-sectional
regressions, I use either ordinary least squares estimates (equal-weighted) or weighted least squares with
the market value of equity as the weighting scheme (value-weighted). I estimate β as in Fama and French
(1992) while BM and OP are calculated as in Fama and French (2015). Panel A presents the results for
excess returns and Panel B shows the results for unlevered excess returns. I follow Doshi et al. (2018) and
calculate unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1− Li(t− 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return for firm i in
month t and Li(t− 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month t− 1. The sample period is from
July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes
4900-4999). The t-statistics in parenthesis are adjusted following Newey and West (1987) using six lags.
The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01.
Value-weighted Equal-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Excess Returns
Log(1+AG) -0.66∗∗ -0.36∗∗ -1.41∗∗∗ -1.11∗∗∗
(-2.35) (-2.19) (-7.71) (-9.45)
β -0.08 -0.05
(-0.25) (-0.17)
Log(ME) -0.08∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗
(-2.29) (-4.14)
Log(BM) 0.15 0.20∗∗∗
(1.64) (2.96)
Log(1+OP ) 0.87∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗
(3.39) (2.58)
Adj. R2 0.01 0.10 0.00 0.03
N 3025.35 2786.96 3025.35 2786.96
Panel B: Unlevered Excess Returns
Log(1+AG) -0.42 -0.21 -0.86∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗
(-1.60) (-1.45) (-5.95) (-8.44)
β -0.09 -0.11
(-0.32) (-0.52)
Log(ME) -0.06∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗
(-2.07) (-3.45)
Log(BM) 0.02 0.04
(0.26) (0.67)
Log(1+OP ) 0.56∗∗ 0.32∗∗
(2.56) (2.15)
Adj. R2 0.02 0.10 0.00 0.03
N 3025.35 2786.96 3025.35 2786.96
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Table IA.18: FM Regressions: Asset Growth and Zero-Leverage Firms
This table presents the results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of future excess returns on the
logarithm of asset growth (AG), beta (β), the logarithm of the market value of equity (ME ), the logarithm
of the book-to-market ratio (BM ), and the logarithm of operating profitability (OP) for zero-leverage firms.
For the cross-sectional regressions, I use either ordinary least squares estimates (equal-weighted) or weighted
least squares with the market value of equity as the weighting scheme (value-weighted). I estimate β as
in Fama and French (1992) while BM and OP are calculated as in Fama and French (2015). I define
firm i as zero-leverage if in both years t − 2 and t − 1 the outstanding amounts of both short-term debt
(DLC ) and long-term debt (DLTT ) equal zero. The sample period is from July 1970 to June 2016 where
I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). The t-statistics in
parenthesis are adjusted following Newey and West (1987) using six lags. The convention for p-values is: ∗
when p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01.
Value-weighted Equal-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Log(1+AG) 0.78 0.29 -0.25 -0.17
(1.22) (0.48) (-0.71) (-0.49)
β 0.78∗ 0.22
(1.72) (0.66)
Log(ME) 0.07 -0.21∗∗∗
(1.13) (-4.48)
Log(BM) 0.26∗ 0.34∗∗∗
(1.94) (3.79)
Log(1+OP ) 1.25∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗
(2.41) (2.61)
Adj. R2 0.05 0.16 0.01 0.03
N 297.71 284.86 297.71 284.86
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Table IA.19: FM Regressions: Asset Growth and Refinancing Intensitites
This table presents the results of Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of future excess returns on the
logarithm of asset growth (AG), refinancing intensities (RI ), and their interaction. For the cross-sectional
regressions, I use either ordinary least squares estimates (equal-weighted) or weighted least squares with
the market value of equity as the weighting scheme (value-weighted). In specifications (2) and (4), I also
include beta (β), the logarithm of the market value of equity (ME ), the logarithm of the book-to-market
ratio (BM ), and the logarithm of operating profitability (OP) in the regressions. I estimate β as in Fama
and French (1992) while BM and OP are calculated as in Fama and French (2015). Panel A presents the
results for excess returns and Panel B shows the results for unlevered excess returns. I follow Doshi et al.
(2018) and calculate unlevered excess returns as RE,i(t)(1 − Li(t − 1)) where RE,i(t) is the excess return
for firm i in month t and Li(t − 1) is the leverage ratio of firm i at the end of month t − 1. The sample
period is from July 1970 to June 2016 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities
(SIC codes 4900-4999). The t-statistics in parenthesis are adjusted following Newey and West (1987) using
six lags. The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01.
Value-weighted Equal-weighted
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Excess Returns
Log(1+AG) -0.73∗∗ -0.33∗ -1.45∗∗∗ -1.07∗∗∗
(-2.47) (-1.80) (-7.42) (-7.63)
RI 0.41 0.40 0.45∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(1.18) (1.52) (2.12) (3.13)
Log(1+AG)*RI -0.96 -1.30 -0.11 -0.48
(-1.16) (-1.48) (-0.28) (-1.06)
Controls N Y N Y
Adj. R2 0.02 0.10 0.01 0.03
N 2643.23 2428.12 2643.23 2428.12
Panel B: Unlevered Excess Returns
Log(1+AG) -0.50∗ -0.20 -0.77∗∗∗ -0.63∗∗∗
(-1.90) (-1.28) (-5.52) (-6.64)
RI 0.43 0.43∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.65∗∗∗
(1.39) (1.76) (2.33) (4.62)
Log(1+AG)*RI -0.69 -1.02 -0.23 -0.56
(-0.96) (-1.34) (-0.80) (-1.57)
Controls N Y N Y
Adj. R2 0.02 0.11 0.01 0.03
N 2643.23 2428.12 2643.23 2428.12
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Chapter 2
Why Does Debt Dispersion Affect
Yield Spreads?
Thomas Kjær Poulsen*
Abstract
I study predictions of rollover risk models and strategic debt service models on the negative rela-
tionship between corporate bond yield spreads and debt dispersion. Rollover risk models predict
a more negative relationship for financially constrained firms, whereas strategic debt service mod-
els predict a less negative relationship. To test these predictions I run panel regressions of yield
spreads on debt dispersion interacted with measures of financial constraints. I find that the re-
lationship between yield spreads and debt dispersion is more negative for financially constrained
firms consistent with rollover risk models.
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1 Introduction
A central question in the corporate bond literature is why some bonds have higher yield spreads
than others. Yield spreads directly determine firms’ debt financing costs and influence both fi-
nancing and investment decisions. Understanding the determinants of yield spreads is therefore
important not only for finance academics but also for finance professionals to inform corporate
financial policies. In the literature there is a well-established negative relationship between yield
spreads and debt dispersion (see e.g. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), Dass and Massa (2014),
and Nagler (2019)). In this paper, I examine two possible explanations for this negative relation-
ship: rollover risk and strategic debt service. According to both theories debt dispersion reduces
yield spreads but for different reasons.
Theories of rollover risk argue that firms with more dispersed debt maturities have lower yield
spreads because they are less likely to default (e.g. Choi et al. (2018)). Theories of strategic debt
service argue that higher renegotiation frictions, which determine how difficult it is to renegotiate
the firm’s debt, reduce equity holders’ incentive to default strategically and therefore results in
lower yield spreads (e.g. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007)). Empirically, measures of debt matu-
rity dispersion and proxies for renegotiation frictions are often highly correlated. I therefore refer
to these measures jointly as debt dispersion.
To disentangle these two candidate explanations from each other I examine how the relation-
ship between yield spreads and debt dispersion depends on the level of financial constraints. I
exploit the fact that financially constrained firms are more exposed to capital market conditions
(see e.g. Gomes et al. (2006), Whited and Wu (2006), Livdan et al. (2009), and Li (2011)). In
rollover risk models yield spreads should decrease more with debt maturity dispersion for finan-
cially constrained firms because they are more exposed to capital market conditions. In strategic
debt service models the relationship between yield spreads and renegotiation frictions should be
less negative for financially constrained firms. To derive this hypothesis I extend the strategic debt
service model by Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007).
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) show that the relationship between yield spreads and rene-
gotiation frictions is determined by a trade-off between two opposing effects. On the one hand,
renegotiation frictions reduce the incentive for equity holders to threaten to default strategically
with a view to obtain debt concessions. This strategic default effect decreases yield spreads because
the probability of default decreases. On the other hand, renegotiation frictions also increase ex-
pected liquidation costs in bankruptcy because renegotiations are more likely to fail. This recovery
effect increases yield spreads because expected recovery rates decrease. When equity holders have
high bargaining power vis-a´-vis debt holders, the strategic default effect dominates and vice versa.
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To analyze the effects of financial constraints in strategic debt service models I make two exten-
sions to the Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) model. First, I assume that financially constrained
firms borrow at higher rates consistent with the empirical evidence that financially constrained
firms face higher costs of capital because they are more exposed to capital market conditions (see
e.g. Gomes et al. (2006), Whited and Wu (2006), Livdan et al. (2009), and Li (2011)). Second, I
assume that firms refinance maturing debt by issuing new debt.
The model shows that financial constraints strengthen the recovery effect because equity hold-
ers default more often as higher borrowing costs make it more expensive to refinance maturing
debt. When equity holders have low bargaining power and the recovery effect dominates, higher
financial constraints increase the recovery effect and make the relationship between yield spreads
and renegotiation frictions more positive. When equity holders have high bargaining power, the
relationship between yield spreads and renegotiation frictions should be less negative for finan-
cially constrained firms because the higher recovery effect offsets the strategic default effect. In
fact the higher recovery effect may dominate for high levels of financial constraints such that the
relationship between yield spreads and renegotiation frictions becomes positive.
In the empirical analysis I use Enhanced TRACE transaction data from 1 July 2002 to 30 June
2017 to compute yield spreads. I follow Choi et al. (2018) and measure debt maturity dispersion
based on an inverse Herfindahl index of the firm’s outstanding debt principal shares within specific
maturity buckets. To proxy for renegotiation frictions I use the normalized number of bond issues
similar to Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007). These two variables have a correlation coefficient of
0.76. My results are robust to using other measures of debt maturity dispersion and proxies for
renegotiation frictions.
I regress yield spreads on either debt maturity dispersion or the normalized number of bond
issues and control for well-known determinants from the literature. The coefficient estimates are
negative and statistically significant. A one standard deviation increase in debt maturity dispersion
(normalized number of bond issues) decreases yield spreads by 14.4 (12.7) basis points (bps) on
average, which corresponds to almost 10% of the median yield spread. I also divide the sample
into four groups based on bond ratings and run the same regression within each rating group. The
absolute value of the coefficient estimates on debt maturity dispersion and the normalized number
of bond issues increase with credit risk and remain statistically significant except for bonds rated
AAA-AA. These findings are consistent with Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), Dass and Massa
(2014), and Nagler (2019).
To analyze the effects of financial constraints I consider three of the most widely used indexes
of financial constraints. The WW index from Whited and Wu (2006), the SA index by Hadlock
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and Pierce (2010), and the KZ index used in Lamont et al. (2001) which builds on Kaplan and
Zingales (1997). Higher index values correspond to higher levels of financial constraints. I interact
these measures of financial constraints with either maturity dispersion or the normalized number
of bond issues and regress yield spreads on the interaction variable and a set of controls. For all
three measures, the coefficient estimate on the interaction variable is negative and mostly statis-
tically significant. The relationship between yield spreads and debt dispersion is therefore more
negative for financially constrained firms consistent with theories of rollover risk. For example, a
one standard deviation increase in debt maturity dispersion (normalized number of bond issues)
decreases yield spreads by up to 47.4 (22.2) bps on average for financially constrained firms.
Taken together, my findings show that the negative relationship between yield spreads and debt
dispersion reflects rollover risk rather than strategic debt service concerns. My results are useful
for understanding the survey evidence in Servaes and Tufano (2006) that firms’ debt maturity
decisions are mainly driven by a desire to mitigate rollover risk.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper belongs to the literature on debt maturity dispersion. Choi et al. (2018) study the firm’s
decision to spread out debt maturity dates across time. They document that firms increase debt
maturity dispersion when they anticipate higher rollover risk and that maturities on newly issued
debt depend on pre-existing maturity profiles. Dass and Massa (2014) find that firms with more
dispersed maturities have lower yield spreads and attribute this finding to higher demand from
institutional investors that economize on information-collection costs. Nagler (2019) also finds a
negative relationship between yield spreads and maturity dispersion using a sample of S&P 500
firms. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) study the effects of strategic actions on yield spreads and
argue that dispersed debt proxies for renegotiation frictions. They document a negative relation-
ship between yield spreads and renegotiation frictions and show how this finding is consistent with
strategic debt service models. None of these papers consider the impact of financial constraints.
My paper also contributes to the literature on debt maturity choice and rollover risk. Barclay
and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Stohs and Mauer (1996) study the determinants
of average debt maturities while Gopalan et al. (2014) analyze the relationship between yield
spreads and rollover risk. Diamond and He (2014) examine the effects of short and long-term
debt on the debt overhang problem. He and Xiong (2012b), He and Milbradt (2014), and Chen
et al. (2018) investigate how bond market illiquidity affects yield spreads through the debt rollover
channel. Xu (2017) shows that firms often use early refinancing to extend debt maturity especially
among speculative-grade firms. Harford et al. (2014) find that firms with more refinancing risk
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increase their cash holdings to mitigate rollover risk. None of these papers focus on debt maturity
dispersion.
Finally, my paper also relates to the literature on strategic debt service. Anderson and Sun-
daresan (1996), Mella-Barral and Perraudin (1997), Fan and Sundaresan (2000), and Hege and
Mella-Barral (2005) study how strategic debt service influences the pricing of debt and equity in
contingent claims models. Christensen et al. (2014) consider strategic debt service when debt hold-
ers can reject non-credible threats by equity holders. Hackbarth et al. (2007) analyze the optimal
mixture of public debt and bank debt when firms can renegotiate the bank debt outside of formal
bankruptcy. Arnold and Westermann (2017) develop a model in which the firm can renegotiate
debt both in financial distress and outside of distress.
2 Testable Hypotheses
This section presents testable hypotheses to guide the empirical analysis. I hypothesize the rela-
tionship between yield spreads and debt dispersion based on theories of rollover risk and strategic
debt service. In Appendix A and B I formally derive the testable hypotheses in extended versions
of the rollover risk model by Choi et al. (2018) and the strategic debt service model by Davydenko
and Strebulaev (2007).
2.1 Rollover Risk
In rollover risk models firms face the risk that capital market conditions deteriorate when they
have to redeem maturing debt. If conditions in capital markets deteriorate, the cost of refinancing
maturing debt increases and in the most extreme case it may be impossible to raise new financing.
The firm could therefore be forced to cut back on investments and/or liquidate assets to repay
maturing debt. When the firm cannot repay its debt, debt holders recover less than their principal
value due to liquidation costs in bankruptcy.
To mitigate the adverse effects of deteriorating capital market conditions firms can divide their
total debt financing needs into smaller debt issues and spread out their maturity dates across
time. If capital markets deteriorate, firms with dispersed debt maturities are less likely to default
compared to firms with concentrated debt maturities that have to refinance a larger amount of
debt. All else equal, bonds issued by firms with dispersed debt maturities therefore have lower
yield spreads relative to firms with concentrated debt maturities.
Financially constrained firms are more exposed to capital market conditions and find it more
difficult and/or costly to raise new financing in capital markets. All else equal, the effect of debt
maturity dispersion on yield spreads is therefore more pronounced for financially constrained firms.
71
This prediction supports the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 1: The relationship between yield spreads and debt maturity dispersion is more
negative for financially constrained firms.
2.2 Strategic Debt Service
In strategic debt service models equity holders can threaten to default strategically with a view
to obtain debt concessions. Debt holders have incentives to renegotiate the debt because they can
avoid liquidation costs in bankruptcy. Hart and Moore (1998) and Fan and Sundaresan (2000)
identify two opposing effects that determine how the possibility to renegotiate debt affects yield
spreads. On the one hand, the possibility to renegotiate enables debt holders to avoid liquidation
cost they would otherwise incur ex post default. This recovery effect reduces yield spreads because
expected recovery rates increase. On the other hand, the possibility to renegotiate may induce
equity holders to default strategically more often. This strategic default effect increases yield
spreads because the probability of default increases. The possibility to renegotiate therefore has
an ambiguous impact on yield spreads.
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) examine the relationship between yield spreads and rene-
gotiation frictions to infer how the possibility to renegotiate the firm’s debt affects yield spreads.
Renegotiation frictions determine how difficult it is to renegotiate between equity and debt hold-
ers. Suppose that q measures the difficulty of renegotiating and let s denote the yield spread. The
derivative φ = ∂s/∂q measures the sensitivity of yield spreads to renegotiation frictions. Davy-
denko and Strebulaev (2007) argue that if φ > 0, it can either be because the strategic default effect
is non-existent or because the recovery effect dominates the strategic default effect. Intuitively,
higher renegotiation frictions reduce equity holders’ incentives to default strategically which de-
crease yield spreads (i.e. the strategic default effect). However, higher renegotiation frictions also
increase expected liquidation costs which increase yield spreads (i.e. the recovery effect). Davy-
denko and Strebulaev (2007) also argue that if φ < 0, it must indicate that the strategic default
effect exists and dominates the recovery effect.
If liquidation costs are strictly positive, the relative bargaining power of debt and equity holders
determines whether the strategic default effect or the recovery effect dominates. When equity
holders have all the bargaining power, they capture the entire bargaining surplus. In this case
there is no recovery effect because debt holders cannot capture any surplus from bargaining. The
strategic default effect therefore dominates meaning that φ < 0. Under these conditions higher
renegotiation frictions decrease yield spreads because equity holders have lower incentives to default
strategically (i.e. the default probability decreases).
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Suppose instead that debt holders have all the bargaining power. Equity holders have no
incentive to default strategically as they cannot capture any surplus from bargaining. In this
case there is no strategic default effect meaning that the recovery effect dominates and φ > 0.
Under these conditions higher renegotiation frictions increase yield spreads because the expected
liquidation costs increases (i.e. the recovery rate decreases).
Gertner and Scharfstein (1991) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) show that free-rider and
coordination problems make renegotiations more difficult when they involve many parties with
competing interests. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) construct proxies for renegotiation frictions
based on the firm’s debt structure. Their measures include the normalized number of outstanding
bond issues, a dispersion measure based on outstanding principal values, the ratio of outstanding
public debt to total debt, and the ratio of short-term debt to total debt. In the Internet Appendix
I show that empirically these proxies for renegotiations frictions are often highly correlated with
measures of debt maturity dispersion.
Importantly, the trade-off between the recovery and the strategic default effect depends on the
level of financial constraints. Suppose that financially constrained firms borrow at higher rates
and that firms refinance maturing debt by issuing new debt. Financial constraints then strengthen
the recovery effect because equity holders default more often as higher borrowing costs increase
the cost of refinancing maturing debt. When equity holders have low bargaining power such that
φ > 0, higher financial constraints increase the recovery effect and make the relationship between
yield spreads and renegotiation frictions more positive. When equity holders have high bargaining
power, the relationship between yield spreads and renegotiation frictions should be less negative for
financially constrained firms because the higher recovery effect offsets the strategic default effect.
I summarize this prediction in the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2: The relationship between yield spreads and renegotiation frictions is less
negative for financially constrained firms.
3 Data and Variables
This section describes the data, sample requirements, and how I construct the main variables used
in the empirical analysis. I also present summary statistics and correlations.
3.1 Data Sources
I obtain bond characteristics and ratings together with the amount outstanding from Mergent
Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD). The amount outstanding data is available from April
1995 and records all changes in the principal amount outstanding for each bond issue over its
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lifetime. At a given point in time, I use the most recent rating from Standard & Poor’s. If this
rating is not available, I use the most recent rating from Moody’s. If this rating is also missing, I
use the most recent Fitch rating. For bonds that are initially rated by Moody’s or Fitch, I keep the
initial rating until a rating becomes available from Standard & Poor’s. I collect bond transaction
data from Enhanced TRACE and follow Dick-Nielsen (2014) to filter out erroneous trades as well
as retail-sized transactions (trades below $100,000). The transaction data is available from 1 July
2002 to 30 June 2017. Finally, I obtain quarterly firm characteristics from COMPUSTAT, daily
stock returns and the annual consumer price index from CRSP together with Treasury rates from
the Federal Reserve Bank.
3.2 Sample Selection
The sample consists of bonds with fixed coupon rates and I exclude bonds that are callable at
a fixed price, putable, convertible, denoted in foreign currency, or have sinking fund provisions.
Similar to Powers and Tsyplakov (2008) and Bao and Hou (2017) I keep bonds with make-whole
call provisions1 in the sample because make-whole calls have little effect on bond prices.
In addition to bonds that are make-whole callable over their entire lifetime, there also exist
a substantial number of hybrid bonds that have both make-whole and fixed-price call provisions.
These hybrid bonds feature a make-whole call provision for the first part of their lifetime and
eventually become callable at a fixed price after some pre-specified date listed in the bond indenture.
They are often issued by speculative grade firms and these firms are typically more financially
constrained. I therefore include bonds that are both make-whole callable and callable at a fixed
price in the sample provided that they are in their make-whole call period and there is at least
one year to the first date at which the bond can be called at a fixed price.
I exclude utilities and financial firms (SIC codes 4900-4999 and 6000-6999) from the sample
because they are regulated and have special capital structures. I only consider non-defaulted bonds
and exclude bonds with time-to-maturities less than one year or greater than 30 years. Lastly, a
bond must have all data items necessary to calculate the main variables below to be included in
the sample.
1The call price for a bond with a make-whole provision is the greater of (1) the principal value or (2) the sum of
the present values of remaining scheduled payments of coupons and principal discounted with the yield-to-maturity
on a similar maturity Treasury bond plus a fixed spread typically between 10 to 50 bps.
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3.3 Main Variables
Yield Spreads
I use Enhanced TRACE data to calculate a bond’s yield-to-maturity as the volume-weighted yield-
to-maturity for all trades on the last day in each quarter where the bond traded. I calculate bond
yields from transaction prices instead of using reported yields in TRACE because these can be
unreliable (see Bao and Hou (2017)). The yield spread is then given by the yield-to-maturity minus
the interpolated maturity-matched Treasury rate from the Federal Reserve Bank.
Debt Maturity Dispersion
I follow Choi et al. (2018) and use the Herfindahl index to measure the concentration of firms’ debt
structures from Mergent FISD. At the end of each quarter, I consider all the firm’s outstanding
bonds and aggregate them into the nearest integer maturity bucket measured in years. Let xi
denote firm j’s principal amount maturing in maturity bucket i. The fraction of principal maturing
in maturity bucket i relative to the firm’s entire principal outstanding is therefore given by wi =
xi/
∑
i xi. I calculate a Herfindahl index of the firm’s principal shares and measure the dispersion
in the firm’s debt structure as:
Maturity dispersionj = 1/Herfindahlj
where
Herfindahlj =
∑
i
(wi)
2
Renegotiation Frictions
I use the main proxy for renegotiation frictions from Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) which is
the normalized number of bond issues. This proxy for renegotiation frictions measures the bond
structure complexity per dollar of debt. At the end of each quarter, I count the firm’s number of
outstanding bond issues from Mergent FISD and determine the total principal value of outstanding
debt from COMPUSTAT. The normalized number of bond issues for firm j is:
Norm. no. of issuesj =
Log (Number of outstanding bond issuesj)
Log (DLCQj +DLTTQj)
where DLCQ is ”Debt in Current Liabilities” and DLTTQ is ”Long-Term Debt - Total” both
from quarterly COMPUSTAT.
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Financial Constraints
The literature on firms’ financial constraints remains undecided on the superior measure of financial
constraints. For this reason, I consider several different measures and focus on three of the most
widely used in the literature. In particular, I use the WW index from Whited and Wu (2006),
the SA index from Hadlock and Pierce (2010), and the KZ index from Lamont et al. (2001) which
is based on Kaplan and Zingales (1997). These indexes include a specific set of accounting and
market variables such as profitability, cash holdings, leverage, dividend payments etc. I explain
the detailed construction of each index in Appendix C. For all three measures, higher index values
correspond to higher levels of financial constraints.
Control Variables
The control variables include the following bond characteristics from Mergent FISD: coupon rate,
time-to-maturity, bond age, and the principal amount outstanding. I also calculate a transaction
based bid-ask spread to measure the illiquidity of each bond. To construct this variable I use
historical buy-sell side information from Enhanced TRACE which requires at least one buy and
one sell transaction on the same day for a given bond. The daily bid-ask spread is the volume-
weighted ask price minus the volume-weighted bid price divided by the mid-price. For each bond,
I define the quarterly bid-ask spread as the median daily bid-ask spread during each quarter.
I also include a set of firm characteristics typically used in the credit risk literature (see e.g.
Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007), Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), and Bao and Hou (2017)). In
particular, I estimate equity volatility at the end of each quarter as the standard deviation of
daily stock returns from CRSP over the preceding 60 trading days. I compute the firm’s market
leverage, the ratio of cash to total debt, the return on assets, and the book-to-market ratio from
quarterly COMPUSTAT data. For each firm, I also compute the average maturity of all currently
outstanding bonds weighted by their principal shares at the end of each quarter. I include a
detailed description of all variables in Appendix C.
3.4 Merging the Data
I align a yield spread measured on the last day where the bond traded in quarter t with the bid-ask
spreads measured within the same quarter2. The debt maturity dispersion, the normalized number
of bond issues, and the estimated equity volatility are measured at the end of quarter t− 1. I use
2By construction, the bid-ask spread is typically lagged in time compared to the yield spread because I use the
median of daily bid-ask spreads within the same quarter. It may happen, however, that bid-ask spreads and yield
spreads are measured on the same day.
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the linking table from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS Bond Returns) to merge bond-
level information with equity volatility from CRSP for bonds/firms with non-overlapping linking
dates. At the end of quarter t − 1, I use the CRSP-COMPUSTAT linking table to merge the
estimated equity volatility from CRSP with firm characteristics from COMPUSTAT for the fiscal
quarter ending in calendar quarter t− 2. This methodology ensures that COMPUSTAT data are
lagged by 3-5 months compared to observations of yield spreads such that accounting information
should be available to market participants when I observe market prices.
3.5 Summary Statistics and Correlations
Before calculating summary statistics, I winsorize the top and bottom 1% of yield spreads, normal-
ized number of bond issues, bid-ask spreads, equity volatility, cash-to-debt ratios, return on assets,
book-to-market ratios, and both the WW and KZ indexes3 to mitigate the influence of outliers.
[INSERT TABLE 1]
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the entire sample and for four groups based on bond
rating (AAA-AA, A, BBB, and SPEC). The table shows that average yield spreads increase mono-
tonically with credit risk: the average yield spread is 76 bps for bonds rated AAA-AA, 110 bps
for A, 190 bps for BBB, and 451 bps for SPEC. These estimates are somewhat higher compared
to Feldhu¨tter and Schaefer (2018) because they use swap rates to calculate yield spreads whereas
I use Treasury rates. The positive relationship between yield spreads and credit risk, however, is
well-known in the literature (see e.g. Longstaff et al. (2005), Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007),
and Huang and Huang (2012)).
Table 1 also shows that on average, debt maturity dispersion decreases with the level of credit
risk from 6.09 for AAA-AA rated bonds to 3.14 for SPEC rated bonds. The degree of maturity
dispersion remains fairly similar between investment grade bonds, whereas issuers of speculative
grade bonds have considerably less dispersed maturities. The average normalized number of bond
issues shows the same patterns. The relatively flat relationship between average bid-ask spreads
and credit risk partly reflects the fact that bonds with low credit risk on average have longer
time-to-maturity relative to bonds with high credit risk. Since long-term bonds are typically more
illiquid than short-term bonds it is not clear how bid-ask spreads should vary with credit risk
without conditioning on time-to-maturity4. While average bond age remains fairly similar across
rating groups, the average firm-level debt maturity decreases with credit risk. On average, bond
3The SA index is already winsorized by construction. See the detailed construction in Appendix C.
4See Feldhu¨tter and Poulsen (2018) for a detailed analysis on the cross-sectional variation of bid-ask spreads
across bond rating and maturity in the US corporate bond market.
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size decreases substantially with credit risk: AAA-AA rated bonds have an average principal value
of $827 millions compared to $437 millions for SPEC rated bonds. Both average equity volatility
and leverage increase monotonically with credit risk while the average cash/debt ratio decreases
with credit risk. Lastly, return on assets decreases with credit risk while the book/market ratio
increases.
[INSERT TABLE 2]
Table 2 presents summary statistics on the financial constraints indexes. All three indexes
increase monotonically with credit risk. This pattern highlights that issuers of lower-rated bonds
are more financially constrained relative to issuers of higher-rated bonds. The fact that the average
index values are negative reflects that firms in my sample (listed firms with rated corporate bonds)
are typically less financially constrained relative to the remaining population of firms.
[INSERT TABLE 3]
I present correlation coefficients in Table 3. The correlations between yield spreads and the
explanatory variables all have the expected sign. Yield spreads are positively correlated with bid-
ask spreads, coupon rate, time-to-maturity, equity volatility, leverage, the book-to-market ratio,
and indexes of financial constraints. The correlations with maturity dispersion, normalized number
of bond issues, bond age, average firm maturity, amount outstanding, the cash-to-debt ratio, and
return on assets are negative. These correlations, however, do not consider potential interaction
effects with the remaining variables which I take into account in the next section. Maturity
dispersion and the normalized number of bond issues are highly correlated with a correlation
coefficient of 0.76. The correlation coefficients between measures of financial constraints are all
positive: 0.29 between WW and SA, 0.07 between WW and KZ, and 0.03 between SA and KZ. The
modest magnitude of these correlation coefficients mirrors the lack of agreement in the literature
on how to measure financial constraints.
4 Empirical Results
In this section, I test the hypotheses from Section 2. First, I confirm the negative relationship
between yield spreads and debt dispersion consistent with the existing literature. Second, I examine
how this relationship depends on firms’ financial constraints with a view to distinguish rollover
risk from strategic debt service explanations. Third, I discuss robustness checks.
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4.1 Yield Spreads and Debt Dispersion
I begin by analyzing the relationship between yield spreads and debt dispersion by estimating the
following regression:
Y ield spreadijt = β0 + β1Dispersionj,t−1 + δControlsij,t−1 + γit + ijt (1)
where Y ield spreadijt is the yield spread on bond i issued by firm j measured in quarter t, and
Dispersionj,t−1 is either the debt maturity dispersion or the normalized number of bond issues
measured at the end of quarter t − 1, Controlsij,t−1 is a vector of control variables, and γit is a
quarter times rating fixed effect. Control variables include the bid-ask spread, coupon rate, time-
to-maturity, bond age, the firm’s average debt maturity, the bond’s amount outstanding, equity
volatility, leverage, cash/debt, return on assets, and book/market. In all regressions I cluster
standard errors by firm and quarter to take into account that a firm may have several bonds
outstanding at the same point in time. Rollover risk models predict that the coefficient estimate
of β1 is negative and strategic debt service models can generate the same prediction when the
strategic default effect dominates.
[INSERT TABLE 4]
Table 4 presents estimates of equation (1) for the full sample and by bond rating when I use
debt maturity dispersion as explanatory variable. The coefficient estimate of β1 for the full sample
is −0.048 and highly statistically significant. A one standard deviation increase in the dispersion
measure decreases the yield spread by 14.4 bps on average which corresponds to almost 10% of the
median yield spread (145.6 bps). For AAA-AA rated bonds, the coefficient estimate of β1 is close
to zero and statistically insignificant. The coefficient estimate remains negative and statistically
significant for lower-rated bonds while the absolute magnitude of the coefficient estimate increases
with the level of credit risk. For example, a one standard deviation increase in the dispersion
measure decreases the average yield spread by 27 bps for speculative grade bonds. These findings
are consistent with rollover risk models.
The remaining coefficient estimates are in line with the existing literature. The coefficient
estimate on Bid-ask spread is positive and statistically significant consistent with the findings by
e.g. Chen et al. (2007), Bao et al. (2011), and Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) who also document a
positive relationship between yield spreads and bond illiquidity measures. I obtain positive and
statistically significant coefficient estimates on Coupon rate and Log(time-to-maturity) similar to
Chen et al. (2007). The coefficient estimates on Avg. firm maturity are negative as in Bao and Hou
(2017). Similar to Chen et al. (2007) and Bao et al. (2011) I obtain a negative coefficient estimate
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on Log(amount outstanding). The coefficients on Equity volatility and Leverage are positive and
statistically significant consistent with e.g. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007). The results also
show that firms with high cash-to-debt ratios typically have higher yield spreads consistent with
Harford et al. (2014) who show that risky firms choose higher cash holdings to mitigate rollover
risk. I also find that more profitable firms with higher return on assets have lower yield spreads
while the coefficient estimates on book-to-market is mainly positive but statistically insignificant
except for A-rated bonds.
[INSERT TABLE 5]
Table 5 presents estimates of equation (1) for the full sample and by bond rating when I use
the normalized number of bond issues to proxy for renegotiation frictions. The results are almost
identical to those in Table 4 because debt maturity dispersion and the normalized number of
bond issues are highly positively correlated. For example, the coefficient estimate of β1 is −1.273
and highly statistically significant for the full sample. A one standard deviation increase in the
normalized number of bond issues decreases the yield spread by 12.7 bps on average. This economic
magnitude is substantially higher compared to Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) who find that a
one standard deviation increase in their proxies for renegotiation frictions decrease average yield
spreads by 1 − 8 bps. I also find that the absolute magnitude of the coefficient estimate on the
normalized number of bond issues tends to increase with the level of credit risk. These findings
are consistent with strategic debt service models.
My results confirm that yield spreads decrease with debt dispersion. In rollover risk models
this negative relationship reflects that firms with dispersed debt maturities have less rollover risk
and therefore lower default risk and yield spreads. In models of strategic debt service higher
renegotiation frictions reduce equity holders’ incentive to default strategically because bargaining
is more difficult. When this strategic default effect dominates, higher renegotiation frictions result
in lower yield spreads. The results in Table 4 and 5 are therefore consistent with both explanations.
4.2 The Effect of Financial Constraints
I now investigate how the relationship between yield spreads and debt dispersion depends on
the level of firms’ financial constraints. Whited and Wu (2006), Hadlock and Pierce (2010), and
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) divide firms into five groups based on financial constraints when they
construct their indexes. In each quarter, I divide my sample into five groups based on the level
of each financial constraint index. I construct a dummy variable which equals one when the firm
belongs to the top quintile of the financial constraints index and equals zero otherwise. Next, I
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estimate the following regression:
Y ield spreadijt = β0 + β1Dispersionj,t−1 + β2HFCj,t−1 + β3Dispersionj,t−1HFCj,t−1
+ δControlsij,t−1 + γit + ijt (2)
where Y ield spreadijt is the yield spread on bond i issued by firm j measured in quarter t, and
Dispersionj,t−1 is either the debt maturity dispersion or the normalized number of bond issues
measured at the end of quarter t − 1, HFCj,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to one when the firm
belongs to the high-financial-constraints quintile, Controlsij,t−1 is a vector of control variables,
and γit is a quarter times rating fixed effect. I use the same set of control variables and fixed
effects as in equation (1) and continue to cluster standard errors by firm and quarter.
In addition, I also use the financial constraints index values themselves to estimate the following
regression:
Y ield spreadijt = β0 + β1Dispersionj,t−1 + β2FCIj,t−1 + β3Dispersionj,t−1FCIj,t−1
+ δControlsij,t−1 + γit + ijt (3)
where FCIj,t−1 is the financial constraint index value for firm j at time t − 1. The remaining
variables are the same as in equation (2). For equations (2) and (3), the coefficient estimate of β3
should be negative according to Hypothesis 1 but positive according to Hypothesis 2.
[INSERT TABLE 6]
Panel A in Table 6 presents estimates of equation (2) for the three different measures of
financial constraints when I use debt maturity dispersion as explanatory variable. The coefficient
estimates on Maturity dispersion remain negative and statistically significant in all specifications
when controlling for financial constraints. This finding means that debt maturity dispersion is
not simply another measure of financial constraints already captured by the three indexes. The
coefficient estimates on both the WW and SA indexes are positive and statistically significant
meaning that more financially constrained firms on average have higher yield spreads. The KZ
index has a negative coefficient estimate in some specifications akin to the finding by Lamont et al.
(2001) that firms with higher KZ index values have lower average stock returns.
Importantly, the coefficient on the interaction variable between Maturity dispersion and HFC is
negative using all three measures of financial constraints. This finding means that the relationship
between yield spreads and debt maturity dispersion is more negative for financially constrained
firms consistent with rollover risk models. For example, a one standard deviation increase in debt
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maturity dispersion decreases yield spreads by 47.4 bps on average (3.00 ∗ (−0.035 − 0.123) =
−0.474) for financially constrained firms using the WW index. In Panel B, I use the actual index
values of financial constraints to estimate equation (3) and obtain virtually the same results as in
Panel A.
The coefficient estimate on β3 using the SA index is statistically insignificant in Panel A. The
SA index is based on a combination of firm age and firm size measured by total assets. To calculate
the index firm age is capped at 37 years while total assets are capped at $4.5 billions measured
in 2004 dollars. These thresholds may not be reasonable for my sample of listed firms with rated
corporate bonds because these firms are much older and larger than the average firm. In fact 45%
of the observations in my sample have the lowest possible SA index value because firms exceed
the size and/or age thresholds. In untabulated results I replace the FCI variable in equation (3)
with either firm size or firm age. The coefficient estimates on β3 are now positive (because larger
firms and older firms are less constrained) and have t-statistics of 5.62 when I use firm size and
1.86 when I use firm age. When I use dummy variables instead as in equation (2) the coefficient
estimates on β3 remain positive and have t-statistics of 2.39 for both size and age. These results
provide additional evidence on the effects of financial constraints consistent with Hennessy and
Whited (2007) who argue that firm size is the most important proxy for financial constraints.
[INSERT TABLE 7]
Table 7 presents estimates of equation (2) and (3) when I use the normalized number of bond
issues as explanatory variable. Again, the results are almost identical to Table 6 because of the
high correlation between debt maturity dispersion and the normalized number of bond issues.
For example, the coefficient estimate on the interaction variable between Norm. no. of issues
and HFC is negative using all three measures of financial constraints. A one standard deviation
increase in the normalized number of bond issues decreases yield spreads by 22.2 bps on average
(0.10 ∗ (−1.062− 1.174) = −0.222) for financially constrained firms using the KZ index. Panel B
shows that the coefficient estimates on β3 remain negative when I use the actual index values of
financial constraints to estimate equation (3). In untabulated results I replace FCI with firm size
or firm age and obtain positive coefficient estimates with t-statistics of 1.86 and 1.59, respectively.
These findings show that the relationship between yield spreads and renegotiation frictions is more
negative for financially constrained firms in contrast to the prediction from strategic debt service
models.
Taken together, my findings support Hypothesis 1 and are inconsistent with Hypothesis 2. The
empirical evidence supports rollover risk models in which the effect of debt maturity dispersion
on yield spreads is more pronounced for financially constrained firms. My results are inconsistent
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with strategic debt service models because these models predict a less negative relationship between
yield spreads and renegotiation frictions for firms with higher levels of financial constraints.
4.3 Robustness Checks
In the main analysis I use the inverse Herfindahl measure to quantify debt maturity dispersion.
Choi et al. (2018) point out that this measure may not capture all aspects of firms’ debt maturity
profiles. For example, this measure does not distinguish between maturity dates in the near future
and maturity dates in the more distant future. Moreover, the inverse Herfindahl measure may be
affected by the longest feasible maturity a firm can issue. For example, if a firm cannot issue debt
with maturities greater than five years then the Herfindahl index will be greater than or equal to
0.2. To alleviate these concerns, Choi et al. (2018) develop two additional dispersion measures:
an inverse weighted Herfindahl index that gives more weight to short-term debt and a dispersion
measure based on the distance from a perfectly dispersed debt maturity profile. As a robustness
check I repeat the main analysis using both of these dispersion measures. The results are similar
to those presented above and a full summary can be found in the Internet Appendix together with
a detailed explanation on how to construct the additional dispersion measures.
I also consider other proxies for renegotiation frictions than the normalized number of bond
issues. Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) also use an inverse Herfindahl index of bond principal
values, the fraction of public debt to total debt, and the fraction of short-term debt to total debt to
proxy for renegotiation frictions. I present the results using these proxies in the Internet Appendix
which are broadly similar to those presented above.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, I document that the negative relationship between yield spreads and debt dispersion
is more pronounced for financially constrained firms. I show that this finding supports theories of
rollover risk where dispersed debt maturities reduce default risk and therefore also yield spreads.
The negative relationship is more pronounced for financially constrained firms because they are
more exposed to capital market conditions.
The negative relationship between yield spreads and debt dispersion could also be consistent
with theories of strategic debt service. In these models dispersed debt proxies for renegotiation
frictions which reduce equity holders’ incentive to default strategically. This strategic default effect
tends to decrease yield spreads. However, renegotiation frictions also increase expected liquidation
costs in bankruptcy. This recovery effect tends to increase yield spreads. I show that the recovery
effect is more pronounced for financially distressed firms because they have higher default risk. As
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a result, the relationship between yield spreads and renegotiation frictions should be less negative
for financially constrained firms. This prediction is inconsistent with the empirical evidence found
in this paper.
Taken together, my results shed new light on how and why debt maturity profiles are priced
in the cross-section of yield spreads. My results are useful for understanding the survey evidence
in Servaes and Tufano (2006) that firms’ debt maturity decisions are mainly driven by a desire
to mitigate rollover risk. Moreover, the empirical evidence rationalizes the findings by Choi et al.
(2018) that firms increase debt maturity dispersion when they anticipate higher rollover risk and
explains why maturities on newly issued debt depend on pre-existing maturity profiles. It remains
an interesting question to explore how demand from institutional investors as in Dass and Massa
(2014) may be related to firms’ financial constraints. I leave this question for future research.
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Appendices
A Rollover Risk Model
In this section, I include liquidation costs and risky debt into the rollover risk model by Choi
et al. (2018) to derive Hypothesis 1. For ease of exposition, I do not consider growth options and
issuance costs of debt as in Choi et al. (2018) but only focus on the pricing of debt. The model
has three time periods separated by four dates t0, t1, t2, and t3. The firm is initially all-equity
financed and has assets in place with a market value of A. At time t0, the firm invests in a project
which requires a capital outlay of I > A. This project generates three cash flows: an intermediate
cash flow c at both times t1 and t2 together with a final cash flow I at time t3. The risk-free rate
is zero.
The firm finances the required investment spending I − A at time t0 by issuing one- or two-
period debt with the same seniority. In turn the firm must roll over its debt before time t3. At
times t1 and t2, the debt market may freeze with probability δ. If the debt market freezes, the
firm cannot roll over maturing debt and must repay the debt holders from intermediate cash flows
or default on the debt. The principal value of maturing debt is B so the firm repays the debt
when B ≤ c and defaults when B > c in case the debt market freezes. When the firm defaults,
debt holders recover a fraction (1 − α) of the debt principal where α reflects liquidation costs in
bankruptcy.
Now, consider two firms with different initial debt structures. Firm D issues two bonds at time
t0 with the same principal value B
D
1 = B
D
2 = (I − A)/2. Bond 1 matures at time t1 and bond
2 matures at time t2 such that the firm has a perfectly dispersed debt maturity profile. Firm C
only issues one bond with principal value BC = (I −A) and therefore has a perfectly concentrated
debt maturity profile. This firm is indifferent between choosing maturity date t1 or t2 because the
probability of a debt market freeze remains the same in both periods. Without loss of generality
I therefore assume that the bond matures at time t2.
I require that I−A > c > (I−A)/2 and that any excess cash remaining after rolling over debt
is paid out as dividends to the equity holders in each time period together with the restriction that
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the firm cannot issue new equity. The first inequality entails that the intermediate cash flow c is
insufficient to repay the debt principal for Firm C. Firm C will therefore default in case the debt
market freezes. The second inequality states that firm D can repay the debt principal out of the
intermediate cash flow and therefore do not default if the debt market freezes.
Firm D’s debt is risk-free because the firm never defaults. The market value of its total debt
DD is therefore equal to the total principal value:
DD = BD1 +B
D
2 = I −A (A.1)
Firm C may default at time t2 in which case the debt holders recover less than the principal
value due to liquidation costs. Firm C’s debt is therefore risky and has a market value of:
DC = (I −A)− δα(I −A) (A.2)
where the first term is the risk-free value and the second term is the expected present value of
liquidation costs.
Firm D and C represent the two extremes of perfectly dispersed and perfectly concentrated
debt maturity profiles, respectively. One way to think about firms with intermediate debt maturity
dispersion is to consider a weighted average between these two extremes. Let DI denote the market
value of a bond issued by a firm with intermediate debt maturity dispersion:
DI = qDD + (1− q)DC
= q(I −A) + (1− q)
(
(I −A)− δα(I −A)
)
(A.3)
where q denotes the weight in the perfectly dispersed debt maturity profile. Differentiating DI
with respect to q yields:
∂DI
∂q
= δα(I −A) > 0 (A.4)
meaning that bond prices increase with the level of debt maturity dispersion. Conversely, yield
spreads decrease with debt maturity dispersion.
Gomes et al. (2006), Whited and Wu (2006), Livdan et al. (2009), and Li (2011) find that
financially constrained firms face higher cost of capital. Based on their findings, I assume that the
probability that a given firm experiences a debt market freeze has two components: δ = δM + δI
where δM reflects the market-wide probability and δI reflects an idiosyncratic part. Since financially
constrained firms are more exposed to capital market conditions, I assume that δI increases with
the level of financial constraints.
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HYPOTHESIS 1: Differentiating ∂D
I
∂q with respect to δ yields
∂DI
∂q∂δ
= α(I −A) > 0 (A.5)
meaning that bond prices increase more with debt maturity dispersion when δ is higher i.e. when
the firm is more financially constrained. Conversely, the relationship between yield spreads and
debt maturity dispersion is more negative for financially constrained firms.
I note that the model also gives rise to an additional testable hypothesis on the effect of
liquidation costs. The derivative ∂D
I
∂q∂α = δ(I −A) > 0 meaning that the relationship between yield
spreads and debt maturity dispersion should be more negative the higher the level of liquidation
costs. I do not focus on this hypothesis in the paper because strategic debt service models generate
the same prediction and it is therefore not possible to distinguish the two models from each other
based on this prediction.
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B Strategic Debt Service Model
In this section, I extend the strategic debt service model by Davydenko and Strebulaev (2007) by
introducing costly financial constraints. In particular, I assume that financially constrained firms
borrow at higher rates and that firms refinance maturing debt by issuing new debt. I then use the
extended model to derive Hypothesis 2.
The firm has assets-in-place that follows a geometric Brownian motion under the equivalent
martingale measure Q:
dVt = (r − β)Vtdt+ σVtdZt (B.1)
where r is the risk-free rate, β is the payout ratio, σ is the volatility, and dZt is the increment of
a standard Brownian motion {Zt : 0 ≤ t <∞} under Q.
The firm is financed by both debt and equity. If the firm defaults and the claims are settled
in bankruptcy court, the firm incurs proportional liquidation costs of αV where V is the market
value of assets at default. Alternatively, the debt and equity holders can renegotiate the debt
contract at no cost by agreeing on a debt-for-equity swap. Renegotiation fails with probability q
for exogenous reasons in which case the claims are settled in bankruptcy court according to the
absolute priority rule. The parameter q reflects frictions that impede the renegotiation process
such as having dispersed debt holders. In renegotiation, the equity and debt holders play a Nash
bargaining game with bargaining power η and 1−η respectively. Fan and Sundaresan (2000) show
that this game results in an optimal sharing rule where equity holders get ηαVR and debt holders
get (1− ηα)VR where VR denotes the market value of assets at the endogenous debt renegotiation
boundary.
The firm issues zero-coupon bonds with an aggregate principal value B. Each bond mature with
Poisson intensity m meaning that the expected time-to-maturity is 1m as in Cheng and Milbradt
(2012), He and Xiong (2012a), Chen et al. (2018), Friewald et al. (2018), and Nagler (2019). The
firm commits to keep the aggregate principal value constant through time. At each instant in time,
the firm therefore repays an expected principal amount mB and immediately issues new bonds
to keep the aggregate principal value constant. Debt holders may require a premium δ in excess
of the risk-free rate when they discount cash flows. The parameter δ reflects that debt holders
require higher compensation when they lend to financially constrained firms. This assumption is
consistent with my empirical findings in Table 6 and 7 that bonds issued by financially constrained
firms typically have higher yield spreads.
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The market value of debt D(V ) is the solution to the ordinary differential equation (ODE):
(r + δ)D =
1
2
σ2V 2DV V + (r − β)V DV +m(B −D) (B.2)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The equation states that the required return on the
left-hand side must equal the expected return on the right-hand side. The first two terms is the
expected change in the value of debt when V fluctuates. The third term is the change in debt
value from retiring maturing debt at principal value and issuing new debt at market value.
The general solution to equation (B.2) is given by:
D(V ) = d2V
γ +
mB
r +m+ δ
(B.3)
where
γ =
[
1
2
− r − β
σ2
]
−
√[
1
2
− r − β
σ2
]2
+
2(r +m+ δ)
σ2
< 0 (B.4)
and the coefficient d2 is determined by the value-matching condition at the renegotiation boundary
VR:
D(VR) = (1− q)(1− ηα)VR + q(1− α)VR (B.5)
which is given by:
d2 = (1 + qα(η − 1)− ηα)V 1−γR −
mB
r +m+ δ
V −γR (B.6)
The market value of debt is therefore given by:
D(V ) =
mB
r +m+ δ
−
[
mB
r +m+ δ
− (1 + qα(η − 1)− ηα)VR
](
V
VR
)γ
(B.7)
where the first term is the risk-free value of debt and the second term is the expected present value
of renegotiation and liquidation costs.
The market value of equity E(V ) is the solution to the differential equation:
rE =
1
2
σ2V 2EV V + (r − β)V EV + βV −m(B −D) (B.8)
The equation states that the required return on the left-hand side must equal the expected return
on the right-hand side. The first two terms is the expected change in the value of equity when V
fluctuates. The third term is the cash flow paid to equity holders per unit time and the fourth
term is debt rollover costs.
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The general solution to equation (B.8) is given by5:
E(V ) = e2V
λ + V − mB
r
+m
(
d2V
γ
r − γ(r − β)− 12(γ − 1)γσ2
+
mB
r(r +m+ δ)
)
(B.9)
where
λ =
[
1
2
− r − β
σ2
]
−
√[
1
2
− r − β
σ2
]2
+
2r
σ2
< 0 (B.10)
and the coefficient e2 is determined by the value-matching condition at the renegotiation boundary
VR:
E(VR) = (1− q)ηαVR (B.11)
which is given by:
e2 =
[
(1− q)ηαVR − V + mB
r
−m
(
d2V
γ
r − γ(r − β)− 12(γ − 1)γσ2
+
mB
r(r +m+ δ)
)]
V −λR
(B.12)
where d2 is defined in equation (B.6). The market value of equity is therefore available in closed
form and the endogenous renegotiation boundary VR is determined by the smooth pasting condi-
tion:
∂E(V )
∂V
∣∣∣∣
V=VR
= (1− q)ηα (B.13)
The yield spread s on the firm’s bonds is given by:
s =
m(B −D(V ))
D(V )
− r (B.14)
The model is entirely solved in closed-form including the endogenous renegotiation boundary.
To derive the testable hypothesis, I parametrize the model using parameter values from the credit
risk literature. In particular, I use r = 0.05, β = 0.03, σ = 0.2, α = 0.45, m = 0.2, B = 0.75, and
V0 = 1. In Figure A.1, I study the effects of renegotiation frictions and financial constraints on
yield spreads. The dashed line denotes a firm with low financial constraints δ = 0 and the solid
line is a firm with high financial constraints δ = 0.02.
[INSERT FIGURE A.1]
Panel A in figure A.1 shows that the renegotiation boundary VR increases with renegotiation
frictions q for both firms when equity holders have low bargaining power (η = 0.05). The reason
is that higher renegotiation frictions increase the probability that renegotiation fails in which case
5Dick-Nielsen et al. (2018) derive this type of general solution to the differential equation for equity.
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the debt holders have to incur liquidation costs. Since equity holders have low bargaining power,
they have low incentives to default strategically because they cannot capture much bargaining
surplus. As a result, the higher expected liquidation costs increase yield spreads and make debt
rollover more costly. Equity holders therefore default sooner meaning that VR increases with q
because the recovery effect dominates.
Panel C indeed shows that the recovery effect dominates i.e. yield spreads increase with rene-
gotiation frictions. This graph also shows that the more financially constrained firm (δ = 0.02)
pay higher yield spreads relative to the other firm because debt holders require a premium to hold
bonds in financially constrained firms. It is difficult to see from the graph but the slope of the
curve for the financially constrained firm is higher compared to the firm with δ = 0. Panel E plots
the derivative of the yield spread with respect to renegotiation frictions for a firm with q = 0.2
and a firm with q = 0.8. In both cases the derivative increases with δ meaning that yield spreads
increase more with renegotiation frictions the higher the level of financial constraints. The reason
is that the recovery effect increases with δ.
Panel B in figure A.1 shows that the renegotiation boundary decreases with renegotiation fric-
tions for the two firms with high equity bargaining power η = 0.95. This relationship reflects that
higher renegotiation frictions make it less attractive for equity holders to default strategically be-
cause bargaining becomes more difficult. Panel D shows that the strategic default effect dominates
for the financially unconstrained firm (δ = 0) meaning that the yield spread decreases with q. In
contrast, the yield spread for the financially constrained firm (δ = 0.02) first increases and then
decreases with q. The reason is that this firm has higher default risk cf. Panel B which makes
the recovery effect more pronounced. For low values of q, the recovery effect dominates whereas
for higher values of q the strategic default effect dominates. Importantly, the slope of the curve
for the financially constrained firm remains less negative (and positive for low values of q) relative
to the firm with δ = 0. Panel F shows this feature more clearly by plotting the derivative of the
yield spread with respect to renegotiation frictions. This derivative increases with the level of δ
meaning that yield spreads decrease less (or even increase) with q the higher the level of financial
constraints.
Notice that the derivative of the yield spread with respect to renegotiation frictions increase
with δ in both panel E and F i.e. regardless of the level of equity holders’ bargaining power. I
summarize this result in the following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 2: The recovery effect increases with δ. For low values of η where the recovery
effect dominates and the derivative ∂s∂q is positive when δ = 0, the derivative
∂s
∂q∂δ > 0. Yield spreads
therefore increase more with renegotiation frictions the higher the level of financial constraints. For
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high values of η where the strategic default effect dominates and the derivative ∂s∂q is negative when
δ = 0, the derivative ∂s∂q∂δ > 0. The relationship between yield spreads and renegotiation frictions
is therefore less negative (and may become positive) the higher the level of financial constraints.
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C Definition of Variables
This section contains the detailed variable descriptions. The capitalized acronyms correspond to
quarterly COMPUSTAT data items and subscripts refer to the calendar time.
Bond Characteristics
BAt The bond’s bid-ask spread in quarter t is the median of daily bid-ask spreads in the same quarter
calculated as:
BAt =
At −Bt
1
2 (At +Bt)
where At and Bt are volume-weighted ask and bid prices from Enhanced TRACE.
CRt The coupon rate from Mergent FISD.
MATt The remaining time-to-maturity as of the trade day where the yield spread is calculated.
AGEt The bond’s age as of the trade day where the yield spread is calculated.
AMTt The bond’s amount outstanding from Mergent FISD on the day where the yield spread is
calculated.
The table continues on the next page.
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Firm Characteristics
FMATt The firm’s average debt maturity is the principal-weighted time-to-maturity of all the firm’s
outstanding bond’s at the end of quarter t.
V OLt Equity volatility at the end of quarter t is the standard deviation of daily stock returns from
CRSP over the preceding 60 trading days. I only consider common stocks (SHRCD equal
to 10 or 11 in CRSP) and require at least 20 observations in the estimation window. If a
firm has several share classes, I calculate the weighted equity volatility based on the market
capitalization of each share class.
LEVt The leverage ratio at the end of quarter t is:
LEVt =
DLCQt +DLTTQt
DLCQt +DLTTQt + CSHOQt ∗ PRCCQt
where DLCQt is ”Debt in Current Liabilities”, DLTTQt is ”Long-Term Debt - Total”,
CSHOQt is ”Common Shares Outstanding”, and PRCCQt is ”Price Close - Quarter”.
CDt The cash/debt ratio at the end of quarter t is:
CDt =
CHEQt
DLCQt +DLTTQt
where where DLCQt is ”Debt in Current Liabilities”, DLTTQt is ”Long-Term Debt - Total”,
and CHEQt is ”Cash and Short-Term Investments”.
ROAt The return on assets in quarter t is:
ROAt =
OIBDPQt
ATQt−1
where OIBDPQt is ”Operating Income Before Depreciation - Quarterly”, and ATQt is ”As-
sets - Total”.
BMt The book/market ratio at the end of quarter t is:
BMt =
CEQt
CSHOQt ∗ PRCCQt
where CEQt is ”Common/Ordinary Equity - Total”, CSHOQt is ”Common Shares Outstand-
ing”, and PRCCQt is ”Price Close - Quarter”.
The table continues on the next page.
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Financial Constraints Indexes
WWt The Whited and Wu (2006) index in quarter t is:
WWt = −0.091 ∗ IBQt +DPQt
ATQt
− 0.062 ∗ 1{DV Yt+DV PQt>0} + 0.021 ∗
DLTTQt
ATQt
−0.44 ∗ log(ATQt) + 0.102 ∗ ISGt − 0.035 ∗ SALEQt
SALEQt−1
where IBQt is ”Income Before Extraordinary Items”, DPQt is ”Depreciation and Amortiza-
tion - Total”, and ATQt is ”Assets - Total”, DV Yt is ”Cash Dividends”, DV PQt is ”Divi-
dends/Preferred/Preference”, DLTTQt is ”Long Term Debt - Total”, ISGt is the three-digit
industry-average sales growth based on SIC codes, and SALEQt is ”Sales/Turnover (Net)”.
SAt The Hadlock and Pierce (2010) index in quarter t is:
SAt = −0.737 ∗ SIZEt + 0.043 ∗ SIZE2t − 0.040 ∗AGEt
where SIZEt is the logarithm of inflation-adjusted ATQt ”Assets - Total” measured in 2004
dollars and AGEt is the number of years the firm has a non-missing stock price in COMPUSTAT
i.e. PRCCQt which is ”Price Close - Quarter”. Following Hadlock and Pierce (2010) SIZEt
is capped at log($4.5 billion) and AGEt is capped at 37 years in case the actual values exceed
these thresholds. I use the CPIINDt variable from CRSP which is ”Index Level Associated
with Consumer Price Index” to inflation-adjust total assets.
KZt The Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index from Lamont et al. (2001) is calculated based on annual
COMPUSTAT data:
KZt = −1.002 ∗ IBt +DPt
PPENTt−1
+ 0.283 ∗ ATt + CSHOt ∗ PRCC Ft − CEQt − TXDBt
ATt
+3.139 ∗ DLTTt +DLCt
DLTTt +DLCt + SEQt
− 39.368 ∗ DV Ct +DV Pt
PPENTt−1
− 1.315 ∗ CHEt
PPENTt−1
where IBt is ”Income Before Extraordinary Items”, DPt is ”Depreciation and Amortization”,
PPENTt is ”Property, Plant and Equipment - Total (Net)”, ATt is ”Assets - Total”, CSHOt is
”Common Shares Outstanding”, PRCC Ft is ”Price Close - Annual - Fiscal”, CEQt is ”Com-
mon/Ordinary Equity - Total”, TXDBt is ”Deferred Taxes Balance Sheet”, DLTTt is ”Long
Term Debt - Total”, DLCt is ”Debt in Current Liabilities - Total”, SEQt is ”Stockholders’ Equity
- Total”, DV Ct is ”Dividends Common/Ordinary”, DV Pt is ”Dividends - Preferred/Preference”,
and CHEt is ”Cash and Short-Term Investments”.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics on Bonds
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample and by bond rating. The data fre-
quency is quarterly and Appendix C contains a detailed description of how I construct all variables.
Yield spread, Bid-ask spread, and Coupon rate are measured in percent. Time-to-maturity, Bond
age, and Avg. firm maturity are measured in years. Amount outstanding is in millions of US
dollars and Equity volatility is in annualized percent. Leverage, Cash/debt, and Return on assets
are measured in percent. Data are from Enhanced TRACE, Federal Reserve Bank, Mergent FISD,
COMPUSTAT, and CRSP. The sample period covers 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2017 where I have
excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). I report sample
averages and include standard deviations in parentheses.
Bond Rating
All AAA-AA A BBB SPEC
Yield spread 2.15 0.76 1.10 1.90 4.51
(2.01) (0.53) (0.78) (1.37) (2.47)
Maturity dispersion 5.00 6.09 5.63 5.33 3.14
(3.00) (2.71) (2.86) (3.17) (2.05)
Norm. no. of issues 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.15
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Bid-ask spread 0.38 0.36 0.38 0.37 0.39
(0.44) (0.42) (0.43) (0.46) (0.44)
Coupon rate 5.97 4.70 5.37 5.91 7.35
(1.83) (1.88) (1.69) (1.66) (1.43)
Time-to-maturity 9.32 9.51 9.94 9.82 7.52
(8.01) (8.77) (8.81) (8.40) (5.05)
Bond age 4.40 4.67 4.67 4.26 4.19
(3.98) (4.75) (4.13) (3.65) (4.03)
Avg. firm maturity 9.93 10.88 10.98 10.27 7.57
(4.28) (4.19) (4.35) (4.29) (3.15)
Amount outstanding 574.95 827.18 638.93 551.99 436.54
(514.30) (711.49) (527.03) (500.92) (358.58)
Equity volatility 30.37 21.28 25.16 29.88 41.54
(17.20) (9.77) (12.63) (15.28) (21.73)
Leverage 28.53 15.84 20.57 28.54 43.71
(16.88) (11.42) (11.22) (13.67) (18.89)
Cash/debt 36.79 82.68 44.54 28.94 23.38
(55.82) (91.05) (60.81) (43.95) (36.70)
Return on assets 3.66 4.61 4.13 3.53 2.91
(1.87) (2.00) (1.67) (1.73) (1.98)
Book/market 0.47 0.29 0.35 0.50 0.63
(0.31) (0.15) (0.19) (0.29) (0.41)
Firms 1,153 75 286 527 616
Bonds 5,785 631 1,828 2,683 1,694
N 60,012 5,147 17,181 24,411 13,273
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Table 2: Summary Statistics on Financial Constraints Indexes
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample and by bond rating. The data fre-
quency is quarterly and Appendix C contains a detailed description of how I construct the variables.
The indexes for financial constraints are from Whited and Wu (2006) (WW ), Hadlock and Pierce
(2010) (SA), and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ ). Data are from COMPUSTAT. The sample
period covers 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2017 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999)
and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). I report sample averages and include standard deviations in
parentheses.
Bond Rating
All AAA-AA A BBB SPEC
WW index -4.35 -4.95 -4.62 -4.31 -3.84
(0.61) (0.57) (0.51) (0.50) (0.52)
SA index -4.30 -4.49 -4.41 -4.29 -4.07
(0.43) (0.27) (0.34) (0.44) (0.49)
KZ index -4.37 -12.61 -5.16 -3.61 -1.54
(9.67) (13.25) (7.88) (9.17) (9.13)
Firms 1,153 75 286 527 616
Bonds 5,785 631 1,828 2,683 1,694
N 60,012 5,147 17,181 24,411 13,273
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Table 4: Yield Spreads and Debt Maturity Dispersion
This table presents pooled OLS regression results with the quarterly yield spread in percent as the
dependent variable. Appendix C contains a detailed description of how I construct all variables.
Data are from Enhanced TRACE, Federal Reserve Bank, Mergent FISD, COMPUSTAT, and
CRSP. The sample period covers 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2017 where I have excluded financials
(SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). The regression for the full sample
includes quarter times rating fixed effects (QTR*RAT) while regressions for each rating group
include quarter fixed effects (QTR). Standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter with t-
statistics in parenthesis. The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, and
∗∗∗ when p < 0.01.
Bond Rating
All AAA-AA A BBB SPEC
Maturity dispersion -0.048∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
(-5.83) (0.08) (-4.59) (-3.76) (-3.33)
Bid-ask spread 0.407∗∗∗ 0.074∗∗∗ 0.183∗∗∗ 0.390∗∗∗ 0.774∗∗∗
(7.82) (2.62) (5.06) (5.12) (8.17)
Coupon rate 0.198∗∗∗ 0.078∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗∗
(14.59) (6.39) (9.36) (10.17) (9.62)
Log(time-to-maturity) 0.150∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.188∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗
(5.27) (8.54) (7.42) (5.34) (2.41)
Log(bond age) -0.130∗∗∗ -0.009 -0.017 -0.067∗∗∗ -0.176∗∗∗
(-6.99) (-0.57) (-1.09) (-3.21) (-5.11)
Avg. firm maturity -0.014∗∗∗ -0.009∗ -0.005 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.030∗
(-3.57) (-1.74) (-1.06) (-3.58) (-1.91)
Log(amount outstanding) -0.104∗∗∗ -0.041∗∗ -0.066∗∗∗ -0.121∗∗∗ -0.110∗
(-4.20) (-2.38) (-3.19) (-3.91) (-1.71)
Equity volatility 0.032∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(10.78) (4.60) (3.77) (7.27) (11.26)
Leverage 0.024∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.031∗∗∗
(11.00) (4.25) (3.10) (6.28) (10.49)
Cash/debt 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗
(3.10) (-0.52) (-0.00) (2.78) (2.00)
Log(1+return on assets) -3.747∗∗∗ 0.952 -1.592∗∗ -5.266∗∗∗ -8.740∗∗∗
(-3.41) (0.81) (-2.10) (-3.92) (-3.81)
Log(book/market) -0.008 0.012 0.060∗∗ -0.011 0.040
(-0.30) (0.48) (1.99) (-0.27) (0.79)
Fixed effects QTR*RAT QTR QTR QTR QTR
N 60,012 5,147 17,181 24,411 13,273
Adj. R2 0.788 0.682 0.653 0.639 0.670
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Table 5: Yield Spreads and Renegotiation Frictions
This table presents pooled OLS regression results with the quarterly yield spread in percent as the
dependent variable. Appendix C contains a detailed description of how I construct all variables.
Data are from Enhanced TRACE, Federal Reserve Bank, Mergent FISD, COMPUSTAT, and
CRSP. The sample period covers 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2017 where I have excluded financials
(SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). The regression for the full sample
includes quarter times rating fixed effects (QTR*RAT) while regressions for each rating group
include quarter fixed effects (QTR). Standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter with t-
statistics in parenthesis. The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, and
∗∗∗ when p < 0.01.
Bond Rating
All AAA-AA A BBB SPEC
Norm. no. of issues -1.273∗∗∗ -0.115 -0.918∗∗∗ -1.350∗∗∗ -1.321∗∗
(-6.39) (-0.39) (-3.79) (-5.88) (-2.44)
Bid-ask spread 0.414∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.796∗∗∗
(7.94) (2.60) (5.15) (5.29) (8.37)
Coupon rate 0.196∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.111∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗
(15.00) (6.34) (8.96) (10.61) (9.75)
Log(time-to-maturity) 0.149∗∗∗ 0.199∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.222∗∗
(5.17) (8.47) (7.35) (5.20) (2.45)
Log(bond age) -0.135∗∗∗ -0.011 -0.023 -0.076∗∗∗ -0.186∗∗∗
(-7.45) (-0.68) (-1.40) (-3.50) (-5.56)
Avg. firm maturity -0.019∗∗∗ -0.008∗ -0.008∗ -0.023∗∗∗ -0.040∗∗
(-4.99) (-1.78) (-1.81) (-4.46) (-2.53)
Log(amount outstanding) -0.119∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.140∗∗∗ -0.127∗
(-4.76) (-2.31) (-3.85) (-4.43) (-1.95)
Equity volatility 0.033∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗
(11.08) (4.60) (3.86) (7.60) (11.36)
Leverage 0.023∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(10.97) (3.62) (2.59) (6.39) (10.24)
Cash/debt 0.001∗∗∗ -0.000 -0.000 0.001∗∗∗ 0.002∗
(3.04) (-0.39) (-0.03) (2.87) (1.84)
Log(return on assets) -3.874∗∗∗ 0.822 -1.743∗∗ -5.001∗∗∗ -8.608∗∗∗
(-3.62) (0.76) (-2.16) (-3.78) (-3.66)
Log(book/market) -0.008 0.008 0.069∗∗ -0.007 0.035
(-0.30) (0.33) (2.21) (-0.17) (0.70)
Fixed effects QTR*RAT QTR QTR QTR QTR
N 60,012 5,147 17,181 24,411 13,273
Adj. R2 0.788 0.683 0.651 0.638 0.668
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Table 6: Debt Maturity Dispersion and Financial Constraints
This table presents pooled OLS regression results with the quarterly yield spread in percent as the
dependent variable. Appendix C contains a detailed description of how I construct all variables.
The indexes for financial constraints are from Whited and Wu (2006) (WW ), Hadlock and Pierce
(2010) (SA), and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ ). In Panel A, I use a dummy variable (HFC)
that equals 1 when the financial constraints index level in a given quarter belongs to the top
quintile and equals zero otherwise. In Panel B, I use the actual values of the financial constraints
indexes. Data are from Enhanced TRACE, Federal Reserve Bank, Mergent FISD, COMPUSTAT,
and CRSP. The sample period covers 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2017 where I have excluded financials
(SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). All regressions include quarter times
rating fixed effects and all control variables from Table 4. Standard errors are clustered by firm
and quarter with t-statistics in parenthesis. The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗
when p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01.
WW Index SA Index KZ Index
Panel A: Financial Constraints Dummy
Maturity dispersion -0.041∗∗∗ -0.035∗∗∗ -0.045∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.037∗∗∗
(-5.13) (-4.51) (-5.46) (-5.16) (-5.92) (-4.54)
High fin. constraints (HFC) 0.215∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗ 0.178∗∗∗ 0.292∗∗∗ -0.066 0.211∗∗
(4.20) (6.42) (4.06) (3.76) (-1.18) (2.54)
Maturity dispersion*HFC -0.123∗∗∗ -0.030 -0.057∗∗∗
(-5.27) (-1.51) (-4.25)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter*Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012
Adj. R2 0.790 0.791 0.789 0.790 0.788 0.790
Panel B: Financial Constraints Index
Maturity dispersion -0.040∗∗∗ -0.339∗∗∗ -0.044∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.052∗∗∗
(-4.72) (-6.40) (-5.23) (-2.25) (-5.83) (-5.64)
Fin. constraints index (FCI) 0.185∗∗∗ 0.424∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.307∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ 0.001
(3.67) (6.58) (3.61) (3.97) (-2.03) (0.51)
Maturity dispersion*FCI -0.065∗∗∗ -0.035∗ -0.001∗∗
(-5.90) (-1.79) (-2.23)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter*Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012
Adj. R2 0.790 0.792 0.789 0.790 0.789 0.789
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Table 7: Renegotiation Frictions and Financial Constraints
This table presents pooled OLS regression results with the quarterly yield spread in percent as the
dependent variable. Appendix C contains a detailed description of how I construct all variables.
The indexes for financial constraints are from Whited and Wu (2006) (WW ), Hadlock and Pierce
(2010) (SA), and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ ). In Panel A, I use a dummy variable (HFC)
that equals 1 when the financial constraints index level in a given quarter belongs to the top
quintile and equals zero otherwise. In Panel B, I use the actual values of the financial constraints
indexes. Data are from Enhanced TRACE, Federal Reserve Bank, Mergent FISD, COMPUSTAT,
and CRSP. The sample period covers 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2017 where I have excluded financials
(SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). All regressions include quarter times
rating fixed effects and all control variables from Table 4. Standard errors are clustered by firm
and quarter with t-statistics in parenthesis. The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗
when p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01.
WW Index SA Index KZ Index
Panel A: Financial Constraints Dummy
Norm. no. of issues -1.036∗∗∗ -0.877∗∗∗ -1.186∗∗∗ -1.111∗∗∗ -1.271∗∗∗ -1.062∗∗∗
(-5.36) (-4.15) (-5.99) (-5.51) (-6.45) (-5.54)
High fin. constraints (HFC) 0.219∗∗∗ 0.335∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗ 0.258∗∗∗ -0.076 0.163
(4.25) (4.30) (4.11) (3.22) (-1.31) (1.40)
Norm. no. of issues*HFC -0.729∗ -0.432 -1.174∗∗
(-1.75) (-0.92) (-2.16)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter*Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012
Adj. R2 0.789 0.789 0.789 0.789 0.788 0.788
Panel B: Financial Constraints Index
Norm. no. of issues -1.034∗∗∗ -3.204∗∗∗ -1.134∗∗∗ -4.078∗∗ -1.283∗∗∗ -1.370∗∗∗
(-5.30) (-2.74) (-5.63) (-2.16) (-6.51) (-6.26)
Fin. constraints index (FCI) 0.197∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.162∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗ -0.004∗∗ 0.002
(3.98) (4.41) (3.54) (3.99) (-2.24) (0.53)
Norm. no. of issues*FCI -0.499∗ -0.684 -0.030∗
(-1.95) (-1.61) (-1.67)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter*Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012
Adj. R2 0.789 0.790 0.789 0.789 0.788 0.788
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Figure A.1: The Effects of Renegotiation Frictions
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(A) Renegotiation boundary (η = 0.05)
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(B) Renegotiation boundary (η = 0.95)
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(C) Yield spreads (η = 0.05)
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(D) Yield spreads (η = 0.95)
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(E) Spread sensitivity (η = 0.05)
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(F) Spread sensitivity (η = 0.95)
This figure shows the effects of renegotiation frictions q on yield spreads for different levels of
financial constraints δ. Panel A, C, and E have η = 0.05 while Panel B, D, and F have η = 0.95.
The remaining parameter values are r = 0.05, β = 0.03, σ = 0.2, α = 0.45, m = 0.2, B = 0.75,
and V0 = 1. The y-axes in panels C to F are in basis points.
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Internet Appendix for:
Why Does Debt Dispersion Affect Yield Spreads?
Abstract
This Internet Appendix contains the robustness checks mentioned in the paper. First, I explain
the construction of the additional measures of debt maturity dispersion and renegotiation frictions.
Second, I present summary statistics and correlations. Third, I repeat the regression analysis from
the paper with the additional measures of debt maturity dispersion and renegotiation frictions.
104
Definition of Variables
This section contains the detailed variable descriptions. The capitalized acronyms correspond to
quarterly COMPUSTAT data items and subscripts refer to the calendar time.
Debt Maturity Dispersion
WMD1t The weighted maturity dispersion measure gives more weight to short-term debt. I use the
weighting scheme from Choi et al. (2018), namely, yi =
1
i /
(∑25
i=1
1
i
)
for maturities up to
i = 25 years and yi = 0 otherwise. Let ωi = yixi/
∑
i yixi denote the weighted principal share
of bond i such that the Weighted Herfindahlj =
∑
i (ωi)
2
and the weighted dispersion for
firm j is:
WMD1j = 1/Weighted Herfindahlj
MD2t This maturity dispersion distance measure from Choi et al. (2018) is based on the average
squared deviation between the firm’s observed debt maturity profile and a perfectly dispersed
debt maturity profile. The perfectly dispersed profile has a principal share of 1/tmaxj maturing
in each maturity bucket where tmaxj is the longest maturity of the currently outstanding bonds
measured at the time of issuance. The distance from the perfectly dispersed debt maturity
profile is:
DISTj =
1
tmaxj
tmaxj∑
i=1
(
wj,i − 1
tmaxj
)2
where wj,i is firm j’s principal share maturing in bucket i. The dispersion measure at time t
is then given by MD2j = −log(DISTj + 0.001).
Renegotiation Frictions
BDt The bond dispersion measure is based on the principal shares of outstanding bonds. Let
Bi denote the principal value of bond i issued by firm j such that the principal shares are
zi = Bi/
∑
iBi. The bond dispersion measure is then given by:
BDt = 1−
∑
i
(zi)
2
PDt The ratio of public debt to total debt at the end of quarter t is:
PDt =
∑
iBi
DLCQt +DLTTQt
where Bi is the principal value of bond i, DLCQt is ”Debt in Current Liabilities”, and
DLTTQt is ”Long-Term Debt - Total”.
STDt The ratio of short-term debt to total debt at the end of quarter t is:
STDt =
DLCQt
DLCQt +DLTTQt
where DLCQt is ”Debt in Current Liabilities” and DLTTQt is ”Long-Term Debt - Total”.
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Table IA.1: Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for the entire sample and by bond rating. The data fre-
quency is quarterly and section 1 in the Internet Appendix contains a detailed description of how
I construct the variables. Maturity dispersion and Norm. no. of issues are defined in section 3.3
in the paper. Data are from Mergent FISD and COMPUSTAT. The sample period covers 1 July
2002 to 30 June 2017 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC
codes 4900-4999). I report sample averages and include standard deviations in parentheses.
Bond Rating
All AAA-AA A BBB SPEC
Maturity dispersion 5.00 6.09 5.63 5.34 3.14
(3.00) (2.71) (2.85) (3.17) (2.05)
Weigthed mat. dispersion 2.96 2.99 3.02 3.13 2.54
(1.45) (1.25) (1.41) (1.50) (1.39)
Maturity dispersion distance 4.56 5.00 4.86 4.68 3.76
(1.03) (0.77) (0.86) (0.97) (1.04)
Norm. no. of issues 0.21 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.15
(0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10)
Bond dispersion 0.72 0.83 0.77 0.74 0.55
(0.26) (0.19) (0.22) (0.23) (0.31)
Public debt/total debt 0.58 0.46 0.55 0.62 0.58
(0.28) (0.27) (0.29) (0.26) (0.28)
Short-term debt/total debt 0.11 0.24 0.14 0.09 0.06
(0.13) (0.15) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11)
Firms 1,153 75 286 527 616
Bonds 5,785 631 1,828 2,683 1,694
N 60,012 5,147 17,181 24,411 13,273
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Table IA.2: Correlations
This table shows Pearson correlation coefficients between the measures of debt maturity dispersion
and renegotiation frictions. Section 1 in the Internet Appendix contains a detailed description of
how I construct the variables. Maturity dispersion and Norm. no. of issues are defined in section
3.3 in the paper. Data are from Mergent FISD and COMPUSTAT. The sample period covers 1
July 2002 to 30 June 2017 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities
(SIC codes 4900-4999).
MD1 WMD1 MD2 NNI BD PD STD
Maturity dispersion (MD1) 1.00
Weigthed mat. dispersion (WMD1) 0.74 1.00
Maturity dispersion distance (MD2) 0.87 0.67 1.00
Norm. no. of issues (NNI) 0.76 0.63 0.83 1.00
Bond dispersion (BD) 0.74 0.64 0.89 0.87 1.00
Public debt/total debt (PD) 0.21 0.23 0.19 0.28 0.23 1.00
Short-term debt/total debt (STD) 0.04 -0.08 0.08 0.11 0.10 -0.18 1.00
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Table IA.3: Yield Spreads and Debt Dispersion
This table presents pooled OLS regression results with the quarterly yield spread in percent as
the dependent variable. Section 1 in the Internet Appendix contains a detailed description of
how I construct the variables. Maturity dispersion and Norm. no. of issues are defined in sec-
tion 3.3 in the paper. Data are from Enhanced TRACE, Federal Reserve Bank, Mergent FISD,
COMPUSTAT, and CRSP. The sample period covers 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2017 where I have
excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). The regression for
the full sample includes quarter times rating fixed effects (QTR*RAT) while regressions for each
rating group include quarter fixed effects (QTR). All regressions include the control variables from
Table 4. Standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter with t-statistics in parenthesis. The
convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01.
Bond Rating
All AAA-AA A BBB SPEC
Panel A: Maturity Dispersion
Maturity dispersion -0.048∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.034∗∗∗ -0.048∗∗∗ -0.090∗∗∗
(-5.83) (0.08) (-4.59) (-3.76) (-3.33)
Weighted mat. dispersion -0.066∗∗∗ 0.001 -0.040∗∗∗ -0.062∗∗∗ -0.100∗∗∗
(-5.19) (0.10) (-3.57) (-3.39) (-3.14)
Maturity dispersion distance -0.179∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.101∗∗∗ -0.178∗∗∗ -0.239∗∗∗
(-7.61) (-0.41) (-4.09) (-5.89) (-4.57)
Panel B: Renegotiation Frictions
Norm. no. of issues -1.273∗∗∗ -0.115 -0.918∗∗∗ -1.350∗∗∗ -1.321∗∗
(-6.39) (-0.39) (-3.79) (-5.88) (-2.44)
Bond dispersion -0.559∗∗∗ -0.035 -0.373∗∗∗ -0.515∗∗∗ -0.666∗∗∗
(-7.50) (-0.24) (-4.44) (-5.41) (-4.89)
Public debt/total debt 0.100 0.070 -0.198∗∗ 0.004 0.387∗∗
(1.33) (0.99) (-2.21) (0.04) (2.46)
Short-term debt/total debt -0.085 -0.368∗∗∗ -0.344∗∗∗ -0.265∗ 0.859∗∗
(-0.69) (-5.33) (-2.91) (-1.68) (2.23)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y
Fixed effects QTR*RAT QTR QTR QTR QTR
N 60,012 5,147 17,181 24,411 13,273
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Table IA.4: Debt Dispersion and Financial Constraints
This table presents the coefficient estimates of β3 in equation (2) and (3) i.e. on the interaction
variable between financial constraints and either debt maturity dispersion or renegotiation frictions.
Appendix C in the paper and section 1 in the Internet Appendix contain detailed descriptions of
how I construct the variables. Maturity dispersion and Norm. no. of issues are defined in section
3.3 in the paper. The indexes for financial constraints are from Whited and Wu (2006) (WW ),
Hadlock and Pierce (2010) (SA), and Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (KZ ). HFC denotes a dummy
variable that equals 1 when the financial constraints index level in a given quarter belongs to the
top quintile and equals zero otherwise. Data are from Enhanced TRACE, Federal Reserve Bank,
Mergent FISD, COMPUSTAT, and CRSP. The sample period covers 1 July 2002 to 30 June
2017 where I have excluded financials (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999).
All regressions include quarter times rating fixed effects and all control variables from Table 4.
Standard errors are clustered by firm and quarter with t-statistics in parenthesis. The convention
for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.10, ∗∗ when p < 0.05, and ∗∗∗ when p < 0.01.
HFC Dummy Index Value
WW SA KZ WW SA KZ
Panel A: Maturity Dispersion
Maturity dispersion -0.123∗∗∗ -0.030 -0.057∗∗∗ -0.065∗∗∗ -0.035∗ -0.001∗∗
(-5.27) (-1.51) (-4.25) (-5.90) (-1.79) (-2.23)
Weighted mat. dispersion -0.033∗∗∗ -0.054∗∗∗ -0.049∗∗∗ -0.447∗∗∗ -0.270∗∗ -0.074∗∗∗
(-2.75) (-4.20) (-3.71) (-4.93) (-1.98) (-5.17)
Maturity dispersion distance -0.165∗∗∗ -0.043 -0.158∗∗∗ -0.125∗∗∗ -0.066 -0.004∗∗
(-4.29) (-0.99) (-3.99) (-5.28) (-1.58) (-2.53)
Panel B: Renegotiation Frictions
Norm. no. of issues -0.729∗ -0.432 -1.174∗∗ -0.499∗ -0.684 -0.030∗
(-1.75) (-0.92) (-2.16) (-1.95) (-1.61) (-1.67)
Bond dispersion -0.393∗∗∗ -0.028 -0.548∗∗∗ -0.299∗∗∗ -0.120 -0.007
(-2.95) (-0.19) (-3.81) (-3.45) (-0.87) (-1.30)
Public debt/total debt 0.061 0.042 -0.026 0.347∗∗∗ 0.052 -0.000
(0.44) (0.25) (-0.15) (3.90) (0.36) (-0.04)
Short-term debt/total debt 0.530∗∗ 0.394 -0.609 0.239 0.278 -0.014∗
(2.19) (1.28) (-1.24) (1.35) (1.07) (-1.69)
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter*Rating FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012 60,012
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Chapter 3
What Determines Bid-Ask Spreads in
Over-the-Counter Markets?
Peter Feldhu¨tter and Thomas Kjær Poulsen*
Abstract
We document cross-sectional variation in bid-ask spreads in the U.S. corporate bond market and
use the variation to test OTC theories of the bid-ask spread. Bid-ask spreads, measured by
realized transaction costs, increase with maturity for investment grade but not for speculative
grade bonds. For short-maturity bonds, spreads increase with credit risk while long-maturity bonds
rated AAA/AA+ have significantly higher spreads than other investment grade bonds. We find
that dealer inventory is the most important determinant of the variation in bid-ask spreads. How
bond sales travel through the network of dealers also explains part of the variation, particularly for
speculative grade bonds. In contrast, search-and-bargaining frictions and asymmetric information
have limited explanatory power.
*We are grateful for comments from seminar participants at Copenhagen Business School. Support from the
Center for Financial Frictions (FRIC), grant no. DNRF102, is gratefully acknowledged.
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1 Introduction
Market liquidity of the corporate bond market is important as it affects bond prices and thus the
funding cost of firms, and bid-ask spreads (measured as realized transaction costs) are typically
used when measuring liquidity.1 Despite the importance of the bid-ask spread in understanding
the functioning of the market, we have a limited understanding of why it arises in the first place.
There are a number of theories of over-the-counter (OTC) frictions that have been proposed as
explanations for the size and cross-sectional variation of bond bid-ask spreads, but despite the
extensive theoretical literature, there is little empirical literature examining the relative importance
of different theories in explaining bid-ask spreads. We fill this gap by presenting new evidence on
the cross-sectional variation in corporate bond bid-ask spreads and testing leading theories’ ability
to explain this variation.
The paper begins by documenting new facts about bid-ask spreads in the U.S. corporate bond
market using the Academic TRACE dataset for U.S. corporate bonds for the period 2002-2015.
This data set has anonymized dealer identities and allows us to follow the trail through the dealer
network of a bond being sold by an investor until the bond is ultimately being bought by another
investor, so-called round-trip intermediation chains. For each chain we calculate the investor buy
price minus the investor sell price divided by the mid-price. Schestag et al. (2016) show that there
is a high correlation between realized transaction costs and dealer bid-ask spreads in the U.S.
corporate bond market, and we therefore call our estimates for bid-ask spreads.
We sort bid-ask spreads according to bond maturity and rating. Sorting in one dimension we
find that average spreads increase in bond maturity and credit risk, confirming previous results in
the literature. When double-sorting on maturity and rating, a surprising pattern emerges. Spreads
for investment grade bonds increase strongly in maturity, while spreads for speculative grade bonds
show no clear relation. For short-maturity bonds spreads increase in credit risk, while for long-
maturity bonds spreads for bonds rated AA+ or AAA, which we call Safe bonds, are substantially
higher than other investment grade bonds. We show that these patterns are robust to excluding
the financial crisis, adding time fixed effects, and holds separately for bonds issued by financial
and non-financial firms.
We use the documented patterns in bid-ask spreads to test theories of the bid-ask spread in
OTC markets. To do so, we construct proxies motivated by theories of OTC frictions and examine
the extent to which the variation in proxies explains the variation in bid-ask spreads.
1Examples of research finding that liquidity impacts bond prices include Bao et al. (2011), Friewald et al. (2012),
Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012), and Acharya et al. (2013). Recent research that uses transaction costs to measure corporate
bond liquidity include Aquilina and Suntheim (2016), Adrian et al. (2017), Trebbi and Xiao (2017), Bessembinder
et al. (2018), and Choi and Huh (2018).
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In inventory models the dealer acts as an intermediary providing immediacy for investors and
the bid-ask spread arises as a compensation for inventory risk. The bid-ask spread in the classic
models of Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll (1983) is proportional to asset volatility and we use
bond return volatility as a proxy for inventory risk. We regress actual bid-ask spreads on bond
volatilities and calculate predicted bid-ask spreads from the regression estimates. Predicted spreads
are increasing in maturity for investment grade bonds. Also, predicted spreads are increasing in
credit risk for short-maturity bonds and show a U-shaped pattern for long-maturity bonds. Thus,
patterns in predicted spreads are consistent with those in actual spreads. The average difference
between predicted and actual spreads grows for increasingly credit risky speculative grade bonds,
showing that the importance of other factors than inventory increases in credit risk.
Duffie et al. (2005) introduce search-and-bargaining models to explain bid-ask spreads in OTC
markets. A seller searches for dealers sequentially, and once a seller meets a dealer, they negotiate
bilaterally over the price and their strength of negotiation depends on their outside options, in
particular how easily the seller can find other dealers. We use completion time of round-trip
intermediation chains as a proxy for the easy of finding counterparties. As a proxy for dealer
bargaining power we follow Friewald and Nagler (2018) and compute a bond-specific Herfindahl-
Hirschman (HH) index based on dealers’ trading volume in the past month. We find that neither
proxy, and thus predicted spreads based on any of them, varies much across maturity. Furthermore,
we analyse matched intermediation chains, i.e. where the chain is completed within one minute
and likely prearranged by the dealer(s). Search-and-bargaining models predict that there is no
difference between spreads of matched chains vs unmatched chains, but actual spreads of matched
chains are much smaller than those of unmatched chains. Taken together, our results suggest that
search-and-bargaining frictions have limited explanatory power in explaining bid-ask spreads.
In information-based models, such as Copeland and Galai (1983) and Glosten and Milgrom
(1985), the market maker’s concern is that some investors have private information about the value
of the security and she does not know whether she trades with an informed or uninformed investor.
To protect herself, the market maker charges a bid-ask spread. To construct our proxy, we exploit
that debt and equity are claims on the same asset, the firm, and therefore private information
should affect both equity and bond bid-ask spreads, albeit to a different degree. Specifically, we
calculate the equity bid-ask spread of the bond issuer and compute an implied bond bid-ask spread
based on the equity spread and the ratio of bond and equity price sensitivities to changes in firm
value. We find that predicted spreads are much smaller than actual spreads for all maturities and
ratings. The reason for this underprediction is twofold. First, the size of equity spreads is an upper
bound on the size of bond spreads, because equity is more information-sensitive than debt, and
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equity spreads are on average more than three times smaller than bond spreads. Second, bond
returns are much less sensitive to changes in firm value than equity returns.
Finally, recent empirical research, among others Li and Schu¨rhoff (2018), Maggio et al. (2017),
and Hollifield et al. (2017), finds that how a bond travels through the dealer network is important
for bid-ask spreads. In particular, how many dealers are involved in an intermediation chain and the
centrality of those dealers have an impact on spreads. We calculate the average markup charged by
each dealer and for each chain we calculate a predicted spread by adding the average markups of the
dealers involved in the chain. Predicted spreads for long-maturity bonds show a U-shaped pattern
in the relation between spreads and rating, broadly consistent with the pattern in actual spreads.
Furthermore, the positive relation between actual spreads and credit risk for short-maturity bonds
is also largely matched by predicted spreads. In both cases, however, the slope in the relation is
smaller for predicted spreads than for actual spreads. In stark contrast to actual spreads, there is
no relation between spreads and bond maturity for investment grade bonds. Overall, our results
suggest that the network of dealers plays a significant role in determining spreads across rating
but not across maturity.
We also examine the relation between actual spreads and our measures in a panel regression.
Two measures stand out in terms of R2, bond volatility and predicted dealer network spread. This
is consistent with our results when we average across rating and maturity, namely that dealer
inventory and dealer network are most important in explaining spreads. When we estimate the
regression separately for investment grade and speculate grade bonds, dealer inventory is most
important for investment grade bonds while the dealer network is dominant in explaining spreads
of speculative grade bonds.
Taken together, we find that inventory models explain a significant amount of the variation of
bid-ask spreads, in particular across bond maturity. The network of dealers provides additional
explanatory power, mainly for speculative grade bonds. We find that search-and-bargaining and
asymmetric information have limited explanatory power.
Our paper relates to several strands of literature. One strand tests OTC theories and the
relation to bid-ask spreads. Feldhu¨tter (2012) and He and Milbradt (2014) estimate parameters in
search-and-bargaining models by calibrating to actual bid-ask spreads in the credit markets and
comparing model-implied spreads to actual spreads across either maturity or rating. We investigate
a number of alternative theories, provide more extensive comparisons across maturity and rating,
and present further evidence using matched trades. Benmelech and Bergman (2018) test several
implications of Dang et al. (2015)’s theory of asymmetric information and find that corporate bond
bid-ask spreads (and other liquidity measures) increase in a non-linear pattern as credit quality
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deteriorates, consistent with the theory. Similar to their results we also document a non-linear
relation when we investigate asymmetric information models. However, using another prediction
of Dang et al. (2015), that debt is less information-sensitive than equity, we find that only a small
part of the bond bid-ask spread can be explained by unlevered equity bid-ask spreads.
Another strand of literature investigates the relation between OTC frictions and prices. Using
corporate bond data, Friewald and Nagler (2018) study theories of inventory and search-and-
bargaining, Han and Zhou (2014) study asymmetric information, and Dick-Nielsen and Rossi
(2018) study dealer inventory around index exclusions. These papers focus on prices/returns and
do not investigate bid-ask spreads.
A third strand of literature studies the relation between the dealer network and the bid-ask
spread and these papers include Li and Schu¨rhoff (2018), Maggio et al. (2017), and Hollifield
et al. (2017). We contribute to this literature by studying how dealer network spreads relate to
credit quality and bond maturity. Our paper is also related to a large literature that examines the
bid-ask spread of corporate bonds such as Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2018), Edwards et al. (2007),
Bessembinder et al. (2006), Goldstein et al. (2007), Schultz (2001), Hong and Warga (2000) and
others. We contribute to this literature by studying bid-ask spreads across both bond maturity
and rating and testing OTC theories of the bid-ask spread.
2 Data
We use a transaction data set for the U.S. corporate bond market, called Academic TRACE, which
is provided by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) and covers all transactions
conducted by designated dealers. The data contain dealer identities, in anonymised form, for every
transaction. FINRA provides the data with a three-year lag and the data cover the period 2002:07-
2015:06. We account for reporting errors using Dick-Nielsen (2014)’s filter and since our focus is
on transaction costs of institutional investors we delete trades with a par value below $100,000 as
these are commonly viewed as retail transactions. We do, however, also support our findings with
results based on retail-sized transactions.
We restrict our sample to bonds with fixed coupon rates including zero-coupon bonds and
exclude bonds that are callable at a fixed price, putable, convertible, denoted in foreign currency,
or have sinking fund provisions. We keep bonds with a make-whole call provision since make-
whole calls have little effect on bond prices (see Powers and Tsyplakov (2008) and Bao and Hou
(2017)). We collect information on bond characteristics and bond ratings from Mergent Fixed
Income Securities Database (FISD).2
2We use Mergent FISD’s ISSUER ID as firm identifier. At a given point in time, we use the most recent rating
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Table 1 shows summary statistics of our data sample for institutional-sized transactions. In
total, our sample includes 18.1 million transactions in 23,626 bonds issued by 3,178 firms. We sort
bonds into three maturity groups (0-4 years, 4-8 years, and more than 8 years) which we call short,
medium, and long maturity. The number of transactions in each maturity group are similar: for
short-, medium-, and long-maturity bonds the number is 6.4, 5.5, and 6.2 million, respectively. We
divide our sample into seven rating groups (Safe [AAA and AA+], AA [AA and AA-], A, BBB,
BB, B, and C [C, CC, and CCC]). Table 1 shows that most transactions, 82%, occur in investment
grade bonds. There is broad coverage across rating and maturity. For example, the rating/maturity
combination with fewest firms, long-maturity bonds issued by Safe firms, nevertheless has 310,568
transactions in 586 bonds issued by 71 firms over the sample period. Examples of Safe bond issuers
are Microsoft, Johnson & Johnson, Yale University, Harvard University, New York University,
Stanford University, and MIT.
Finally, when needed, we obtain firm characteristics from COMPUSTAT, Treasury rates from
the Federal Reserve Bank, and equity data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP).
3 Cross-Sectional Variation in Bid-Ask Spreads
We calculate bid-ask spreads by tracking bond prices as a bond travels from a selling investor
through the network of dealers until the bond ends in the inventory of a buying investor. Thus, we
follow a recent literature on intermediation chains (Maggio et al. (2017), Li and Schu¨rhoff (2018),
and Friewald and Nagler (2018)). Specifically, we use the round-trip match algorithm from Li and
Schu¨rhoff (2018) to compute realized transaction costs from round-trip intermediation chains.
A round-trip intermediation chain starts from an investor who sells bonds to a dealer (CD leg).
If the dealer sells all the bonds to another investor (DC leg) then the chain is a CDC chain. If
the dealer sells less than all the bonds to a single investor or sells some or all the bonds to several
investors then the chain is a CDC-Split chain. The dealer may also sell all the bonds to another
dealer (DD leg) who can then sell the bonds either to investors or another dealer. These chains
are classified as C(N)DC or C(N)DC-Split where (N ) denotes the number of dealers and the name
reflects if the initial par size from the CD leg is split into smaller lots in the last leg of the chain
i.e. in the DC leg. As in Li and Schu¨rhoff (2018) we restrict order splitting to the last leg of the
chain and not in interdealer trades. In case of order splitting, we calculate the par-weighted sales
price and the par-weighted transaction date of the DC leg.
We use our sample of round-trip intermediation chains to calculate bid-ask spreads from realized
from Standard & Poor’s. If this rating is not available, we use the most recent rating from Moody’s. If this rating is
also missing, we use the most recent Fitch rating. For bonds that are initially rated by Moody’s or Fitch, we keep
the initial rating until a rating becomes available from Standard & Poor’s.
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transaction costs. For each chain, we calculate the bid-ask spread as the sales price the tail dealer
receives from the investor minus the purchase price the head dealer pays to the investor divided
by the mid-price of the two.
A round-trip intermediation chain may take up to several days to complete during which the
bond’s time-to-maturity decreases and its rating can change. We use the first date of the chain (i.e.
the day where the dealer buys from the investor) to determine the bond’s time-to-maturity and
rating. If a bond has several chains beginning on the same day, we calculate the volume-weighted
bid-ask spread using the trading volume from the last leg in the chain. Since we divide our sample
into three maturity groups and seven rating groups, we end up with a cross-section of 21 groups in
total. Within each of the 21 groups, we winsorize bid-ask spreads at the 1st and 99th percentiles
over the entire sample period to mitigate the influence of outliers. We use these winsorized bid-ask
spreads in the subsequent analysis.
Table 2 shows summary statistics of the round-trip intermediation chains for institutional-sized
transactions. As was the case with the number of transactions, 82% of the chains are in investment
grade bonds. Panel A shows that the average bond age increases with credit risk. For example,
the average bond age is 5.65 years when a C-rated bond trades while it is only 2.99 years for a Safe
bond. Panel A also shows that the average amount outstanding decreases with credit risk. The
average amount outstanding of Safe bonds is more than three times that of C-rated bonds. Finally,
we see that the average trade size is higher for Safe bonds and C-rated bonds, but otherwise shows
no relation with rating.
Table 3 presents average bid-ask spreads across maturity and rating for institutional-sized
transactions. On average, bid-ask spreads increase with bond maturity: the average bid-ask spread
for short-, medium-, and long-maturity bonds is 23.1bps, 36.4bps, and 45.8bps, respectively. The
positive relation between bond maturity and bid-ask spreads is well-known in literature (see for
example Chakravarty and Sarkar (2003), Edwards et al. (2007), and Feldhu¨tter (2012)), and for
all investment grade ratings we see the same pattern of increasing bid-ask spreads as maturity
increases. However, for speculative grade ratings, there is no clear pattern: although long-maturity
bonds have the highest bid-ask spreads, short-maturity bonds have higher bid-ask spreads than
medium-maturity bonds. For example, for BB-rated bonds the average bid-ask spread for short-,
medium-, and long-maturity bonds is 39.8bps, 33.7bps, and 42.8bps, respectively.
Turning to the relation between rating and bid-ask spreads, Table 3 reveals a surprising pattern.
For short-maturity bonds, the bid-ask spread is 16.3-17.3 bps for ratings above BBB while for lower
ratings there is a positive relation between rating and bid-ask spread, increasing from 25.6 bps for
BBB bonds to 63.8 bps for the most risky C-rated bonds. For medium-maturity bonds we see that
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Safe bonds have higher average bid-ask spreads (38.4 bps) than bonds rated AA, A, BBB, and
BB (33.7-37.3 bps), while long-maturity Safe bonds have higher spreads (50.4 bps) than bonds in
other rating classes (40.2-49.8 bps) except the most risky bonds rated C.3
The finding that long-maturity bonds of the lowest credit risk have substantially higher bid-ask
spreads than other investment grade bonds is surprising. Theoretically, research articles studying
the relation between credit risk and illiquidity in the corporate bond market imply a positive
relation between credit risk and illiquidity (Ericsson and Renault (2006), He and Milbradt (2014),
Chen et al. (2018)). Empirically, Edwards et al. (2007) and Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2018) find a
monotone and positive relation between bid-ask spreads and credit risk.
There are at least two reasons why the high bid-ask spreads for long-maturity Safe bonds has
gone unnoticed. First, we double-sort on rating and maturity and the high bid-ask spreads only
become apparent for longer-maturity bonds. Second, previous research articles such as Edwards
et al. (2007) and Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2018) have a coarser grouping of ratings making the
high bid-ask spreads for Safe bonds more difficult to discern.
A concern when using average bid-ask spreads over the period 2002-2015 is that bonds with low
credit risk trade more often in periods when transaction costs are higher. For example, Acharya
et al. (2013) find that there is a flight-to-safety in the U.S. corporate bond market in stress periods,
i.e. investors prefer safe corporate bonds in crisis periods. However, Table 4 shows that the pattern
is present both in the financial crisis 2007-2009 and in the sample period excluding the financial
crisis.
To further examine the impact of time variation in bid-ask spreads, we estimate a regression
with month fixed effects in Table 5. Time fixed effects soak up potential effects of having more
observations of bid-ask spreads from bonds with low credit risk in stress periods where bid-ask
spreads are generally high. For short-maturity bonds, we see that bid-ask spreads now monotoni-
cally increase with credit risk, while the pattern that medium- and long-maturity Safe bonds have
higher bid-ask spreads than other investment grade bonds remains unchanged. The standard errors
show that the differences in bid-ask spreads for long-maturity Safe bonds and other investment
grade bonds are statistically significant.
We estimate bid-ask spreads for both financial and non-financial firms and a potential concern
is that high bid-ask spreads of long-maturity Safe bonds may be caused by many observations
of highly rated financial bonds with high bid-ask spreads and lower-rated non-financial bonds
3Formally, we need to carry out a t-test of differences in mean rather than look at standard errors in individual
groups to claim statistical significance. If we do so we find significant differences; a t-test of the difference in mean
between the long-maturity Safe and AA groups is 3.11, between long-maturity Safe and A groups is 1.54, between
long-maturity Safe and BBB groups is 2.00, and between long-maturity Safe and BB groups is 2.16. Further t-tests
are available on request.
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with low bid-ask spreads. We therefore estimate bid-ask spreads separately for financial and non-
financial firms in Table 6. The size of bid-ask spreads is similar across maturity and rating (except
for C-rated bonds) and, in particular, long-maturity Safe bonds have higher bid-ask spreads than
other investment grade bonds for both financials and non-financials.
In Table 7, we present average bid-ask spreads for retail-sized transactions (trade sizes below
$100,000) across maturity and rating. Our results show that the average bid-ask spread for retail-
sized transactions is 155.6 bps compared to 34.1 bps for institutional-sized transactions. The finding
that bid-ask spreads decrease substantially with trade size is well-documented in the literature by
e.g. Edwards et al. (2007) and Schestag et al. (2016).
The cross-sectional variation in bid-ask spreads for retail-sized transactions show the same
patterns as institutional-sized transactions. The average bid-ask spread for short-, medium-, and
long-maturity bonds is 114.3 bps, 158.1 bps, and 240 bps, respectively. For short-maturity bonds,
average bid-ask spreads increase with credit risk from 76.5 bps for Safe bonds to 369.6 bps for
C-rated bonds. For medium-maturity bonds, the average bid-ask spread for Safe bonds is 151.7
bps which is higher than bonds rated either AA (132 bps) or A (134.4 bps). Also for long-maturity
bonds, Safe bonds have higher average bid-ask spreads (224.7 bps) compared to bonds rated AA
or A (210.4 and 219.8 bps). Unlike our results for institutional-sized transactions, however, we
find that average bid-ask spreads increase with maturity for both investment and speculative grade
bonds.
4 Empirical Measures
In this section, we discuss theories of the bid-ask spread and define our empirical measures. We
leave the implementation details of our measures to Appendix A.
4.1 Measures
Inventory costs. In inventory models, the market maker acts as an intermediary providing im-
mediacy for investors by absorbing an imbalanced order flow. Since the asset entails price risk,
the market maker has inventory risk and as a compensation for this risk the market maker earns a
bid-ask spread. In the classic models of Stoll (1978) and Ho and Stoll (1983) the relative bid-ask
spread is proportional to the volatility in the asset’s returns and volatility is the only asset specific
component. We therefore test the classic models of inventory by examining the extent to which
differences in bond return volatility explains differences in bid-ask spreads.
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Search and bargaining. Duffie et al. (2005) introduce search-based models to explain bid-ask
spreads in OTC markets and these models are used extensively to explain different aspects of bid-
ask spreads and liquidity in general.4 In the models, a seller searches for dealers sequentially and
trade does not occur immediately. Once a seller meets a dealer, they negotiate bilaterally over the
price and their strength of negotiation depends on their outside options, in particular how often
they meet other counterparties.
A key prediction of search models is that the bid-ask spread is decreasing in the speed with
which counterparties find trading partners. This implies that if it is difficult to find counterparties
when trading a particular bond, it will take a longer time for the bond to travel from a selling
investor through the interdealer network to a buying investor, and bid-ask spreads will be higher.
Therefore, we use the average time it takes for a bond to complete a round-trip intermediation
chain as a measure for the inverse search intensity and we expect bid-ask spreads to be positively
related to the chain time.
Another central feature of search based models is the importance of the bargaining power of
the dealer in the bilateral negotiation between dealer and investor. We follow Friewald and Nagler
(2018) and use a bond-specific Herfindahl-Hirschman index based on customer trading volume of
dealers. The intuition is that in a more concentrated market with fewer dealers, the bargaining
power of investors is worse and therefore bid-ask spreads are higher.
Asymmetric information. Information-based models are introduced in Bageshot (1971), Copeland
and Galai (1983), and Glosten and Milgrom (1985). The market maker’s concern is that some in-
vestors have private information about the value of the security and she does not know whether
she trades with an informed or uninformed investor. To protect herself, the market maker charges
a bid-ask spread such that losses from trading with informed investors are offset by gains from
trading with uninformed investors, and more private information leads to a larger bid-ask spread.
To test the prediction of asymmetric information, we exploit that private information is about
the value of the firm and this information therefore affects the bid-ask spread of both equity and
debt, albeit to different degrees. Specifically, we measure the bid-ask spread in the equity market
and unlever this bid-ask spread to a corresponding predicted bid-ask spread in the bond market.
We do so in Merton (1974)’s model of credit risk where we add asymmetric information to the
model following Copeland and Galai (1983); we leave the details of the model and the implemen-
tation details to Appendix A. The intuition for the bid-ask spread in the model is: if the equity
return is three times as sensitive to a change in firm value as the debt return, the bid-ask spread
4Feldhu¨tter (2012), He and Milbradt (2014), Vayanos and Weill (2008), Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), Lagos et al.
(2009), Duffie et al. (2007), Sambalaibat (2018) and many others.
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in the equity market is three times as large as in the bond market because a piece of private
information moves equity prices three times as much as debt prices.5
Dealer networks. There is a recent empirical literature finding that the network of dealers is
central to understanding liquidity in OTC markets (Li and Schu¨rhoff (2018), Maggio et al. (2017),
and Hollifield et al. (2017) among others). In particular, the kind of dealer investors trade with,
periphery or central dealer, as well as the number of dealers involved in an intermediation chain
is important for bid-ask spreads.
We examine the importance of the dealer network by estimating a predicted bid-ask spread for
a given bond transaction based on how this bond travels through the network.6 Specifically, for
each dealer we calculate four average markups, across time and bonds, depending on whether the
dealer buys from an investor or another dealer and whether the dealer sells to another investor or
another dealer. We use the average markups as a proxy for predicted markups. For each round-trip
intermediation chain, we then estimate a predicted bid-ask spread by aggregating the predicted
markups of the individual dealers involved in the chain.
As an example, consider a chain where an investor sells to dealer A, dealer A sells to dealer
B, and dealer B ultimately sells to another investor. Assume that on average dealer A earns a
markup of 10 bps when buying from an investor and selling to another dealer, while dealer B on
average earns a markup of 15 bps when buying from another dealer and selling to an investor. In
this case, the predicted bid-ask spread is 25 bps.
4.2 Relation Between Measures
Table 8 shows the correlations between our measures for institutional-sized transactions. We
calculate correlations using observations for which we can calculate all measures, and in particular
this implies that the correlations are based on a subset of bonds for which the firm is a public
company (since our proxy for asymmetric information requires an equity bid-ask spread).
The highest correlation of 31.5% is between unlevered equity bid-ask spreads as a proxy for
asymmetric information and bond volatility as a proxy for inventory costs. The positive correla-
tion reflects that they are clearly related, but they also have distinctly different predictions. For
instance, consider a firm with low leverage that have issued a safe bond with near-zero default
risk. The theoretical prediction from asymmetric information models is a near-zero bid-ask spread
5The prediction of our model is consistent with Dang et al. (2015) who show that debt is less information sensitive
than equity.
6We take the structure of the network as exogeneously given. The network structure may arise because of search
frictions (Hugonnier et al. (2017), Neklyudov (2014)), relationships (Colliard and Demange (2018)), asymmetric
information (Glode and Opp (2016), Babus and Kondor (2018), Chang and Zhang (2018)), or inventory (U¨slu¨
(2018)).
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and the empirical prediction from the unlevered equity bid-ask spread will likewise be a near-zero
spread because of the low leverage. In contrast, both the theoretical prediction from inventory
models and the empirical prediction from bond return volatility predict a positive bid-ask spread
because of interest rate risk related to movements in the risk-free rate.
Dealer concentration has negative (but in most cases modest) correlations with the other mea-
sures. This implies that dealer concentration is higher for bonds with lower volatility, small un-
levered equity bid-ask spreads, intermediation chains with shorter completion times, and lower
predicted dealer network markups.
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we examine to what extent different theories explain the cross-sectional variation of
bid-ask spreads for institutional-sized transactions. In Section 5.1 we estimate a predicted bid-ask
spread implied by each theory in turn and evaluate how well predicted bid-ask spreads match
actual bid-ask spreads across maturity and rating groups. In Section 5.2 we evaluate the theories
jointly in a panel regression. In Section 5.3 we investigate bid-ask spreads of matched chains i.e.
round-trip intermediation chains completed within one minute.
5.1 Testing Theories of the Bid-Ask Spread
We use bond volatility, chain time, and dealer concentration as proxies for theories of the bid-ask
spread in Section 4 and for each proxy in turn, we calculate a predicted bid-ask spread as follows.
We estimate the regression
BAit = β0 + β1pit + it (1)
where BAit is the actual bid-ask spread of bond i at day t and pit is the specific proxy. The intercept
in the regression should be zero: for example when we estimate equation (1) using bond return
volatility as a proxy, inventory models predict that the bid-ask spread is zero if bond volatility is
zero because there is no inventory risk. However, we include an intercept in the regression to allow
for a fixed cost of market making.
We use the estimated regression parameters from equation (1) to calculate a predicted bid-ask
spread as
BˆAit = βˆ0 + βˆ1pit (2)
and calculate average predicted bid-ask spreads grouped according to rating and maturity in the
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same way as for the actual bid-ask spreads. For asymmetric information and dealer network
theories, we calculate an implied bond bid-ask spread and use this directly when comparing to
actual bid-ask spreads.
Note that the average actual bid-ask spreads in some tables are different from those in Table
3 because proxies may not exist for all observations of actual bid-ask spreads. In the tables, we
therefore calculate an average actual bid-ask spread based on bid-ask spread observations for which
we have values of the proxy and report the difference between average predicted and average actual
bid-ask spreads in brackets.
Inventory
Standard models of inventory costs imply that bond bid-ask spreads increase with bond return
volatility, since higher volatility implies larger fluctuations in the value of inventory. Table 9
shows annualized bond return volatility. Average bond volatility is 8.3% which is similar to the
average bond volatility of 6.9% in Bao and Pan (2013). On average bond volatility increases in
rating: volatility is 5.3% for Safe bonds increasing to 25.1% for C-rated bonds. We also see that
average bond volatility increases in bond maturity from 5.2% for short maturities to 13.2% for
long maturities. The positive relation between bond volatility and maturity is present in all rating
categories except for the most risky C-rated, where the relation is flat. Likely, this is because
prices of the most credit risky bonds depend primarily on the expected bond recovery value and
for a given firm the expected recovery value is the same across bonds with different maturities.
Table 10 shows the estimated parameters from equation (2). The estimate βˆ0 = 9.067 implies
that the fixed cost of market making is 9.1 bps and βˆ1 = 278.124 implies that a one percentage
point increase in annualized bond volatility increases the bid-ask spread by 2.8 bps.
Table 11 shows predicted spreads when using bond volatility as the single explanatory vari-
able for bond bid-ask spreads. Consistent with actual bid-ask spreads, average predicted spreads
increase in bond maturity: the average implied (actual) spread for short-maturity bonds is 23.5
(19.8) bps and 45.9 (51.5) bps for long-maturity bonds.
Turning to the relation between bid-ask spreads and rating, Table 11 shows that there is a
positive relation between predicted spreads and credit risk consistent with the actual relation. For
example, the average predicted spread is 23.7 bps for Safe bonds and 78.8 bps for C-rated bonds.
However, predicted spreads are too high for speculative grade bonds and increasingly so for more
credit risky bonds: average predicted spreads are higher than average actual spreads by 2.5 bps
for BB-rated bonds, 11.7 bps for B-rated bonds, and 29.0 bps for C-rated bonds. For investment
grade bonds, predicted spreads are broadly in line with actual spreads. The predicted spread for
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long-maturity Safe bonds is 4.6 bps higher than for AA bonds, which is also in line with actual
spreads.
Overall, variation in bond volatilities captures a large fraction of the variation in bid-ask
spreads.
Search and bargaining
A major implication of search-based models is that there is a positive relation between bid-ask
spreads and the time it takes dealers to intermediate bonds. Table 10 shows that this is indeed the
case since the slope coefficient βˆ1 in the regression of bid-ask spreads on chain times is significantly
positive.
Table 9 shows the average time it takes dealers to complete a round-trip intermediation chain.
Depending on bond maturity and rating, it takes dealers on average between 5.7 and 9.4 days
to complete a chain. The table shows that it takes longer to intermediate long-maturity bonds
compared to short-maturity bonds; for example it takes on average 7.7 days to intermediate long-
maturity BBB bonds while the corresponding time is 6.4 days for short-maturity BBB bonds.
Across rating, chain time is lower for speculative grade bonds compared to investment grade
bonds.
Table 12 shows average bid-ask spreads predicted by chain times. Inconsistent with actual bid-
ask spreads, there is little variation in predicted bid-ask spreads both across rating and maturity,
due to the modest variation in average chain times combined with a low loading on chain times.
Predicted bid-ask spreads range from 33.0 bps to 35.3 bps while actual bid-ask spreads range from
24.2 bps to 78.7 bps.
Turning to bargaining, we see in Table 9 that depending on rating and maturity the average
dealer concentration is between 24.4% and 39.4%. To interpret this range, note that if there are
three dealers with an equal market share, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index is 33.3%. The dealer
concentration in the U.S. corporate market is substantially higher than in other OTC markets such
as the markets for options, forwards, and interest rate swaps (see Cetorelli et al. (2007)).
Table 13 shows average predicted bid-ask spreads from bargaining. Predicted bid-ask spreads
range from 32.4 bps to 35.6 bps, far below the actual range. The low range is, as is the case with
search frictions, due to the low variation of dealer concentration combined with the low loading on
dealer concentration.
Our results imply that search and bargaining frictions are unable to explain bid-ask spreads
across rating and maturity.
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Asymmetric information
If some investors have private information, dealers charge a positive bid-ask spread and obtain a
positive profit from uninformed investors to offset losses arising from trading with the informed
investors. In Appendix A we derive an unlevered bond bid-ask spread from the Merton (1974)
model where we include asymmetric information as in Copeland and Galai (1983). In the model,
the bond bid-ask spread is equal to the equity bid-ask spread times the sensitivity of bond returns
to equity returns.
We calculate an equity bid-ask spread for each observation of the bond bid-ask spread and
Table 9 shows average equity bid-ask spreads. Equity bid-ask spreads increase with credit risk,
similar to the pattern in bond bid-ask spreads. However, the size of equity bid-ask spreads is
smaller than in the bond market. For example, the average equity bid-ask spread for firms with
Safe (BBB-rated) bonds is 6.9 (10.7) bps while the corresponding average bond spread in Table 3
is 28.4 (36.3) bps. In models with asymmetric information, the bid-ask spread on equity is larger
than the bid-ask spread on debt (see for example Dang et al. (2015)).
Table 14 shows the bond bid-ask spread unlevered from the equity market. We see that
unlevered bid-ask spreads are small, in particular for investment grade bonds. For example, the
average predicted bond bid-ask spread for Safe bonds is only 0.1 bps, far from the average actual
spread of 32.7 bps. The reason is that the sensitivity of bond returns to equity returns is too low
to generate a significant unlevered bond bid-ask spread. As an example, the 10-year cumulative
default rate for safe bonds is less than 0.23% and such small default rates have very modest effects
on bond prices.7 In this case, private information about a safe bond issuer can have a sizeable
effect on equity prices but will have almost no effect on bond prices. This in turn implies a sizeable
equity bid-ask spread and a close-to-zero bond bid-ask spread.
Consistent with actual bond spreads, predicted bond spreads increase in maturity and rating,
but the sizes of predicted spreads are substantially lower than actual spreads. Overall, the results
show that asymmetric information only accounts for a minor fraction of bond bid-ask spreads.
Dealer network
Theories of dealer networks predict that how bonds are traded throughout the network of dealers
is crucial for the bid-ask spread. As outlined earlier, we calculate an average markup for each
dealer and then estimate a predicted bid-ask spread for each round-trip intermediation chain by
adding the average markups of the dealers involved in the chain. If, for example, central dealers
on average charge higher markups, predicted bid-ask spreads will be higher for chains involving
7See Moody’s (2018) Exhibition 35.
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central dealers.
Table 15 presents predicted bid-ask spreads based on dealer network. We see that for long-
maturity bonds, predicted spreads show a U-shaped pattern across rating consistent with actual
bid-ask spreads: Safe bonds have substantially higher spreads than other investment grade bonds
and for lower rated bonds there is a gradual increase in spreads. Thus, the dealer network is
important in explaining the variation in bid-ask spreads for long-maturity bonds. For short-
maturity bonds predicted spreads appear less consistent with actual spreads. In particular, average
spreads predicted by the dealer network decrease in maturity which is in stark contrast to the
increasing pattern in actual spreads. Overall, the results show that the dealer network is important
for understanding spreads for long-maturity bonds across rating, while spreads across maturity
remain unexplained by the dealer network.
5.2 Joint Prediction in Panel Regression
In Section 5.1, we investigate variation in bid-ask spreads across bond maturity and rating. There
may be other dimensions in which there is important variation in spreads, and we therefore examine
the ability of models to capture the spread in a panel regression. We restrict the sample to bond
spread observations for which all five empirical measures are available and present the results for
institutional-sized transactions in Table 16 and for retail-sized transactions in Table 17.
Panel A in Table 16 shows the results for all bonds based on institutional-sized transactions.
There are two models that stand out in terms of their ability to explain spreads: inventory and
dealer network models. R2’s of inventory and dealer networks models are 3 and 3.5%, respectively,
while the remaining models have R2’s of 0.5% or below. The t-statistics also point to inventory
and dealer network models as most important in explaining spreads.8 The R2 of 6.0% in the joint
regression shows that inventory and dealer network models capture distinct aspects of the spread.
Focusing on investment grade bonds, we see in Panel B that inventory and dealer network
models stand out even more than in the full sample with R2’s of 6.1% and 5.0%, respectively.
Thus, for investment grade bonds inventory risk is the main determinant of spreads followed by
the dealer network. Our asymmetric information measure has a sizeable R2 of 2.6% but we note
that the coefficient is 30.172, far from one as predicted by our model. A potential explanation
for this is that the measure is correlated with bond volatility and to a certain extent captures
inventory effects. Consistent with this explanation, we see in specification (6) that the coefficient
on asymmetric information is substantially smaller when included in a joint regression with bond
volatility.
8Since standard errors are clustered, there is not a one-to-one correspondence between t-statistics and R2.
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For speculative grade bonds, we see in Panel C that inventory and dealer network models have
the highest explanatory power, consistent with the results on investment grade bonds. However,
for speculative grade bonds the dealer network stands out as the most important determinant of
bid-ask spreads.
Panel A in Table 17 shows the results for all bonds based on retail-sized transactions. Similar
to our findings for institutional-sized transactions, we also find that inventory and dealer network
models have the highest R2’s of 15.6% and 15%, respectively. When we use bond volatility to
proxy for dealer inventory risk, the relatively high R2 partly reflects that higher levels of bid-ask
spreads induce more noise in bond prices and leads to higher volatility estimates. Since retail-sized
transactions have higher bid-ask spreads than institutional-sized transactions, the relation between
bid-ask spreads and bond volatility becomes more pronounced. We confirm this relation using
simulations and refer the details to Appendix B. In addition, we also find that our asymmetric
information measure has a sizeable R2 of 6.3% for retail-sized transactions but the coefficient
estimate remains far from one as predicted by our model. Surprisingly, we obtain a negative
coefficient estimate on chain time unlike our results with institutional-sized transactions. The
statistical significance of this estimate, however, is substantially below our other proxies and the
R2 of the regression is essentially zero. The joint regression in column 6 has an R2 of 25.1%
meaning that our proxies also capture distinct aspects of the spread for retail-sized transactions.
For investment grade bonds in Panel B, we again find that inventory and dealer network models
stand out even more than in the full sample with R2’s of 19.1% and 19.5%, respectively. Panel
C presents the results for speculative grade bonds where inventory and dealer network models
continue to have the highest highest R2’s of 6.3% and 6.1%. The coefficient estimate on dealer
concentration is negative and statistically significant in column 5 but the R2 remains close to
zero. In column 6 where we include all proxies, this coefficient estimate becomes positive but
statistically insignificant. Taken together, our results for retail-sized transactions support our
conclusions from institutional-sized transactions that inventory and dealer network models have
the highest explanatory power for the variation in bid-ask spreads.
5.3 Matched Trades
There is a recent literature finding that matched trades are different in nature than other trades in
the corporate bond market (see among others Schultz (2017), Bao et al. (2018), and Bessembinder
et al. (2018)). Matched trades are riskless principal trades arranged by a dealer such that trades
offset each other, typically within one minute, and the dealer does not have inventory risk.
The theories we test above have distinct predictions on the bid-ask spread of matched trades. In
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standard search-and-bargaining models, the main drivers of spreads is the search for counterparties
and bilateral bargaining and the models abstain from modelling inventory of dealers. A standard
feature of the models is that dealers have immediate access to an interdealer market in which
they unload their positions, so that they have no inventory at any time (see for example Duffie
et al. (2005), Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), Feldhu¨tter (2012), and He and Milbradt (2014)). In
such models, dealers immediately unload bonds in the interdealer market and all transactions
appear as prematched. Therefore, we do not expect to see different bid-ask spreads of matched
and unmatched trades.
In inventory models, the bid-ask spread arises because the dealer is compensated for the risk
that the bond price decreases while the dealer has the bond in inventory. In matched trades there
is no such risk and the bid-ask spread in matched trades should be constant across rating and
maturity.
Bid-ask spreads in asymmetric information models arise because the dealer has to earn a
positive profit when trading with uninformed investors to offset trading loses when trading against
informed investors. In matched trades, there is no such potential trading losses regardless of
whether the counterparty is informed or uninformed and therefore the models predict that the
bid-ask spread of matched trades is constant.
As noted in footnote 6, there are a number of theories that may explain the network structure,
for example search frictions and asymmetric information, and therefore dealer network models do
not have clear predictions on matched trades.
In our sample, we define matched trades as round-trip intermediation chains completed within
one minute. We calculate bid-ask spreads in the same way as for the full sample. Specifically, if
a bond has several chains beginning on the same day, we calculate the volume-weighted bid-ask
spread. This implies that the sum of matched and unmatched chains is higher than the sum of
all chains in Table 1, because if a bond trades in both a matched and in a unmatched chain on
a given day, this gives rise to only one volume-weighted chain in the full sample. Finally, we
divide our samples of matched and unmatched chains into seven rating groups and three maturity
groups similar to our previous analysis. We winsorize bid-ask spreads within each of the 21 rating-
maturity groups, for matched and unmatched chains separately, at the 1st and 99th percentiles
over the entire sample.
Table 18 shows the bid-ask spread for matched and unmatched chains, respectively. For in-
vestment grade bonds, the bid-ask spread of matched chains is a small fraction of the spread of
unmatched chains. For example, the bid-ask spread of matched chains for Safe bonds is 5.9 bps
while the spread is 31.8 bps for unmatched chains. Furthermore, the spread does not consistently
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become larger as bond maturity increases. For example, the spread for BBB bonds shows little
relation to maturity for matched chains. Since search-and-bargaining models predict that there
is no difference in bid-ask spreads of matched and unmatched chains, these results suggest that
these models cannot explain the size of bid-ask spreads for speculative grade bonds. In contrast,
the large difference between matched and unmatched chains is consistent with models of inventory
and asymmetric information.
For speculative grade bonds, we see that bid-ask spreads of matched chains increase substan-
tially as credit quality deteriorates and for the lowest C-rated bonds the average bid-ask spread of
matched chains is 46.1 bps which is a sizeable 66% of the bid-ask spread of unmatched chains of
69.7 bps. This is consistent with the importance of search-and-bargaining frictions increasing as
bonds become more credit risky.
6 Conclusion
We estimate bid-ask spreads in the U.S. corporate bond market using realized transaction costs
from round-trip intermediation chains and document variation across credit quality and bond
maturity. Spreads increase in bond maturity for investment grade bonds, but there is no clear
relation for speculative grade bonds. For short-maturity bonds, spreads increase with credit risk
while long-maturity Safe bonds have significantly higher spreads than other investment grade
bonds. We use the documented patterns to test prominent theories of the bid-ask spread in OTC
markets: inventory, search-and-bargaining, asymmetric information, and dealer networks.
A key implication of dealer inventory models is that the bid-ask spread is proportional to bond
return volatility, and consistent with this implication we find that variation in bond volatilities
explains a large part of the variation in bond bid-ask spreads, in particular for investment grade
bonds. We also calculate a predicted spread from the dealer network by calculating an average
markup for each dealer and estimating a predicted spread for each round-trip intermediation chain
by adding the markups of the involved dealers. We find that predicted spreads can also explain
part of the variation, especially for speculative grade bonds.
We do not find much support for search-and-bargaining models. Our proxies for search-and-
bargaining models, the time it takes to complete a round-trip intermediation chain and dealer
concentration, do not exhibit much variation across bond maturity or rating. Furthermore, we
find that matched chains, i.e. chains that are completed within one minute, have much smaller
spreads than unmatched chains. Search-based models predict that there is no difference in spreads
of matched and unmatched chains.
Finally, asymmetric information models predict that the equity bid-ask spread is larger than
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the bond bid-ask spread because the equity price is more sensitive to information than the bond
price, and we exploit this feature to derive a predicted bond bid-ask spread by unlevering the
equity bid-ask spread. We find that predicted bond spreads are much too small, in particular for
investment grade bonds, suggesting that asymmetric information, at least for investment grade
bonds, is not important for determining bid-ask spreads.
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Appendices
A Empirical Measures: Implementation Details
This appendix explains implementation details of the measures we use to proxy for central predic-
tions from theories on frictions in OTC markets.
A.1 Inventory: bond return volatility
We use the WRDS Bond Returns dataset to estimate bond return volatility. This dataset contains
monthly bond returns based on cleaned transaction prices from Enhanced and Standard TRACE.
We use the monthly return based on the last price at which a bond traded in a given month
provided that day falls within the last 5 trading days of the month. If there are no trades in the
last five days of the current month or the previous month, the bond return is missing for the month.
We estimate bond return volatility as the standard deviation of monthly bond returns in the past
24 months and require at least 12 monthly observations in the two-year estimation window. We
use bond return volatility instead of bond return variance as implied by Stoll (1978) and Ho and
Stoll (1983) because the distribution of bond volatilities is less skewed. To account for outliers, we
winsorize the bond-month observations of bond volatility one-sided at the 98% level. We have also
done our analysis using the monthly return based on either (1) the last price at which the bond
traded in a given month or (2) the price on the last trading day of the month and these choices
give similar results.
A.2 Search: chain time
We measure chain time as the number of days it takes to complete a round-trip intermediation
chain. A chain starts when the head dealer buys bonds from an investor and ends when the tail
dealer sells bonds to an investor. The chain time is the number of days between the first and last
transaction in the chain. In case of order splitting, we calculate the par-weighted transaction date
of the last leg in the chain. For example, assume an investor sells $1mio in par value to a dealer
on a Monday. This dealer sells half the amount to an investor on the following Wednesday and
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the rest to another investor on the following Friday. In this case the chain time is 12 ∗ 2 + 12 ∗ 4 = 3
days.
A.3 Bargaining: Herfindahl-Hirschman index for dealer concentration
For each bond, we calculate a Herfindahl-Hirschman (HH) index based on bond transactions in
the past month. Assume that there are N dealers transacting in bond j over the last month and
dealer i transacts a par value of vi. The market share of dealer i is si =
vi∑N
i=1 vi
and the HH index
at time t is
DCj,t =
N∑
i=1
s2i . (A.1)
A.4 Dealer network: predicted bond bid-ask spreads based on the dealer network
For each dealer we find all instances in the round-trip intermediation chains where the dealer
• buys from an investor and sells to another investor
• buys from an investor and sells to a dealer
• buys from a dealer and sells to another dealer
• buys from a dealer and sells to an investor
and in each of the four cases we calculate a dealer-specific average markup, across all chains, where
the markup in each leg of the chain is estimated as
dealer sell price − dealer buy price
mid-price
(A.2)
where the mid-price is the average of the investor sell price and the investor buy price in the chain.
In case of order splitting, the investor buy price is the par-weighted average of investor buy prices.
The average markup in each of the four cases serves as the predicted markup for this particular
dealer.
For each round-trip intermediation chain, we calculate a bid-ask spread predicted by the dealer
network in the following way. For each dealer in the chain, we replace the actual markup with
the predicted markup, and then calculate the total round-trip markup based on the sum of the
predicted dealer markups. As in example, consider a chain where an investor sells to dealer A,
dealer A sells to dealer B, and dealer B ultimately sells to another investor. Assume that on
average dealer A earns a markup of 10 bps when buying from an investor and selling to another
dealer, while dealer B on average earns a markup of 15 bps when buying from another dealer and
selling to an investor. In this case the predicted markup is 25 bps.
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We winsorize predicted bid-ask spreads at the 1% and 99% level.
A.5 Asymmetric information: predicted bond bid-ask spread extracted from the
equity bid-ask spread
We use a model to calculate predicted bond bid-ask spreads from equity bid-ask spreads for the
issuing firm. Our model follows Copeland and Galai (1983). We assume that V0 is the current
value of the firm as perceived by a risk-neutral dealer. The dealer trades a claim on the value of
the firm C0 and commits to sell a fixed quantity of the claim for KA and buy a fixed quantity for
KB within a short period of time.
Firm value can take on two values in the next period, Vu > V0 and Vd < V0, and each value is
equally likely. We assume that claim value is monotone in firm value and therefore Cu > C0 and
Cd < C0. An investor arrives and trades before the next period; after the transaction firm value
in the next period is revealed. With probability p the investor is informed about the value of the
firm while with probability 1 − p the investor trades for liquidity-reasons and is uninformed. It
is equally likely that the liquidity-trader will buy or sell. The dealer’s expected revenue from the
transaction if the investor is a liquidity-trader is
1
2
(KA − C0) + 1
2
(C0 −KB) (A.3)
while the expected revenue if the investor is informed is
1
2
(KA − Cu) + 1
2
(Cd −KB) (A.4)
The dealer revenue in equation (A.4) is negative because the informed investor only trades if he
gains a profit. We assume that dealer markets are competitive and therefore the expected dealer
profit is zero
(1− p)
(
1
2
(KA − C0) + 1
2
(C0 −KB)
)
+ p
(
1
2
(KA − Cu) + 1
2
(Cd −KB)
)
= 0 (A.5)
and simplifying the expression yields
KA −KB = p(Cu − Cd). (A.6)
Assume that dealer A trades equity while dealer B trades debt and the probabilities in the two
markets (of the investor being informed and the liquidity-trader selling) are the same. In this case
equation (A.6) holds for both dealers and the ratio between the bid-ask spread in the equity and
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the debt market is
KEA −KEB
KDA −KDB
=
Eu − Ed
Du −Dd (A.7)
while the ratio between the relative bid-ask spreads is
(KEA −KEB )/E0
(KDA −KDB )/D0
=
(Eu − Ed)/E0
(Du −Dd)/D0 . (A.8)
Equation (A.8) shows that the relative spreads depend on the price sensitivity of debt and equity
to changes in firm value: if the percentage change in equity value is twice the percentage change
in debt value, the relative bid-ask spread of equity is twice that of debt.
Assume now that firm value follows a Geometric Brownian Motion and that the firm has issued
one zero-coupon bond with maturity date T , i.e. this is the Merton (1974) model. It is well-known
that the value of equity is equal to the value of a call option while the value of debt is equal to the
value of a risk-free bond minus the value of a put option.
Consider the above model as one period in a discrete-time binomial tree version of the Merton
model. We know that as the time period in the binomial model shrinks, the value of debt, equity,
and deltas converge to the Black-Scholes values (Walsh (2003)). Therefore, the ratio between the
relative bid-ask spreads converges to
(KEA −KEB )/E0
(KDA −KDB )/D0
→ N(d1)/C(V0)(
1−N(d1)
)
/(D − P (V0))
(A.9)
where C(V0) and P (V0) are Black-Scholes call and put option values, D is the value of a risk-free
zero-coupon bond with maturity date T and face value equal to the face value of the risky debt,
N(.) is the standard normal distribution function, and
d1 =
1
σ
√
T
(
log(V0/d) + (rt − δt − 1
2
σ2)T
)
(A.10)
where σ is asset volatility, T is the time-to-maturity of the bond, d is the default point, rt is the
yield at time t for a Treasury bond with maturity T , and δt is the payout rate at time t.
We use data from several sources to estimate the model parameters. For a given bond on a
given day, we use data from Mergent FISD to determine time-to-maturity T and calculate rt as
the interpolated maturity-matched Treasury rate using data from the Federal Reserve Bank. To
estimate the remaining parameters, we combine annual accounting information from COMPUS-
TAT with daily stock market data from CRSP. We align each firm’s fiscal year with the calendar
year and lag accounting data by six months when we merge the two datasets using the CRSP-
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COMPUSTAT linking table. We only consider common stocks (SHRCD equal to 10 or 11 in
CRSP) and calculate the daily market value of equity and the daily equity bid-ask spread from
CRSP. If a firm has more than one share class, we compute a weighted bid-ask spread based on
the market capitalization of each share class.
We use the approach from Feldhu¨tter and Schaefer (2018) to estimate firms’ asset volatilities
as
σt = R(Lt)(1− Lt)σE,t (A.11)
where σE,t is equity volatility and Lt is the market leverage ratio at time t, and R is a step-
function of Lt that is 1 if Lt < 0.25, 1.05 if 0.25 < Lt ≤ 0.35, 1.10 if 0.35 < Lt ≤ 0.45, 1.20
if 0.45 < Lt ≤ 0.55, 1.40 if 0.55 < Lt ≤ 0.75, and 1.80 if Lt > 0.75. The firm’s daily market
leverage is the ratio of total debt to the sum of total debt and the market value of equity. The
equity volatility is the annualized standard deviation of daily stock returns from CRSP measured
over the past three years. We require return observations on at least half the trading days in the
three-year window before we compute the equity volatility. If a firm has more than one share class,
we compute the weighted equity volatility based on the market capitalization of each share class.
For a given firm, we calculate the average asset volatility over the entire sample period and use
this constant asset volatility σ for every day in the sample period.
We follow Feldhu¨tter and Schaefer (2018) and calculate daily payout rates as the sum of interest
payments to debt, dividend payments to equity, and net stock repurchases divided by the sum of
total debt and the market value of equity. We also use the estimated default point d = 0.8944 ∗ F
from Feldhu¨tter and Schaefer (2018) where F is the total debt face value from COMPUSTAT.
We use the linking table from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) to merge bond-level
information with firm characteristics for bonds/firms with non-overlapping linking dates.
Finally, we imply out firm value V0 such that the value of the call option C(V0) equals the
market value of equity at time t and subsequently we calculate the ratio in equation (A.9) and
multiply the equity bid-ask spread with this ratio to derive a predicted bond bid-ask spread.
Predicted bond bid-ask spreads are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.
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B Regression Results with Simulated Transaction Prices
In this section, we analyze the relationship between bid-ask spreads and bond return volatility
using simulated transaction prices. Let mit denote the mid-price for bond i at time t
mit = mi,t−1 + uit, uit ∼ N(0, σ) (B.1)
such that the transaction price pit for bond i at time t is
pit = mit + qitci, ci ∼ unif(a, b) (B.2)
where qit is the trade indicator (+1 for buys and -1 for sells) and ci is the half spread. We assume
qit is independent of uit and P (qit = 1) = P (qit = −1) = 0.5. Let mi0 = 100 for all i = {1, . . . N}
bonds and consider t = {1, . . . T} months. The monthly bond return is
rit = log(pit)− log(pi,t−1) (B.3)
and the estimated monthly bond volatility for bond i is
σˆi =
√√√√ 1
T − 1
T∑
t=1
(rit − µˆi)2 (B.4)
where
µˆi =
1
T
T∑
t=1
rit (B.5)
We calculate bid-ask spreads measured in bps as
BAi = 2 ∗ ci (B.6)
and estimate the regression
BAi = β0 + β1σˆi + i (B.7)
For N = 10, 000 bonds and T = 36 months, we only draw one set of random numbers and consider
different combinations of underlying parameter values. In Table B.1, we present the regression
results. Panel A shows that for institutional-sized bid-ask spreads (0-70 bps), it requires a small
annualized bond volatility of 4% to generate a meaningful R2. For comparison, the average an-
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nualized bond volatility is 8.3% in our sample. Panel B shows the results for retail-sized bid-ask
spreads (0-220 bps). Both the magnitudes of the coefficient estimates βˆ1 and the R
2’s are sub-
stantially higher for retail-sized transactions compared to institutional-sized transactions. These
features are consistent with our findings in Table 16 and 17.
Table B.1: Regressions Results Based on Simulated Transaction Prices
This table presents regression results of the equation BAi = β0 + β1σˆi + i based on simulated transaction
prices. The bid-ask spread is measured in bps and annualized bond volatility is in percent. Panel A shows
the results for (institutional-sized) bid-ask spreads between 0 og 70 bps while Panel B presents the results
for (retail-sized) bid-ask spreads between 0-220 bps.
Annualized σ
4% 8% 12%
Panel A: Spreads from 0-70 BPS
βˆ0 15.23 29.1 31.85
(8.95) (16.95) (18.60)
βˆ1 487.51 72.12 25.22
(11.62) (3.37) (1.77)
Adj. R2 0.013 0.001 0.000
Panel B: Spreads from 0-220 BPS
βˆ0 -161.11 -23.90 43.20
(-51.30) (-4.72) (8.14)
βˆ1 6006.51 1622.00 547.90
(87.21) (26.55) (12.59)
Adj. R2 0.432 0.066 0.016
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Table 1: Sample composition
This table shows the number of trades, bonds, firms, and dealers in our sample. The data are for U.S.
corporate bonds with fixed coupons and bonds that are callable at a fixed price, putable, convertible,
denoted in foreign currency, or have sinking fund provisions are excluded. ’Safe’ includes AAA and AA+
rated bonds, ’AA’ includes bonds rated AA or AA-, ’C’ includes C, CC, and CCC rated bonds, while the
remaining categories follow standard conventions. Data are from Academic TRACE and the sample period
is 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2015.
Safe AA A BBB BB B C All
Panel A: All Bonds
Trades 1,150,127 1,617,763 6,132,073 5,996,227 1,878,930 919,741 451,125 18,145,986
Bonds 1,692 3,289 10,591 10,375 3,881 1,760 984 23,626
Firms 200 391 1,290 1,843 810 507 254 3,178
Dealers 1,752 1,794 2,288 2,367 1,895 1,653 1,437 2,867
Panel B: Short Maturity (0-4 Years)
Trades 551,520 806,902 2,278,409 1,727,149 515,662 306,705 193,688 6,380,035
Bonds 1,131 2,317 6,810 6,569 2,481 1,113 657 16,931
Firms 172 319 1,066 1,411 566 355 199 2,671
Dealers 1,432 1,536 1,901 2,041 1,577 1,352 1,195 2,509
Panel C: Medium Maturity (4-8 Years)
Trades 288,039 454,844 1,813,048 1,713,405 717,313 359,942 170,759 5,517,350
Bonds 772 1,305 4,867 4,763 1,451 675 300 12,030
Firms 114 256 941 1,420 560 358 158 2,537
Dealers 1,299 1,351 1,832 1,843 1,403 1,234 1,018 2,350
Panel D: Long Maturity (>8 Years)
Trades 310,568 356,017 2,040,616 2,555,673 645,955 253,094 86,678 6,248,601
Bonds 586 698 3,583 3,958 1,051 427 202 8,370
Firms 71 210 831 1,309 458 215 90 2,037
Dealers 1,252 1,113 1,716 1,803 1,330 1,093 833 2,385
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Table 2: Round-trip intermediation chain summary statistics
This table shows summary statistics for our sample of round-trip intermediation chains (RTICs). Maturity
is the time-to-maturity and Age is the time since issuance, both measured in years. Amount outstanding
and Trade size are in millions of US dollars. We use the last leg in RTICs to measure Trade size. N is the
number of RTICs. ’Safe’ includes AAA and AA+ rated bonds, ’AA’ includes bonds rated AA or AA-, ’C’
includes C, CC, and CCC rated bonds, while the remaining categories follow standard conventions. Data
are from Academic TRACE and the sample period is 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2015.
Safe AA A BBB BB B C All
Panel A: All Bonds
Maturity 6.12 5.71 7.65 9.24 7.55 7.09 6.74 7.85
Age 2.99 3.31 3.34 3.32 3.49 4.55 5.65 3.44
Amt. Out. 1,953 1,252 1,124 885 744 685 621 1,028
Trade size 2.83 2.21 2.26 2.51 2.24 2.29 2.64 2.38
N 95,933 172,235 625,917 591,137 193,252 94,045 38,641 1,811,160
Panel B: Short Maturity (0-4 Years)
Maturity 1.87 1.83 1.93 2.08 2.29 2.31 2.17 2.00
Age 3.30 4.00 4.25 4.47 4.71 5.44 6.00 4.33
Amt. Out. 1,767 1,165 990 799 667 570 474 966
Trade size 3.17 2.04 1.94 2.20 2.29 2.42 2.54 2.18
N 54,842 97,019 276,465 192,586 55,049 32,973 16,401 725,335
Panel C: Medium Maturity (4-8 Years)
Maturity 5.57 5.39 5.64 5.81 5.95 5.86 5.72 5.73
Age 2.60 2.36 2.74 2.99 2.75 3.12 3.95 2.85
Amt. Out. 1,863 1,334 1,261 841 760 692 710 1,026
Trade size 2.25 2.19 2.20 2.47 2.17 2.09 2.60 2.29
N 20,459 40,224 161,885 164,093 75,890 36,775 14,914 514,240
Panel D: Long Maturity (>8 Years)
Maturity 17.95 16.84 17.82 17.53 14.15 15.42 19.07 17.16
Age 2.54 2.50 2.51 2.60 3.30 5.51 8.35 2.84
Amt. Out. 2,538 1,401 1,204 987 794 833 771 1,109
Trade size 2.50 2.72 2.78 2.79 2.29 2.44 2.95 2.70
N 20,632 34,992 187,567 234,458 62,313 24,297 7,326 571,585
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Table 3: Bid-ask spread estimates
For all bonds in the sample, we calculate daily bid-ask spreads from round-trip intermediation chains, as
a percentage of the mid-price and measured in basis points and report the average bid-ask spread across
rating and maturity. ’Safe’ includes AAA and AA+ rated bonds, ’AA’ includes bonds rated AA or AA-,
’C’ includes C, CC, and CCC rated bonds, while the remaining categories follow standard conventions.
Maturities are 0-4 years (short), 4-8 years (medium), and >8 years (long). We report standard errors
clustered at the bond level in parentheses and the number of observations in brackets. Data are from
Academic TRACE and the sample period is 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2015.
Maturity
Short Medium Long All
Safe 16.3 38.4 50.4 28.4
(0.95) (2.52) (2.84) (1.15)
[54,842] [20,459] [20,632] [95,933]
AA 17.3 37.2 40.2 26.6
(0.67) (2.19) (1.67) (0.83)
[97,019] [40,224] [34,992] [172,235]
A 16.7 34.5 45.8 30.0
(0.36) (0.88) (0.91) (0.45)
[276,465] [161,885] [187,567] [625,917]
BBB 25.6 37.3 44.5 36.3
(0.55) (0.84) (0.92) (0.49)
[192,586] [164,093] [234,458] [591,137]
BB 39.8 33.7 42.8 38.4
(1.23) (1.28) (2.11) (0.96)
[55,049] [75,890] [62,313] [193,252]
B 43.5 41.8 49.8 44.4
(2.81) (2.87) (4.59) (1.91)
[32,973] [36,775] [24,297] [94,045]
C 63.8 43.0 116.3 65.7
(8.20) (8.47) (17.03) (5.78)
[16,401] [14,914] [7,326] [38,641]
All 23.1 36.4 45.8 34.1
(0.37) (0.60) (0.70) (0.11)
[725,335] [514,240] [571,585] [1,811,160]
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Table 4: Bid-ask spread estimates: crisis vs non-crisis
For all bonds in the sample, we calculate daily bid-ask spreads from round-trip intermediation chains, as
a percentage of the mid-price and measured in basis points and report the average bid-ask spread across
rating and maturity. ’Safe’ includes AAA and AA+ rated bonds, ’AA’ includes bonds rated AA or AA-,
’C’ includes C, CC, and CCC rated bonds, while the remaining categories follow standard conventions.
Maturities are 0-4 years (short), 4-8 years (medium), and >8 years (long). The crisis period is from 1 April
2007 to 30 June 2009. We report standard errors clustered at the bond level in parentheses and the number
of observations in brackets. Data are from Academic TRACE and the sample period is 1 July 2002 to 30
June 2015.
Non-Crisis Crisis
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
Safe 11.3 32.7 47.6 47.5 64.9 65.6
(0.44) (2.02) (2.83) (3.18) (7.06) (6.00)
[47,204] [16,868] [17,388] [7,638] [3,591] [3,244]
AA 12.0 29.3 36.2 48.2 79.2 61.0
(0.39) (1.68) (1.58) (2.41) (5.06) (4.09)
[82,878] [33,887] [29,374] [14,141] [6,337] [5,618]
A 13.0 29.8 41.3 50.1 69.9 70.5
(0.28) (0.79) (0.87) (1.38) (2.19) (1.92)
[248,523] [142,787] [158,622] [27,942] [19,098] [28,945]
BBB 21.9 33.8 41.7 57.8 67.5 63.5
(0.52) (0.83) (0.97) (1.71) (2.16) (1.95)
[173,181] [146,841] [205,033] [19,405] [17,252] [29,425]
BB 36.8 33.3 44.2 62.1 37.2 32.4
(1.20) (1.36) (2.28) (3.54) (3.34) (4.48)
[48,528] [67,629] [54,675] [6,521] [8,261] [7,638]
B 46.3 43.4 56.6 31.8 28.9 12.6
(2.99) (3.06) (4.11) (6.68) (7.69) (18.51)
[26,497] [32,681] [20,544] [6,476] [4,094] [3,753]
C 55.2 45.8 105.3 105.6 28.8 154.1
(8.50) (9.22) (15.84) (23.10) (19.69) (51.68)
[13,586] [12,428] [5,678] [2,815] [2,486] [1,648]
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Table 5: Bid-ask spread estimates with time fixed effects
This table shows bid-ask spread estimates from a regression with time fixed effects. For all bonds in the
sample, we calculate daily bid-ask spreads from round-trip intermediation chains, as a percentage of the
mid-price and measured in basis points. We then estimate the regression:
BAit =
7∑
r=1
3∑
m=1
αrmDitrm + δt + it
where BAit is the bid-ask spread for bond i at day t, Ditrm is a dummy variable that equals one if bond i
at time t belongs to rating group r and maturity group m and equals zero otherwise, and δt denotes month
fixed effects. ’Safe’ includes AAA and AA+ rated bonds, ’AA’ includes bonds rated AA or AA-, ’C’ includes
C, CC, and CCC rated bonds, while the remaining categories follow standard conventions. Maturities are
0-4 years (short), 4-8 years (medium), and >8 years (long). Estimates of αrm represent the average bid-ask
spread for each rating-maturity group. We report standard errors clustered at the bond level in parentheses
and the number of observations in brackets. Data are from Academic TRACE and the sample period is 1
July 2002 to 30 June 2015.
Maturity
Short Medium Long All
Safe 14.1 38.3 47.8 26.4
(0.93) (1.92) (2.47) (1.15)
[54,842] [20,459] [20,632] [95,933]
AA 18.9 35.5 39.6 26.9
(0.55) (1.83) (1.60) (0.74)
[97,019] [40,224] [34,992] [172,235]
A 19.1 34.2 43.3 30.3
(0.32) (0.74) (0.78) (0.40)
[276,465] [161,885] [187,567] [625,917]
BBB 25.2 36.9 43.3 35.6
(0.46) (0.69) (0.86) (0.46)
[192,586] [164,093] [234,458] [591,137]
BB 40.9 35.6 46.6 40.8
(1.13) (1.20) (2.09) (0.96)
[55,049] [75,890] [62,313] [193,252]
B 41.6 43.0 51.7 44.8
(2.64) (2.65) (4.34) (1.78)
[32,973] [36,775] [24,297] [94,045]
C 59.0 43.3 112.7 63.1
(7.47) (7.92) (16.22) (5.31)
[16,401] [14,914] [7,326] [38,641]
All 23.9 36.5 44.9 34.1
(0.34) (0.52) (0.66) (0.10)
[725,335] [514,240] [571,585] [1,811,160]
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Table 6: Bid-ask spread estimates: financials vs non-financials
For all bonds in the sample, we calculate daily bid-ask spreads from round-trip intermediation chains, as
a percentage of the mid-price and measured in basis points and report the average bid-ask spread across
rating and maturity. ’Safe’ includes AAA and AA+ rated bonds, ’AA’ includes bonds rated AA or AA-,
’C’ includes C, CC, and CCC rated bonds, while the remaining categories follow standard conventions.
Maturities are 0-4 years (short), 4-8 years (medium), and >8 years (long). We report standard errors
clustered at the bond level in parentheses and the number of observations in brackets. Data are from
Academic TRACE and the sample period is 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2015.
Non-financials Financials
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
Safe 13.2 33.1 44.3 16.9 40.1 53.7
(1.18) (3.51) (4.72) (1.09) (3.17) (3.65)
[8,438] [4,963] [7,317] [46,404] [15,496] [13,315]
AA 12.0 28.5 36.9 20.4 44.0 44.7
(0.51) (1.54) (1.78) (0.99) (3.51) (2.97)
[36,619] [17,756] [20,020] [60,400] [22,468] [14,972]
A 15.1 31.0 44.3 18.1 38.4 48.6
(0.40) (0.80) (0.95) (0.58) (1.59) (1.85)
[127,644] [85,390] [120,665] [148,821] [76,495] [66,902]
BBB 22.5 34.9 43.0 32.3 45.0 51.0
(0.60) (0.83) (0.95) (1.16) (2.36) (2.66)
[132,740] [125,654] [191,056] [59,846] [38,439] [43,402]
BB 33.7 32.7 41.0 54.7 40.0 55.6
(1.26) (1.35) (2.20) (3.05) (3.81) (6.78)
[39,009] [65,004] [54,842] [16,040] [10,886] [7,471]
B 44.0 41.9 51.8 40.9 41.1 33.7
(3.17) (3.06) (5.02) (5.79) (8.37) (8.88)
[27,285] [32,100] [21,662] [5,688] [4,675] [2,635]
C 40.8 36.0 110.7 138.2 101.2 175.9
(9.26) (9.08) (17.90) (14.35) (16.36) (44.87)
[12,521] [13,314] [6,692] [3,880] [1,600] [634]
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Table 7: Bid-ask spread estimates for retail-sized transactions
This table presents average bid-spreads for retail-sized transactions i.e. transactions with a trade size less
than $100,000. For all bonds in the sample, we calculate daily bid-ask spreads from round-trip intermediation
chains, as a percentage of the mid-price and measured in basis points and report the average bid-ask spread
across rating and maturity. ’Safe’ includes AAA and AA+ rated bonds, ’AA’ includes bonds rated AA or
AA-, ’C’ includes C, CC, and CCC rated bonds, while the remaining categories follow standard conventions.
Maturities are 0-4 years (short), 4-8 years (medium), and >8 years (long). We report standard errors
clustered at the bond level in parentheses and the number of observations in brackets. Data are from
Academic TRACE and the sample period is 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2015.
Maturity
Short Medium Long All
Safe 76.5 151.7 224.7 137.0
(2.38) (5.16) (5.78) (3.71)
[76,104] [47,445] [44,584] [168,133]
AA 81.9 132.0 210.4 113.1
(1.98) (5.46) (9.63) (3.23)
[123,172] [53,935] [29,030] [206,137]
A 82.2 134.4 219.8 129.3
(1.15) (2.13) (3.98) (1.93)
[361,684] [227,036] [175,531] [764,251]
BBB 116.3 164.2 237.9 160.8
(1.41) (2.46) (4.17) (1.93)
[281,643] [168,144] [154,952] [604,739]
BB 181.7 202.0 280.1 209.0
(2.38) (4.95) (7.60) (3.13)
[108,945] [48,572] [46,627] [204,144]
B 227.1 250.2 318.8 255.2
(6.24) (10.16) (11.05) (5.41)
[38,772] [21,464] [18,878] [79,114]
C 369.9 369.2 454.5 388.4
(12.55) (20.04) (24.67) (9.84)
[24,314] [9,165] [9,463] [42,942]
All 114.3 158.1 240.0 155.6
(1.22) (1.78) (2.86) (2.05)
[1,014,634] [575,761] [479,065] [2,069,460]
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Table 8: Correlations between empirical measures
This table shows the correlations between measures of inventory, asymmetric information, search
costs, dealer network, and dealer concentration. The measures are defined in Section 4. We
combine data from Academic TRACE, Mergent FISD, COMPUSTAT, and CRSP. We report
standard errors in parentheses and the convention for p-values is: * when p < 0.05, and ** when
p < 0.01. The sample period covers 1 August 2004 to 30 June 2015.
BV AI CT DN DC
Bond volatility (BV) 1
Asymmetric information (AI) 0.315∗∗ 1
(0.001)
Chain time (CT) 0.050∗∗ −0.005∗∗ 1
(0.001) (0.001)
Dealer network (DN) 0.08∗∗ 0.028∗∗ 0.131∗∗ 1
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Dealer concentration (DC) −0.025∗∗ −0.016∗∗ −0.091∗∗ −0.039∗∗ 1
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
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Table 10: Estimated relation between bid-ask spreads and empirical measures
For our measures of inventory costs (bond return volatility), search costs (chain time), and bargaining (dealer
concentration) we calculate predicted bid-ask spreads as follows. We run the regressionBAit = β0+β1pit+it
where BAit is the bid-ask spread of bond i on day t and pit the corresponding proxy and then calculate
a predicted spread as BˆAit = βˆ0 + βˆ1pit. This table presents summary statistics from the regression. We
combine data from Academic TRACE and Mergent FISD. The sample period covers 1 August 2004 to 30
June 2015 for inventory, 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2015 for search costs, and 1 August 2002 to 30 June 2015
for dealer concentration. Standard errors are clustered at the bond level with t-statistics in parenthesis.
The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.05 and ∗∗ when p < 0.01.
Bond volatility Chain time Dealer
concentration
βˆ0 9.067
∗∗ 29.181∗∗ 27.305∗∗
(15.65) (109.13) (46.34)
βˆ1 278.124
∗∗ 0.658∗∗ 20.937∗∗
(27.98) (22.41) (19.60)
N 982,078 1,811,160 1,709,744
Adj. R2 0.024 0.002 0.001
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Table 11: Dealer inventory - predicted bid-ask spreads
This table shows average predicted bid-ask spreads from inventory models measured in basis points as a
function of bond rating and maturity. For an actual bid-ask spread for bond i on day t, BAit, we calculate
a predicted bid-ask spread by estimating the regression
BAit = β0 + β1σit−1 + it
where σit−1 is the volatility of bond i at the end of the previous month, and calculate a predicted bid-ask
spread as BˆAit = βˆ0 + βˆ1σit−1. We report the average difference between actual and predicted bid-ask
spreads in brackets. ’Safe’ includes AAA and AA+ rated bonds, ’AA’ includes bonds rated AA or AA-
, ’C’ includes C, CC, and CCC rated bonds, while the remaining categories follow standard conventions.
Maturities are 0-4 years (short), 4-8 years (medium), and >8 years (long). Data are from Academic TRACE,
Mergent FISD, and WRDS Bond Returns. The sample period covers 1 August 2004 to 30 June 2015.
Maturity
Short Medium Long All
Safe 17.4 26.2 43.3 23.7
[-0.42] [15.33] [10.98] [4.73]
AA 19.3 32.3 38.7 24.2
[-2.06] [19.35] [7.30] [2.87]
A 19.4 31.0 43.8 27.6
[-4.04] [6.34] [8.30] [1.15]
BBB 23.2 33.1 45.0 32.8
[-1.69] [3.96] [5.01] [2.03]
BB 33.8 40.1 50.6 40.6
[-0.35] [-8.70] [3.73] [-2.50]
B 39.5 49.3 55.9 47.0
[-10.23] [-12.97] [-12.05] [-11.66]
C 79.3 79.8 75.5 78.8
[-36.86] [-41.82] [14.91] [-29.00]
All 23.5 35.8 45.9 32.2
[-3.65] [1.57] [5.63] [0.00]
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Table 12: Search costs - predicted bid-ask spreads
This table shows average predicted bid-ask spreads implied by search costs measured in basis points as a
function of bond rating and maturity. For an actual bid-ask spread for bond i on day t, BAit, we calculate
a predicted bid-ask spread by estimating the regression
BAit = β0 + β1TIMEit + it
where TIMEit is the time it takes to complete the round-trip chain for bond i that starts on day t, and
calculate a predicted bid-ask spread as BˆAit = βˆ0 + βˆ1TIMEit. We report the average difference between
actual and predicted bid-ask spreads in brackets. ’Safe’ includes AAA and AA+ rated bonds, ’AA’ includes
bonds rated AA or AA-, ’C’ includes C, CC, and CCC rated bonds, while the remaining categories follow
standard conventions. Maturities are 0-4 years (short), 4-8 years (medium), and >8 years (long). Data are
from Academic TRACE and Mergent FISD. The sample period covers 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2015.
Maturity
Short Medium Long All
Safe 34.1 35.1 35.3 34.6
[-17.77] [3.23] [15.07] [-6.23]
AA 33.7 34.8 34.3 34.1
[-16.39] [2.37] [5.90] [-7.48]
A 33.7 34.8 34.7 34.3
[-16.98] [-0.30] [11.17] [-4.23]
BBB 33.4 34.0 34.3 33.9
[-7.85] [3.35] [10.18] [2.41]
BB 33.0 34.2 34.2 33.9
[6.86] [-0.50] [8.53] [4.51]
B 33.2 34.2 34.2 33.8
[10.30] [7.56] [15.56] [10.59]
C 33.2 34.3 33.3 33.7
[30.61] [8.66] [83.01] [32.07]
All 33.6 34.4 34.4 34.1
[-10.41] [2.01] [11.40] [0.00]
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Table 13: Bargaining - predicted bid-ask spreads
This table shows average predicted bid-ask spreads implied by dealer bargaining power measured in basis
points as a function of bond rating and maturity. For an actual bid-ask spread for bond i on day t, BAit,
we calculate a predicted bid-ask spread by estimating the regression
BAit = β0 + β1DCit + it
where DCit is the dealer concentration for bond i at day t, and calculate a predicted bid-ask spread as
BˆAit = βˆ0 + βˆ1DCit. We report the average difference between actual and predicted bid-ask spreads in
brackets. ’Safe’ includes AAA and AA+ rated bonds, ’AA’ includes bonds rated AA or AA-, ’C’ includes
C, CC, and CCC rated bonds, while the remaining categories follow standard conventions. Maturities are
0-4 years (short), 4-8 years (medium), and >8 years (long). Data are from Academic TRACE and Mergent
FISD. The sample period covers 1 August 2002 to 30 June 2015.
Maturity
Short Medium Long All
Safe 33.6 32.9 32.4 33.2
[-17.45] [6.28] [20.09] [-4.66]
AA 33.9 33.5 33.8 33.8
[-16.82] [4.75] [7.57] [-7.24]
A 34.6 34.1 34.1 34.3
[-18.06] [0.84] [12.92] [-4.28]
BBB 35.6 34.9 34.0 34.8
[-10.32] [2.79] [11.83] [1.84]
BB 35.2 33.6 33.7 34.1
[4.62] [0.38] [11.18] [5.02]
B 34.8 33.4 34.2 34.1
[8.64] [9.26] [16.21] [10.81]
C 34.3 33.0 35.1 34.0
[30.07] [10.82] [83.43] [32.68]
All 34.7 34.1 34.0 34.3
[-11.77] [2.81] [13.31] [0.00]
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Table 14: Asymmetric information - predicted bid-ask spreads
This table shows daily predicted bid-ask spreads from our asymmetric information model measured in basis
points as a function of bond rating and maturity. We report the average difference between actual and
predicted bid-ask spreads in brackets. ’Safe’ includes AAA and AA+ rated bonds, ’AA’ includes bonds
rated AA or AA-, ’C’ includes C, CC, and CCC rated bonds, while the remaining categories follow standard
conventions. Maturities are 0-4 years (short), 4-8 years (medium), and >8 years (long). Data are from
Mergent FISD, COMPUSTAT, and CRSP. The sample period covers 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2015.
Maturity
Short Medium Long All
Safe 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
[19.49] [41.59] [53.81] [32.60]
AA 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
[19.00] [44.22] [45.98] [29.81]
A 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.1
[17.76] [38.46] [48.43] [32.24]
BBB 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.5
[26.05] [41.06] [48.83] [38.67]
BB 0.7 1.4 1.9 1.3
[38.99] [37.15] [44.70] [40.13]
B 2.7 3.1 6.2 3.8
[44.01] [38.07] [52.39] [44.07]
C 5.1 7.3 11.1 7.5
[74.41] [29.67] [107.46] [66.63]
All 0.3 0.7 1.0 0.6
[23.29] [39.48] [49.34] [35.71]
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Table 15: Dealer network - predicted bid-ask spreads
This table shows daily predicted bid-ask spreads implied by the dealer network measured in basis points
as a function of bond rating and maturity. We report the average difference between actual and predicted
bid-ask spreads in brackets. ’Safe’ includes AAA and AA+ rated bonds, ’AA’ includes bonds rated AA or
AA-, ’C’ includes C, CC, and CCC rated bonds, while the remaining categories follow standard conventions.
Maturities are 0-4 years (short), 4-8 years (medium), and >8 years (long). Data are from Academic TRACE
and Mergent FISD. The sample period covers 1 July 2002 to 30 June 2015.
Maturity
Short Medium Long All
Safe 37.0 40.7 36.4 37.6
[-20.61] [-2.36] [14.05] [-9.26]
AA 36.5 36.3 29.3 35.0
[-19.23] [0.85] [10.89] [-8.42]
A 34.8 34.9 31.1 33.7
[-18.09] [-0.42] [14.70] [-3.69]
BBB 36.5 33.9 31.9 33.9
[-10.96] [3.45] [12.57] [2.37]
BB 39.1 32.4 35.1 35.1
[0.73] [1.38] [7.71] [3.23]
B 38.0 33.9 35.0 35.6
[5.46] [7.90] [14.83] [8.83]
C 44.3 35.1 42.2 40.4
[19.53] [7.83] [74.12] [25.36]
All 36.3 34.5 32.3 34.5
[-13.19] [1.94] [13.57] [-0.45]
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Table 16: Predicted bid-ask spreads - panel regression
This table presents coefficient estimates using actual bid-ask spreads from institutional-sized transactions
(trade sizes greater than or equal to $100,000) measured in basis points as the dependent variable. We
combine data from Academic TRACE, Mergent FISD, WRDS Bond Returns, COMPUSTAT, and CRSP.
The sample period covers 1 August 2004 to 30 June 2015. Standard errors are clustered at the bond level
with t–statistics in parenthesis. The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.05 and ∗∗ when p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All Bonds
Bond volatility 309.452∗∗ 269.186∗∗
(25.36) (25.90)
Asymmetric information 5.801∗∗ 1.530∗∗
(7.23) (2.83)
Chain time 0.701∗∗ 0.298∗∗
(13.77) (6.47)
Dealer network 0.807∗∗ 0.734∗∗
(41.35) (44.33)
Dealer concentration 10.378∗∗ 19.088∗∗
(4.87) (10.21)
N 616,887 616,887 616,887 616,887 616,887 616,887
Adj. R2 0.030 0.005 0.002 0.035 0.000 0.060
Panel B: Investment Grade
Bond volatility 367.494∗∗ 293.469∗∗
(36.28) (31.50)
Asymmetric information 30.172∗∗ 14.925∗∗
(7.82) (6.90)
Chain time 0.777∗∗ 0.346∗∗
(21.31) (12.20)
Dealer network 0.730∗∗ 0.637∗∗
(40.09) (49.03)
Dealer concentration 5.461∗∗ 11.851∗∗
(2.87) (9.52)
N 520,680 520,680 520,680 520,680 520,680 520,680
Adj. R2 0.061 0.026 0.005 0.050 0.000 0.107
Panel C: Speculative Grade
Bond volatility 229.035∗∗ 186.636∗∗
(7.87) (7.09)
Asymmetric information 3.122∗∗ 1.619∗∗
(5.28) (3.12)
Chain time 0.341 -0.083
(1.37) (-0.35)
Dealer network 1.175∗∗ 1.138∗∗
(18.55) (18.58)
Dealer concentration 39.984∗∗ 51.784∗∗
(4.77) (6.91)
N 96,207 96,207 96,207 96,207 96,207 96,207
Adj. R2 0.007 0.002 0.000 0.024 0.001 0.031
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Table 17: Predicted bid-ask spreads - panel regression for retail-sized transactions
This table presents coefficient estimates using actual bid-ask spreads from retail-sized transactions (trade
sizes less than $100,000) measured in basis points as the dependent variable. We combine data from
Academic TRACE, Mergent FISD, WRDS Bond Returns, COMPUSTAT, and CRSP. The sample period
covers 1 August 2004 to 30 June 2015. Standard errors are clustered at the bond level with t–statistics in
parenthesis. The convention for p-values is: ∗ when p < 0.05 and ∗∗ when p < 0.01.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: All Bonds
Bond volatility 984.918∗∗ 652.121∗∗
(37.64) (30.48)
Asymmetric information 44.204∗∗ 22.835∗∗
(8.06) (8.14)
Chain time -0.173∗∗ -0.505∗∗
(-2.67) (-10.60)
Dealer network 0.964∗∗ 0.719∗∗
(74.42) (80.44)
Dealer concentration 130.806∗∗ 54.130∗∗
(12.41) (8.44)
N 851,858 851,858 851,858 851,858 851,858 851,858
Adj. R2 0.156 0.063 0.000 0.150 0.007 0.251
Panel B: Investment Grade
Bond volatility 924.276∗∗ 613.422∗∗
(35.27) (28.11)
Asymmetric information 82.270∗∗ 34.955∗∗
(14.41) (11.63)
Chain time -0.346∗∗ -0.590∗∗
(-5.86) (-15.37)
Dealer network 0.879∗∗ 0.668∗∗
(68.61) (72.67)
Dealer concentration 141.405∗∗ 66.114∗∗
(12.55) (10.11)
N 732,280 732,280 732,280 732,280 732,280 732,280
Adj. R2 0.191 0.075 0.000 0.195 0.013 0.314
Panel C: Speculative Grade
Bond volatility 924.177∗∗ 656.805∗∗
(15.96) (13.96)
Asymmetric information 27.347∗∗ 18.952∗∗
(7.16) (6.84)
Chain time 1.308∗∗ 0.128
(4.52) (0.49)
Dealer network 1.039∗∗ 0.889∗∗
(38.42) (40.66)
Dealer concentration -60.138∗ 5.481
(-2.48) (0.32)
N 119,578 119,578 119,578 119,578 119,578 119,578
Adj. R2 0.063 0.040 0.001 0.061 0.001 0.125
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Table 18: Bid-ask spread estimates: matched vs. unmatched chains
For all bonds in the sample, we separate round-trip intermediation chains into those completed within one
minute (matched) and those with completion times more than one minute (unmatched). We then calculate
daily bid-ask spreads from round-trip intermediations for the two groups separately, as a percentage of the
mid-price and measured in basis points and report the average bid-ask spread across rating and maturity.
The Safe rating bucket includes AAA and AA+ rated bonds and the AA rating bucket includes bonds rated
AA or AA-. The Short, Medium, and Long maturity buckets denote 0-4 years, 4-8 years, and >8 years. We
report standard errors clustered at the bond level in parentheses and the number of observations in squared
brackets. We combine data from Academic TRACE with Mergent FISD and the sample period covers 1
July 2002 to 30 June 2015.
Matched Unmatched
Short Medium Long All Short Medium Long All
Safe 4.0 8.4 9.2 5.9 18.6 42.1 54.8 31.8
(0.22) (0.82) (1.09) (0.30) (1.10) (2.69) (3.05) (1.28)
[10,166] [3,072] [3,519] [16,757] [47,845] [18,653] [18,979] [85,477]
AA 4.0 6.0 5.9 4.8 19.8 42.2 47.1 30.6
(0.17) (0.44) (0.52) (0.19) (0.77) (2.41) (1.81) (0.93)
[19,192] [6,960] [7,367] [33,519] [83,489] [35,373] [29,853] [148,715]
A 4.8 7.3 9.7 6.8 18.9 38.6 51.0 33.8
(0.13) (0.27) (0.40) (0.15) (0.41) (0.98) (0.98) (0.50)
[50,527] [25,730] [31,043] [107,300] [239,364] [143,634] [166,868] [549,866]
BBB 9.4 11.4 11.0 10.6 29.1 42.8 50.3 41.4
(0.30) (0.45) (0.42) (0.25) (0.63) (0.97) (1.01) (0.55)
[38,681] [34,438] [47,988] [121,107] [163,629] [139,782] [204,334] [507,745]
BB 15.3 14.9 18.4 16.1 47.3 38.2 48.0 44.0
(0.57) (0.61) (0.86) (0.42) (1.56) (1.57) (2.46) (1.17)
[14,521] [18,313] [13,888] [46,722] [43,916] [63,125] [53,389] [160,430]
B 22.0 22.5 30.0 24.1 50.2 46.9 53.3 49.7
(1.01) (1.41) (1.91) (0.83) (3.81) (3.62) (5.72) (2.46)
[9,230] [9,103] [5,523] [23,856] [26,237] [30,850] [20,859] [77,946]
C 39.6 47.3 59.2 46.1 69.7 42.1 129.4 69.7
(2.32) (3.54) (4.83) (1.98) (11.16) (10.29) (21.97) (7.42)
[4,711] [3,363] [2,007] [10,081] [13,321] [12,994] [6,034] [32,349]
All 9.1 12.7 13.0 11.3 26.1 41.0 51.4 38.4
(0.20) (0.33) (0.35) (0.03) (0.44) (0.70) (0.80) (0.15)
[147,028] [100,979] [111,335] [359,342] [617,801] [444,411] [500,316] [1,562,528]
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